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Overview 
This is the report on one of the Work Packages of the Bikeoff 2 project, funded by AHRC/EPSRC 
Design for the 21st Century. :3$ LV DERXW µ6WDQGDUG generation through application of CCO 
IUDPHZRUN¶ 7KH VWDQGDUGV LQ TXHVWLRQ DSSO\ WR VHFXUH ELF\FOH SDUNLQJ IDFLOLWLHV CCO ± the 
Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity1 ± is a conceptual framework for providing a unified 
theoretical map of immediate causes of criminal events, and an equivalent map of preventive 
interventions intended to block, weaken or divert those causes. The interventions can be created 
and implemented through products, places and communications which are deliberately designed 
to influence the causes of crime.  In the present case the events and the interventions relate to 
bicycle parking, but the framework is generic.  
The output of WPA2 is intended to complement guidance obtained from a compilation of existing 
secure cycle parking experience, under WPA1, as modified by public contributions from a user 
Wiki. In fact, the wider aim, of which WPA2 is a preparation, is to compare design 
recommendations obtained from the two sources, the one theoretical, the other experiential. More 
details are in the Introduction, below. The relevant section of the project application (April 2006) 
states: 
7KLVSURMHFWDLPVWRJHQHUDWHDµ6HFXUHG%\'HVLJQ´VWDQGDUGIRUELF\FOHSDUNLQJDQG
LQ VR GRLQJ WHVW (NEORP¶V PRGHO RI WKH µ&RQMXQFWLRQ RI &ULPLQDO 2SSRUWXQLW\¶ DV DQ
appropriate framework for standard generation.  To deliver this research the work 
packages will identify and generate standards, using different methodologies, in order to 
HYDOXDWH WKH HIILFDF\ RI WKH VWDQGDUGV DQG WKH µILWQHVV IRU WDVN¶ RI WKH methodologies 
                                                          
1
 Ekblom (2000), and see www.designagainstcrime.com/web/crimeframeworks . 
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that generated them. The standards we generate will be combined to provide a definitive 
µ6HFXUHG %\ 'HVLJQ¶ VWDQGDUG IRU F\FOH SDUNLQJ 7KH GHILQLWLYH VWDQGDUG ZLOO EH
HYDOXDWHGDQGµHYROYHG¶E\SRWHQWLDOXVHUVVXFKDVHQJLQHHUVGHVLJQHUV cycle parking 
specifiers and providers and cyclists (users of that the facilities the standard seek to 
inform).   
The present report describes the process of adapting the CCO framework ± quite significantly as it 
transpired ± to fit in with the demands of WKHGHVLJQSURFHVV DQGGHVLJQHUV¶ZD\VRI WKLQNLQJ. 
The purpose of the adapted framework was twofold:  first, to develop a systematic method of 
crime risk analysis that was suited to the design field; and second, to translate the identified risks 
into the design recommendations which constitute the output of this work package. 
Part 1 introduces the approach to crime prevention evolving within the Design Against Crime 
5HVHDUFK &HQWUH DW &HQWUDO 6DLQW 0DUWLQ¶V &ROOHJH RI $UW 	 'HVLJQ 8QLYHUVLW\ RI WKH $UWs, 
London; and in particular, how this approach involves activity at a number of different levels, 
from preventive operations aimed at tackling crime at specific sites to developing innovative 
capacity to transfer to designers. It then describes the Bikeoff project within this context, sets the 
scene for the current Work Package, discusses the concept of standards and guidelines, and 
UHYLHZVVRXUFHVRINQRZOHGJHIRUGHYHORSLQJGHVLJQHUV¶FDSDFLW\, including CCO (as DµGLJHVW¶RI
theory) and experience (as from reviews of existing designs). 
Part 2 sets out the CCO approach to crime prevention and design as it was at the start of the 
current project ± CCO Classic. It first shows how CCO originated as a means of unifying crime 
prevention theories and classifying diverse practice, and ended up as a dual conceptual framework 
for mapping out the immediate causes of criminal events and the corresponding intervention 
principles that serve to prevent them.  Key ideas are introduced covering Situational Crime 
Prevention, causal mechanisms (how crimes happen and how interventions work) and the 
importance of context. This is followed by an account of how in principle CCO can guide Design 
Against Crime and why it seems well-suited to the task; and how it came to be used, and tested, in 
the Bikeoff project.  
That process of bringing a theoretical criminological framework together with design and 
designers in fact caused CCO to evolve in several significant ways, documented next. These 
modifications included combining CCO witK DGGLWLRQDO FRQFHSWV VXFK DV FULPH µVFULSWV¶ DQG
moving from the consideration of crime in general to that of different kinds of crime risk, handled 
by the Misdeeds & Security framework. (These developments have more general implications for 
some of the traditional tenets and assumptions of Situational Crime Prevention.) To distinguish 
this new version from CCO Classic, this became known as CCO Dynamic. During the 
development process it also became clear that the scope of the Work Package, originally aimed at 
producing CCO standards, in fact would only meaningfully deliver CCO-based guidance.  
Part 3 describes how CCO Dynamic was applied to the task of generating guidance for securing 
bike parking furniture and facilities. It covers the overall procedure for generating design 
guidance using CCO Dynamic;  the development of the underlying framework for analysing the 
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risks; the development of the framework for the response to that risk, namely for design 
guidance; and finally the complete prescriptive design guidance output.  
Part 4 supplies a brief conclusion. How CCO performed in generating guidance for bike parking 
VHFXULW\LQFRPSDULVRQZLWKWKHGHVLJQHUV¶H[SHULHQFHVR-FDOOHGµ%HVWRI%UHHGFRPSLODWLRQLV
reported in a subsequent document (WP4). 
At this point it should be stated what this document is, and is not. It is an account of a 
developmental process based on the interaction of design and crime science (Smith and Tilley 
2005), which evolved as it unfolded and iterated, leading to these intellectual products:  
a) Crime risk analysis for bike parking furniture and facilities, with emphasis on design and 
contextual issues  
b) Based on that analysis, design guidance on functional considerations for secure bike 
parking furniture and facilities  
c) Procedures for undertaking the two analyses  
d) A conceptual framework to support those procedures and generate those intellectual 
products  
Production of the design guidance is sufficient for the present purpose of µEHQFK-testing¶ the CCO 
framework (as it has evolved during this project) as a source of ideas to stimulate and shape 
design; and for subsequent comparison with guidance based on practitioner experience.  Although 
the design subject in this project ± secure bicycle parking ± is a narrow one, the intention has 
always been to ensure the framework and procedures are generic enough to be adapted to tackle 
any kind of crime and its prevention through design.  
However, the document, and more particularly the intellectual products it contains, are not in the 
form of user-friendly embodiments of the frameworks, the procedures or the specific design 
advice. Although various moves are made in this direction as the opportunity has arisen, the 
framework and procedures in their current state should be regarded as prototypes on a test rig, 
rather than anything that can immediately be handed over to developers of design guidance and 
standards, or users of same. Converting them into usable applications would require a separate 
project involving further conceptual tidying-up, graphic design and development and testing of 
interactive IT-based guidance.   
A slide presentation summarising this report, Risk analysis design guide: Using theory to analyse 
crime risks and generate design guidance for secure bike parking is available on 
www.bikeoff.org  as is an earlier one establishing some of the theory, Thinking Thief:   
Crime Frameworks for Design Against Crime. 
Acknowledgements 
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1. Introduction  
The Design Against Crime Research Centre (DACRC) at University of the Arts London aims to 
use the processes and products of design to reduce all kinds of crime and promote community 
safety whilst improving quality of life.2  The reduction is to be achieved by crime prevention, 
ZKLFKFDQEHGHILQHGDVµintervening in the causes of criminal events to reduce their risk, whether 
the prREDELOLW\RI WKHLU RFFXUUHQFHRU WKHLUKDUPIXO FRQVHTXHQFHV¶3  Some of those causes and 
consequences reside in, or act through, the design of products, places and systems; design, too, 
can contribute to their prevention, alleviation and mitigation. 
Developing, building and applying the capacity for design against crime 
DACRC aims to connect to the practice of designers, and to the world of µRUGLQDU\¶ FULPH
prevention practitioners and other users of design, on several levels. These range from the most 
local and tangible to the most generic and globally applicable.  
 Operational crime prevention involves undertaking specific crime preventive projects 
ourselves or alongside partners, for example to reduce bike theft in Brighton & Hove. 
 Building operational capacity among crime prevention practitioners involves 
manufacturing, marketing, or otherwise making available, our anti-crime products (such as 
bike stands), or anti-crime communication designs (such as stickers advising on secure bike 
parking practice), so crime prevention practitioners and designers can use them to tackle crime 
in their own localities.  
 Developing operational capacity involves using our own design capacity and knowledge of 
crime and its prevention, to create marketable products with secure functionality which can 
then be made available to practitioners for operational use as described above.  
 Building innovative capacity among designers involves spreading our researched 
knowledge, conceptual/theoretical frameworks and design-process models, to designers so 
they in turn can develop and build operational capacity to supply to crime prevention 
practitioners. (There is also a subsidiary aim to develop the design mindset and innovation 
skills of ordinary operational crime prevention practitioners themselves, so they are not 
PHUHO\DWWKHUHFHLYLQJHQGRIRWKHUV¶LGHDVDQGSURGXFWVKey to this area of our work are the 
µGHVLJQ UHVRXUFHV¶ LQWHQGHG WR WUDQVIHU RXU UHVHDUFK NQRZOHGJH WR GHVLJQHUV WR LQIRUP
empower and motivate them, to undertake DAC themselves.  
 Developing innovative capacity Before this innovative capacity can be transferred, of course, 
it has to be created. This involves locating, interpreting and presenting requisite knowledge of 
                                                          
2
 www.designagainstcrime.com  
3
 www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/37    
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crime and its prevention, and creating or improving conceptual and theoretical frameworks 
and process models to support innovation in reducing crime.  
The Bikeoff project as a whole is about developing and building innovative and operational 
capacity.  It comprises three work packages. 
 WP A covers the development of design standards and methodologies, hence is centred on the 
domain of developing operational and innovative capacity.  
 WP B focuses on the development of a design resource for education, so its emphasis is on 
building these capacities among professional designers and crime prevention practitioners 
using design processes and products.  
 WP C involves evolution of the bikeoff.org website both for building operational and 
innovative capacity through dissemination; and for getting ongoing feedback and new 
experience from bike users, designers and other stakeholders, which can contribute to 
continual redevelopment of capacity. All this is (to be) accomplished by facilitating user 
evaluation of design standards, and to provide geographic locational data for bike users linked 
to bicycle security in addition to a database and search facilities providing access to 
qualitative user experience and evaluation.   
Capacity for DAC can be transferred to designers (and crime prevention practitioners who use the 
fruits of design) in several ways. Two such ways are standards and guidelines. Standards tend to 
be closely-specified requirements and may be technical or constructional (µmaterials should be 
PDQJDQHVH VWHHO«¶ RU performance-EDVHG µWKH ELF\FOH ORFN VKRXOG EH capable of resisting 
picking for 5 minutes¶Performance standards FRXOGEHH[SOLFLWO\µIXWXUH-SURRIHG¶HJE\DGGLQJ
µ«E\ FXUUHQWO\ DYDLODEOHKDQG WRROV¶ ± see Ekblom 2005a).   Guidelines are less specific than 
standards and do not contain quantitative or qualitative benchmarks ± rather, they draw attention 
to particular issues and considerations and may suggest ways of addressing them (for example 
µWKHELF\FOHORFNVKRXOGUHVLVWUHPRYDOE\SLFNLQJRUIRUFLQJ¶ 
Performance standards offer greater design freedom than technical standards; guidelines even 
more.  Tight specification can be important ± particularly when based on research evidence of 
what works, that is fairly narrow.4 But design freedom is equally vital for those designers willing 
and able to embrace it because crime, the requirements and priorities of users to prevent it, and 
what preventive methods are effective, all change from context to context, and over time. This is 
not least because of social and technological change and adaptive offenders who can be relied on 
to make countermoves ± so that what works now, may not always do so in future (Ekblom 1997, 
1999, 2005a). The importance of developing, building and operationally applying innovative 
capacity for crime prevention rests on the perpetual need for preventers to out-innovate offenders.   
Sources of knowledge for capacity development 
                                                          
4 .QRZOHGJHRIµZKDWZRUNV¶LVQRWDOZD\VQDUURZKRZHYHU(FNDUJXHVWKDWWKHHYLGHQFHEDVHLQVLWXDWLRQDO
crime prevention is best considered in terms of generic principles (the full quote is on p91 of this report).  Ekblom 
(2002, 2007a), and Tilley (1993) argue along similar lines.  
6 
 
There are (at least) four sources of knowledge for developing operational and innovative capacity 
for prevention of bicycle crime through design standards:  formalised past experience, current 
user experience, empirical research (both conventional academic and practice-led) and theory. 
Given that there is only a limited body of formal research evidence specifically on what works in 
reducing cycle crime (summarised in COPS bikes guide± Johnson et al. 2008), that leaves three 
complementary sources to contribute to the development of design standards and methodologies under 
WP A. 7KH µ%HVW RI %UHHG¶ approach (WP A1) has sought to glean, and combine, the widest 
possible range of past experience from existing standards and guidelines for bike parking. The 
current approach (WP A2) is a parallel, alternative exercise based initially around a theoretical 
conceptual framework for understanding both the causes of crime and the corresponding 
interventions of crime prevention ± the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity (CCO). User 
consultation (WP A3) follows this current stage of work, and the final stage (WP A4) compares 
and synthesises all sources possibly contributing to a final standard under the UK Secured By 
Design scheme.  
In the course of this sequence, one objective is to test out CCO as an appropriate framework for 
standard generation. Can a theoretical framework derived from experience and research  in 
generic crime prevention, albeit one that was designed to be comprehensive and complex, 
generate as rich and inclusive a range of security considerations as a worldwide trawl of the fruits 
of GHVLJQHUV¶experience? (Research that was practitioner-oriented academic research as opposed 
to practice-led?) Can it identify and fill gaps in the knowledge supplied by experience? Can it 
produce outputs which are in a form suitable to sit alongside those of existing design requirements 
and prescriptions? What other knowledge inputs, and reformatting of outputs, are needed to make 
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2. The CCO approach to crime prevention and design  
The starting point: CCO-Classic  
Design Against Crime sits largely within the approach known as Situational Crime Prevention 
(SCP),5 which takes RIIHQGHUV¶criminal motivation and propensity as given and seeks instead to 
reduce the likelihood of criminal events by altering the immediate situation criminals find 
themselves in. A major theoretical and practical focus6 is on influencing how criminals 
experience the situation, in terms of risk of harm (getting shamed, beaten up or arrested and 
punished), effort and reward, and consequently how they make a broadly rational choice whether 
or not to commit this crime here and now.  A second focus7 is on how offenders encounter crime 
WDUJHWV LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI µFDSDEOH JXDUGLDQV¶ LQ WKHLU HYHU\GD\ routine activities or deliberate 
foraging. A third8 is how the environment helps to support such routine or deliberate encounters 
in spatial terms, predicting why crime and disorder should cluster in some places and not others 
on the basis of offenderV¶ URXWLQH DFWLYLWLHV DQG PRELOLW\ KRZ WKHVH LQIOXHQFH the places they 
frequent and consequently their awareness of opportunities for crime and their availability to 
exploit them. A fourth is a lesser-known or appreciated offshoot of situational prevention, known 
as crime precipitation.9 Here, the situation is seen not just as providing opportunity, but 
awakening or channelling attention, motivation and emotion: provoking, prompting, pressuring 
and permitting the offender who then if suitably motivated takes advantage of the available 
opportunity as previously described. 
The Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity was an attempt, starting in 1994, to bring these 
situational theories, and other theories on the offender side, into a single, consistent framework. 
The aim was to have a unitary language and a dual map of a) the causes of criminal events as 
these operate in the immediate crime situation; and b) interventions in those causes stated in 
terms of the principles underlying all methods of crime prevention. CCO pays more attention to 
offenders than does SCP, both because it attempts wider coverage of prevention as a whole, and 
because it was felt a better understanding of offender capability, motivation and emotion would 
lead to better situational prevention. CCO also distinguishes between a generalised environment 
of crime and a specific enclosure surrounding the target, such as a building or a wall; and 
introduces not just people in crime preventer roles (a wider concept than guardians ± people 
who by their action or presence make crime less likely) but others acting as crime promoters ± 
people who by their action or inaction, deliberately, carelessly or accidentally make crime more 
likely. Examples of promoters could be the careless householder who fails to shut the window on 
                                                          
5 Eg Clarke (1997), Ekblom (1998) and see also www.popcenter.org/library/reading/?p=2  
6
 Rational Choice Theory ± Cornish and Clarke (1986). 
7
 Routine Activities Theory ± Cohen and Felson (1979). 
8 Environmental criminology ± pattern theory ± Brantingham and Brantingham (2008). 
9
 Precipitation ± Wortley (2001). 
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leaving for work; the youth who eggs his mate on to damage street furniture; or the fence of 
stolen goods.  Included among the offender-based causes are resources to avoid crime (such as 
ability to control temper or hold down a rewarding legitimate job) and to commit crime (tools, 
ZHDSRQV SK\VLFDO DQG VRFLDO VNLOOV VXFK DV DELOLW\ WR SDUU\ D µZKDW DUH \RX GRLQJ KHUH"¶
challenge, and emotional factors such as courage and control of guilt).10 The concept of resources 
in fact requires a modification of the SCP concept of opportunity. Traditionally seen as something 
µRXW WKHUH¶ WKDW WKH RIIHQGHU VHL]HV WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ LV DV PXFK GHWHUPLQHG E\ WKH RIIHQGHU¶V
capacity to spot it and to safely and rewardingly exploit it. An open window three floors up is 
only an opportunity to someone with courage, agility and maybe a ladder. 
CCO sets out in total 11 generic immediate causes of criminal events (whether these arise from 
the situation or what the offender brings to the situation from their immediate mood or needs, 
their upbringing, their culture or even their genes); and 11 equivalent families of intervention 
seeking to tackle those causes.  
In one sentence, the causal side of CCO sees a criminal event as happening when an offender 
who is predisposed, ready and capable, encounters, seeks or engineers a situation in which there 
are: a vulnerable and attractive or provocative target; absent crime preventers and perhaps present 
promoters;  an environment which tactically favours and/or motivates offenders more than  
preventers;  and if any enclosure such as a building is present, one which offers inadequate 
protection.  
The preventive side of CCO is simply a matter of blocking, weakening or diverting one or more 
of these 11 causal factors so that the set of necessary conditions for a criminal event to happen are 
no longer complete. This reduces the probability of criminal events happening (total elimination 
is unlikely), and any consequent harm. Essentially, the causes of criminal events are recast (in 
terms of discourse) as generic, functional intervention principles.  
The 11 causal elements and their preventive counterparts are set out in Table 1 and illustrated in 
Figures 1-3. 
                                                          
10
 See Ekblom and Tilley (1999). 
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Table 1 Causes of, and interventions in, criminal and disorderly events:   
the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity  
 
Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
1. Criminality (predisposition to offend) 
Longer-term psychological features of offender  including  
 Aggression 
 Antisocial attitudes 
 Criminal self-image or reputation  
 Habits or standing decisions  
 Drug addiction 
 
 
Reducing criminality through: 
 Early /developmental intervention  - tackling risk and protective factors 
 Remedial intervention  (convicted/ cautioned/ at risk young people) 
 
At various ecological levels especially 
 Family   
 Schools 
 Friends 
 Treatment in prisons, probation and medicine relating to prevention of 
recidivism 
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Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
2. Lack of resources to avoid crime 
Social and intellectual skills to 
 Avoid conflicts 
 Exercise self-control  
 De-escalate fights   
 Earn a legitimate living and achieve esteem and social inclusion 
Supplying skills to avoid crime: 
 Training offenders in social skills 
 Training in practical/ work skills 
 Contacts with preventers - mentors, minders and models 
 
3. Readiness to offend 
Short-WHUPLQIOXHQFHVRQSHRSOH¶VPRRGRUPRWLYDWLRQ 
 Current life circumstances including unemployment or 
homelessness 
 Needing risk, excitement, esteem 
 Recent events such as a domestic argument 
 Being in a particular emotional state such as anger  
 Being disinhibited through alcohol or drugs 
 
 
Reducing readiness to offend 
 Control of disinhibitors eg alcohol 
 Control of stressors/ motivators 
 Tackling debt, unemployment, housing  problems etc 
  Resolving prior conflicts 
 Satisfaction of psychological and social needs legitimately 
 Esteem 
 Inclusion 
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Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
4. Resources for committing crime 
(See Ekblom and Tilley 2000.) These help offenders reduce risk and 
effort, increase reward, control conscience, by exploiting vulnerability 
of target, enclosure and environment, avoiding/ overcoming 
preventers, exploiting promoters, and networking with co-offenders 
 Skills 
 Inside knowledge 
 Repertoire of Modus Operandi 
 Tools 
 Weapons 
 Transport 
 Ability to overcome moral inhibitions 
 Physical strength and social skills for intimidation/deceit 
 Access to trusted network of collaborators (crime promoters) 
 
Restricting resources 
Control of/ screening for/ design of  
 Weapons 
 Tools 
 Information oQWDUJHW¶VDWWUDFWLYHQHVVDQGYXOQHUDELOLW\ 
 Know-how/ MOs  
 
Control of criminal organisations: 
 Recruitment  
 Growth  
 Efficiency 
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Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
5. Decision to commit offence   
2IIHQGHU¶VLPPHGLDWHDQWLFLSDWLRQRIUHVSRQVHWR 
 Risk 
 Effort  
 Reward  
 Conscience 
 Provocation 
And more strategic decisions on whether this kind of crime, or the 
criminal career, are worthwhile 
 
Deterrence 
 Increase perceived risk of getting caught 
 Increase perceived costs of getting caught 
 Formal ± arrest and punishment 
 Informal ± shame 
 Personal ± guilt 
 Discouragement 
 Increase perceived effort  
 Reduce perceived reward  
 
6. Offender presence in situation 
 Routine activities of offender  
 Crime attractors ± motivated to look for crime there (see 
environment, enclosure) 
 Free to enter or circulate in crime situation  
 No detectable traces left 
 
Excluding offenders from crime situation 
 Segregating conflicting groups  
 Closing roads and paths 
 Attracting offenders elsewhere 
 Exclusion of specific offenders 
 Enhancing traceability 
13 
 
Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
7a. Target property 
µ+RWSURGXFW¶&ODUNH2EMHFWVHUYLFHV\VWHPRULQIRUPDWLRQ
that is 
 Concealable 
 Removable 
 Accessible 
 Valuable 
 Enjoyable 
 Disposable 
(Mobile phone = typical example) 
 
Reducing target vulnerability/ attraction 
 Target hardening 
 Concealment 
 Target removal 
 Value reduction  
 Reducing provocativeness  
 Property identification 
14 
 
Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
7b. Target person 
(Passive aspects of person who is the target in him/herself, as with 
revenge or honour assaults, or who becomes target in course of 
robbery of property. Active aspects are covereGXQGHUµSUHYHQWHUVDQG
SURPRWHUV¶ 
 Vulnerable 
 Accessible 
 Provocative (take care over this!) 
 
Reducing target vulnerability/ attraction 
 Target absence/avoidance 
 Reducing provocation (careful) 
 
8. Target enclosure 
Compound, building, room, container, ATM lobby that is 
 Vulnerable to penetration at its entry point or its boundary 
 Has a vulnerable interior  
 Contains attractive and vulnerable targets 
 
Perimeter/ access security 
 Adding enclosure and access 
 Control of perimeter 
 Control of access 
 Screening at entrances/ exits 
 Control of interior 
15 
 
Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
9. Wider environment 
Housing estates, town centres, transport interchanges,   which 
encourage crime because they are: 
Logistically/ tactically favourable for the  offender and for crime 
promoters,  unfavourable for crime preventers 
 Concealment/surveillance (sight / sound) 
 Rationale for legitimately being present ± µFRYHU¶ 
 Escape/pursuit 
 Presence of promoters offering support/ turning blind eye 
 
May attract the offence, or motivate it through the presence of 
 Attractive or vulnerable targets 
 Conflict ± such as a place where rival gangs fight for control over 
drug outlets  
 
Environmental design and management 
 µ'HIHQVLEOHVSDFH¶SULQFLSOHV 
 Aiding surveillance 
 Intelligently planned lighting 
 Setting/ communicating rules  
 Conflict reduction (eg sound insulation) 
16 
 
Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
10. Crime preventers 
Potential victims, strangers, employees, police, probation, prison, 
private security staff, acquaintances, intimates who make crime less 
likely by playing active, or potentially active, roles involving 
 Shaping the situation or influencing the offender in advance of the 
criminal event (concealing phone, locking car doors when driving 
etc) 
 Intervening during the criminal event 
 Reacting after it (to make next event less likely) 
Factors which  
 Alert 
 Motivate and 
 Empower preventers (resources including knowledge, skills, tools, 
eg forensic kit, CCTV) and perhaps  
 Direct them (objectives, standards, regulations) 
 
%RRVWSUHYHQWHUV¶SUHVHQFHFRPSHWHQFH
motivation/responsibility 
 Extra surveillance of enclosed and wider environments  
 Aids for preventers - alarms, CCTV 
 Cultivating/ protecting witnesses and informants  
 Informal social control 
 Formal control 
 Self-protection and avoidance 
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Immediate causes of criminal  event Possible interventions in cause 
11. Crime promoters  
Make crime more likely, by unwittingly, carelessly or deliberately  
 Shaping the situation or influencing the offender (supplying 
ZHDSRQVWRROVRULQIRUPDWLRQLQGXFLQJWKHRIIHQGHU¶VFRRSHUDWLRQ
by illegal threat or reward, promising to buy stolen goods, 
promising to look away (corruption) 
 Intervening during the criminal event (giving encouragement, 
distracting the victim or preventers) 
 Reacting after it (helping dispose of stolen goods and weapons, 
providing an alibi etc) 
Factors which  
 Lull 
 Deter and discourage 
 Hinder promoters including denying them resources 
 
Discouraging/deterring promoters: 
 Naming and shaming 
 Civil/ criminal liability 
 Tackling a criminal subculture 
 Market reduction for stolen goods 
 Procedural controls 
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Figure 1 
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 Figure 2 Figure 3 
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Causal mechanisms ± how crimes happen and how interventions work ± in context 
Both causes of crime, and interventions in those causes, are best understood in terms of causal 
mechanisms.11 Mechanisms take the description of interventions beyond the functional, and 
postulate how something works causally HJµF\FOHVWDQGUHVLVWVGDmage E\ULJLGFRQVWUXFWLRQ¶), 
but they are not necessarily fully technical (rigidity being a construction principle rather than 
something as specific as, say µ«ZLWK EXFNOH-UHVLVWDQW ULEV«¶ or even µ«XVLQJ LQWHULRU FURVV-
EUDFHV¶). The operation of preventive mechanisms has been shown to be highly context-
dependent. Much as a match causes fire only when properly struck, on paper, that is dry, and 
sheltered from wind, preventive mechanisms can be delicate and usually require a suite of 
conditions to be met before they can be successfully triggered. This often involves human 
perception, performance and choice. For example, the most secure cycle stand in the world will 
not protect the bike if the user fails to operate it properly or decides not to bother.  
CCO was designed to reflect and support this understanding of mechanism and context.  For 
example, an intervention may involve hardening a target against physical attack by making it 
protest either by alarm or simply the shriek of tortured metal joints, thereby increasing the risk to 
the offender of being detected and arrested. The immediate contextual conditions necessary for 
that intervention mechanism to work can be described in terms of the remaining 10 causes of 
CCO. For example, preventers have to be present within earshot, they have to be motivated and 
capable of responding; offenders have to perceive this possibility and to be concerned about it 
because the environment GRHVQ¶WDOORZWKHPWRVHHSHRSOHFRPLQJRUWRHVFDSHSXUVXLW, and so 
on. 
CCO and Design Against Crime 
Design Against Crime has to influence the risk of criminal behaviour by manipulating elements 
of the immediate crime situation12 to realise the intervention principles, and in particular to have 
a good chance of triggering the appropriate causal mechanisms in the particular context of use.   
This involves either physically blocking WKH RIIHQGHU¶V DFWLRQ WKH ZDOO FDQQRW EH FOLPEHG 
affecting WKH RIIHQGHU¶V perception of risk, effort and reward (the wall looks difficult or 
dangerous to climb and impossible to lift stolen bikes over);  or influencing any prompting, 
pressuring or provocation of the offender (such as an officious notice provoking graffiti).  As 
well as influencing these factors directly DAC can influence the other roles (preventer and 
promoter) who then in turn exert their own influence on the situation (the householder can lock 
their doors and windows; the cyclist is guided by the shape of the bike stand designed to lock the 
bike securely; and the facility manager can be informed by designed communications about kinds 
of suspicious behaviour to look out for.)   
                                                          
11
 7KHµ6FLHQWLILF5HDOLVW¶DSSURDFK±Tilley (1993). 
12
 ,WFDQDOVRLQIOXHQFHSHRSOH¶VUHDGLQHVVWRRIIHQGYLDFXUUHQWOLIHFLUFXPVWDQFHVVXFKDVVWUHVVIXOOLYLQJFRQGLWLRQV
but this is beyond current scope. 
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CCO was considered a good starting point for introducing criminological concepts and 
perspectives into DAC because it:  
 Maps immediate causes of criminal events and counterpart interventions exhaustively, 
systematically and generically (hence maximising design scope and design freedom) 
 Allows indefinite zooming into detail rather than remaining at the level of broad 
generalisation (important for adjusting to context and to moving from design-in-principle 
to design-in-practical-terms) 
 Supports a mechanism and context approach to the understanding and prevention of 
criminal events  (allowing for a necessary subtlety of design) 
 Involves both objects, places and people (covering the full scope of the design field) 
 Considers people as users or abusers, in a range of roles rather than focusing in a limited 
and inflexible way on offenders, guardians and managers 
 Provides designers with analytic principles of crime prevention which complement the 
more tangible and in some ways more restricting 25 Techniques of Situational Crime 
Prevention13 (further discussed in the Conclusion) 
 Although CCO sits well with Situational Crime Prevention, it does not tie designers (or 
those developing innovative capacity for designers) down to one particular theory or set of 
theories or approaches within crime prevention, allowing a potentially broad transfer of 
knowledge, even from the offender-oriented side as appropriate 
Before moving on, one final point should be made about the source of CCO knowledge. Although 
CCO has been presented as a theoretical framework it did not spring out of empty space. It was in 
fact a distillation of a wide range of generic crime and crime prevention research, plus a specific 
attempt to classify several thousand diverse preventive projects.14  
CCO and the Bikeoff Project 
CCO was introduced to colleagues at the DAC Research Centre from around 2005 with the arrival 
in post of Paul Ekblom. During early work on bike crime at the Research Centre CCO was 
presented as an input to various studio projects with MA Industrial Design students at CSM. 
Subsequently it was considered by the rest of the team planning the current Bikeoff Project, and 
was judged suitable to give an angle on the development of standards and guidelines for bike 
parking security, which was both plausible and complementary to the gleaning and distillation of 
worldwide practical experience.  
                                                          
13
 www.popcenter.org/25techniques/  
14
 Ekblom (1994, 2000). A note on the origins of CCO is at www.designagainstcrime.com > crimeframeworks. CCO 
was originally called µ3UR[LPDO&LUFXPVWDQFHV¶ 
22 
 
As the Bikeoff project unfolded, CCO was brought together with the other work, and introduced 
to the other team members, in various ways. These efforts involved tutorial discussions; iterative 
construction and discussion of a range of diagrams with the aid of a graphic designer; drafting of 
written documents and tables; preparation and presentation of slideshows. In each case strong and 
sometimes fierce feedback from within and beyond the WPA team moved the work onto the next 
iteration. 
CCO was meant to provide an independent angle on bike parking security, and the intention was 
to test its performance and suitability to this task. To these ends, the author (Paul Ekblom) was not 
involved in the meetings and circulations to distil the Best of Breed material under WPA1, except 
for a brief viewing of a sample format in order to guide the CCO output in a similar direction. 
However, LQRUGHUWRµSURJUDP¶WKHJHQHULF&&2IUDPHZRUNwith bike-specific knowledge, so that 
it could generate bike-specific output, he did require information on bike crimes (especially 
perpetrator techniques), bike parking design categories and the range of existing kinds of 
design of furniture and facilities and what functions they sought to serve in general terms (such 
DVµVXSSRUWELNH¶µFROOHFWSD\PHQW¶HWF 
Moving on from CCO-Classic 
During the course of this process several factors originating both within and outside the Bikeoff 
work caused the original CCO-Classic framework to evolve in significant ways:  
 Detailed application of CCO in a highly-focused practical context caused many 
assumptions to be examined. 
 So, too, did attempts to incorporate CCO within a design process, and to articulate and 
communicate it to both the designers on the Bikeoff project and design students in 
associated studio workshops.  
 CCO by itself was found to be too generalised in the way it handled crime for it to give 
designers enough of a steer. A way of tuning it to specific crime types (such as theft) was 
required. 
 Fresh and challenging ideas emerged from parallel work on a journal article (Ekblom and 
Sidebottom 2007) in critiquing and attempting to solve conceptual and terminological 
SUREOHPV LQDSURFHGXUH IRU V\VWHPDWLF µFULPH-SURRILQJ¶RIGRPHVWLF HOHFWURQLFSURGXFWV 
(in other words, assessing how far the crime risk to which they would be exposed in 
everyday use, was matched by appropriate levels of product and environmental security). 
The criticism of existing approaches extended to some quite fundamental aspects of SCP.15 
)RU H[DPSOH WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ RI µULVN¶ DQG WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI FULPH SUHYHQWLRQ ZHUH
further developed. These changes had implications of how the concept of risk was to be 
used in both CCO in particular and DAC in general. 
  
                                                          
15
 See also Ekblom and Sidebottom (2007b). 
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 A recently-completed book chapter µ0DNLQJRIIHQGHUVULFKHU¶(NEORPc) raised the 
level of understanding of human agency in crime and crime prevention, and how to 
represent it. 
 Previous development of the 5Is framework,16 a process-model of doing crime prevention, 
suggested how to systematically incorporate ways of involving people as crime preventers. 
These influences led to a range of modifications and extensions to CCO-Classic, which continued 
to evolve in the course of the current project, and more widely. 
 Pressure to define what the elements of CCO were, exactly, led to the distinction between 
µentities¶ WDUJHW HQFORVXUH HQYLURQPHQW PDterial resources ± which can be designed) and 
µagents¶RIIHQGHUs, preventers, promoters ± who can be influenced by design, and who react 
and respond to installed designs ± and their mental properties and resources for or against 
committing crime).  
 Entities were given the design- and engineering-oriented attributes of causal properties, 
structural features, components and configurations and material composition. A more 
detailed hierarchy of properties etc (such as space, access, visibility) is in development 
beneath these main headings. 
 Human agents were seen as both caused (through internal mental states and by their 
environment) and causing (in terms of striving to fulfil goals of both achievement and 
avoidance by more or less planned behaviour).  They interact with installed designs in both 
ways. 
 7R HQVXUH WKDW WKH µDEXVHU-unfriendly tail does not wag the user-IULHQGO\ GRJ¶ HIIRUWV ZHUH
made to render the basic terms and concepts underlying CCO and its interface with design, 
FRPSDWLEOHZLWKµKRQHVW¶FRJQition and behaviour of legitimate users.  
 Understanding of influences on such users, and how designers can systematically seek to 
involve them in crime prevention, was enhanced by incorporating elements of the CLAIMED 
framework,17 which itself originated as a distillation of how designers were/were not involved 
in crime based on a reading of a Home Office/Design Council-commissioned study of the 
state of design against crime circa 2000 (Design Council 2000; Learmount 2005).  This is set 
out in Box 1 below. 
                                                          
16
 See www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=taxonomy/term/6  
17
 See www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=taxonomy/term/6  
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 Designers needed a more detailed representation of the dynamics of offending, beyond the 
HOHPHQWDU\µFULPLQDO¶VGHFLVLRQWRRIIHQGEDVHGRQSHUFHSWLRQRIULVNHIIRUWDQGUHZDUG¶7KLV
was achieved by introducing the concepts of routine scripts (Cornish 1994) pursued by 
offenders (VXFK DV µseek parked bike, see, select, UHOHDVH UHPRYH HVFDSH VHOO¶) and 
incorporating specific µSHUSHWUDWRUWHFKQLTXHV¶ of the kind identified and applied within prior 
bike crime research at DAC, such as lifting, cutting, picking etc).  
 Given the parity of user and abuser in DAC approaches, the concept of user scripts was 
LQWURGXFHGVXFKDVµseek bike parking facility, see, enter, select and approach free stand, lean 
DQGORFNELNHOHDYH«UHWXUQXQORFNELNHUHPRYHELNHXVHELNH¶).  
 This in turn generated the potentially fertile concept of script clashes between the two agents 
(eg µFRQFHDOPHQWYVXUYHLOODQFH¶µSXUVXLWYHVFDSH¶). Script clashes were found to relate to the 
contradictions whose specification is at the heart of the TRIZ approach to systematic 
invention.18 They were felt to be particularly useful for designers to be aware of in envisaging 
the dynamics of the potential or actual criminal events that they were seeking to influence. 
The key task, of course, would be to design the environment, product etc in such a way as to 
consistently and significantly favour performance of WKH VFULSW RI WKH µJRRGLHV¶ XVHUV
managers, guardians, concerned passers-E\RYHUWKDWRIWKHµEDGGLHV¶LQDQ\FODsh. 
 Clear definitions of the crime to be prevented (such as theft) were judged necessary to focus 
the mind of the designer. In the course of this it was realised that such statements themselves 
                                                          
18
 See for example Savransky (2000) and Ekblom and Sidebottom (2007b). 
Box 1  The CLAIMED framework 
CLAIMED ± the generic procedure for mobilising crime preventers to implement particular 
interventions ± comprises several steps: 
 Clarify the crime prevention tasks or roles that need doing, eg the intervention itself; 
alleviating constraints; and supplying enablers.  
 Locate the individuals or organisations best-placed to undertake them, including designers, 
manufacturers, marketers and consumers. Then  
 Alert them that their product could be causing crime, or that they could help stop unrelated 
crimes. 
 Inform them of the nature of the crime problem, its causes, likelihood and consequences. 
 Motivate them ± by hard or soft incentives including an image of corporate social 
UHVSRQVLELOLW\QDPLQJDQGVKDPLQJµSROOXWHU-SD\V¶WD[HVDZDNHQLQJFRQVXPHUH[SHFWDWLRQV
and pressures and imposing insurance costs, and legislation.  
 Empower them ± by supplying preventers with education, guidance on intervention, tools (eg 
property-marking kit) and other resources; and by alleviating a range of constraints. 
 Direct them, perhaps, in terms of standards (such as BSI or CEN), and targets. Regulations 
relating to privacy or anti-vigilantism may also be applied to stop people taking crime 
prevention beyond acceptable limits or clashing with other values. 
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introduced the most fundamental and defining contradiction ± in the case of theft, between 
legitimate and illegitimate acquisition, possession and disposal of the target item.  
 The factors of risk, effort and reward XQGHUO\LQJ WKH RIIHQGHU¶V FKRLFH LQ FODVVLFDO 6&3
whilst important for designers to consider, cannot be manipulated in any simplistic, 
mechanistic way, as much of the SCP literature and guidance tends to imply. To the adaptive 
offender these factors are interchangeable currency. For example, to obtain greater reward, 
the offender may tolerate greater risk; to reduce the risk, the offender may increase the effort 
such as by taking greater care to cover tracks. ($OWKRXJK µGLVSODFHPHQW¶ RI FULPH WR RWKHU
places, targets or times has been shown to be only a limited problem in SCP in the immediate 
aftermath of deploying preventive interventions (Hesseling 1994), offenders over a longer 
time period (Ekblom 1997, 1999, 2002, 2005a) may adjust their perpetrator techniques to 
these and even develop new countermoves.)  
 Risk, effort, reward and various motivating factors should not be treated as the exclusive 
preserve of the offender point of view, as is done in classical SCP. They were seen as equally 
important for understanding and influencing the behaviour of other agents such as users or 
place managers acting as preventers or promoters (or indeed doing everyday activities 
unconnected with crime). 
 Risk itself required a clearer definition than what we now see as a rather restricted but also 
imprecise usage within Situational Crime Prevention. There, risk centred on offenders¶ 
perception of likely harm to themselves, usually in terms of arrest after the event, and how this 
influenced their decisionmaking. Considerations of probability and harm were not clearly 
distinguished. The conception of risk used here goes beyond risks to offenders to include the 
risks to other agents and entities potentially involved in the criminal event itself. An approach 
to risk was therefore developed that relates WRWKHZD\WKHFRQFHSWLVXVHGZLWKLQWKHµsecurity 
DQG ULVN DVVHVVPHQW¶ field (Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007a) and that of harm reduction. 
Risk is therefore considered as 1) possibility ± a particular kind of hazardous event or 
human threat, 2) with a probability of occurrence and 3) with particular harmful 
consequences which may be iPPHGLDWHRUµNQRFN-RQ¶ Risk could apply to all agents, and to 
the product of design.  
 Designers needed to explicitly consider harm associated with, or following from, the criminal 
event.  This is for two reasons. Designers themselves, and their clients, need information on 
harm to prioritise requirements for the designed product or place, and perhaps for users with 
particular susceptibilities such as the elderly or blind. And specific knowledge of harm could 
inform designs to avoid, reduce or mitigate it during and after the criminal event should this 
still happen despite attempts to reduce its probability.  Harm can come from crime and its 
consequences such as mental trauma or loss of credit cards (crime propagation). But it can 
also come from inept prevention such as trapping of fingers in badly-designed locks or 
neglect of fail-safe considerations in the event of damage to stands, barriers etc. Even aesthetic 
offence can be considered as harm to quality of life. 
 Another risk management concept it was thought helpful to incorporate is that of the security 
sequence: 
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o Primary security ± this reduces the possibility of harmful event; and if event 
nevertheless remains possible, it reduces its probability 
o Secondary security ± if event does happen, this limits harm as it unfolds to product, 
owner and beyond ± i.e. increases resilience of product and immediate system 
o Tertiary security ± this limits propagation of harm that may occur post-event ± e.g. 
increase shielding against misuse of product ± and increases resilience of wider 
system 
From a design perspective, it is usually preferable to put most effort into primary security ± so 
the undesired event is much less likely to happen. But there may be circumstances where it 
becomes less cost-effective to aim to prevent every last product or place from every last 
incident, and instead to dedicate some resources to making the product or place resilient, and 
to limit crime propagation. 
 Deliberate attention was paid to discourse ± to take particular perspectives and ways of 
articulating crime and design VXFKDVµIXQFWLRQDO¶YµWHFKQLFDO¶LQDGHOLEHUDWHDQGVHOI-aware 
way, with consistent use of terms, rather than haphazardly and unconsciously slipping 
between different discourses in the same analysis or sometimes even the same sentence, as 
SCP is wont to do. ,QSDUWLFXODUWKHµFDXVHGDJHQW¶DSSURDFKPHQWLRQHGDERYHDXWRPDWLFDOO\
leads designers into consciously choosing whether to think about users and abusers in terms of 
what causes their behaviour and how to block these causes; what goals they are pursuing and 
how to frustrate or disrupt them, and how to influence their choices; or some combination.19  
 To move from consideration of crime in general, to specific types of crime, it became 
necessary to combine CCO with an additional framework ± Misdeeds and Security (M&S)20 
± from the same conceptual stable.  M&S describes the crime risks and crime prevention 
opportunities that may be associated with a designed product, place or system. Rather than 
confront designers with dozens of legal categories of offence or nuisance, these can be 
summarised under broad headings of misdeeds in which the designed object is either the 
target of crime or otherwise a contributor to crime directed at something or someone else. 
Likewise, where the designed object is self-protected against being a target or contributor, or 
can positively contribute to preventing crimes directed against other targets, these crime 
prevention opportunities can be summarised in the counterpart list of security considerations.  
Note that these are essentially different discourses for describing the same thing ± µbeware of 
risk ;¶, and µreduce risk ;¶7KHODWWHURIFRXUVHLVDIXQFWLRQDOVSHFLILFDWLRQ ± and amounts to 
guidance, but not a standard.  M&S is set out in Box 2 below. 
                                                          
19
 These twin discourses have also supplied alternative ways of defining crime prevention. See 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/37  
20
 Ekblom (2005b); see also www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=taxonomy/term/6  
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Box 2 Misdeeds and Security framework 
Identifying types of crime risk to or with designed products and functionally specifying what to do 
about them; and how to exploit their protective function in reducing crime against other targets 
Misdeeds  
Each designed product, place or system (hereafter product for brevity) is considered in relation to the 
possibility, expressed in CCO terms, that it is at risk of being a target of crime; or a contributor to crime 
risk by virtue of being a resource, an enclosure or an environment.  
In each case the risk is taken as increased (so for example we consider inadequacies of enclosures 
which let offenders in).  
 Target of crime 
 Misappropriated ± property stolen, information stolen or made unavailable; 
 Mistreated ± property damaged, people assaulted, self-harm, information integrity compromised;  
 Mishandled ± property subject to deception, counterfeiting and smuggling;  confidentiality of 
information breached; 
 Contributor to crime 
 Misused ± DV UHVRXUFHV IRU FULPH VXFK DV WRROV RU DQ HQFORVXUH DFWLQJ DV D µGHFR\ WUDS¶ IRU
robbery) to support a specific perpetrator techniques; 
 Misbehaved with ± creating an environment or enclosure conducive to disorder and antisocial 
behaviour; 
 Mistaken ± a category of a different order ± errors are also made by public or police which whilst not 
illegal serve to constrain or misdirect crime reduction activity (e.g. false alarms, arresting the wrong 
person). 
Security ± identifying and specifying counterpart crime reduction opportunities 
The security perspective takes the above risks and considers how the designed product, place or system 
might be designed to be self-protected against crime; or exploited to reduce crime committed either by 
preventing misuse or misbehaviour with the product itself, or by using the product to make a positive 
contribution to preventing crime against some other target (in the present case, mainly the bicycle 
and/or its human user): 
 Self-protected 
 Secured against theft ± resistant to theft, indicating that theft has happened, or recoverable/ 
restorable to owner; 
 Safeguarded against damage ± resistant to, fail-safe in, or indicative of damage; 
 Scam-proofed ± resistant to or indicative of fraud/ counterfeiting/ smuggling; 
 Reducing crime from misuse or misbehaviour with product 
 Shielded against misuse ± resistant to misuse, including for attacks on law enforcers, or 
indicative of misuse, including tamper-evidence;   
 µ6¶LYLOLVHG ± environment resistant or repellent to misbehaviour and conducive to good 
behaviour;  
 Reducing crime elsewhere 
 Shielding other targets/ places against crime; 
 Supporting ± law enforcement/ justice/ crime reduction/ community safety; 
 Slip-proofed ± resistant to mistakes eg false alarms. 
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Standards or guidelines? 
One other thing became clear during the course of the process of adapting CCO to the design 
process. The original aspiration RIWKH%LNHRIISURMHFWZDVWRGHYHORSµ&&2VWDQGDUGV¶%XW WKH
present exercise made it abundantly clear that CCO, M&S and CLAIMED in themselves can only 
directly support the development of guidelines. Standards require extra information derived from 
specific, focused research studies and practical trials so that created designs can be assessed 
against them. These can only be imported from outside of CCO. The only sense in which CCO etc 
could be treated as a standard is in process terms ± HJ µWKLV GHVLJQ ZDV JHQHUDWHG DQG WHVWHG
using the CCO framework ± which could indicate a certain methodological rigour. 
 
CCO-Dynamic 
For brevity, the wider framework is hereinafter referred to as CCO Dynamic.21 As used in the 
current exercise, this is essentially captured in the CCO Dynamic slideshow 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/83, supplemented by descriptions of the 
CLAIMED and Misdeeds & Security frameworks ± respectively 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/85 and 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/77. 
                                                          
21
 On the DAC website (crimeframeworks section) the three frameworks are currently listed separately and CCO 
Dynamic therefore has a somewhat more restricted content.  
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3. Applying CCO Dynamic: development and application of a 
procedure 
The rest of this document describes the overall procedure which has evolved for handling the 
generation of design guidance using CCO Dynamic;  the framework for analysing the risks;  the 
framework for the response to that risk, namely for design guidance; and  the complete 
prescriptive design guidance output. This is followed by a brief conclusion. 
Developing the procedure 
Initial attempts to develop risk analysis and design guidance worksheets led all the way to design 
solutions, including both functional solutLRQVHJµUHVLVWFXWWLQJ WRROV¶DQGWHFKQLFDOUHDOLVDWLRQV
HJ µE\ XVLQJ KDUGHQHG VWHHO DQG E\ GHQ\LQJ VSDFH WR GHSOR\ WRRO¶  7KHVH ZHUH VXEVHTXHQWO\
judged to be overambitious for current purposes but may be returned to after the present project. 
In order to complete WP A2 on time, cut-down versions were developed which the author, with 
his familiarity with the frameworks, was able to apply. These stopped at functional design 
considerations. 
Design as object and design in-function 
An important distinction emerged during the development process, which now features in both 
risk analysis and design guidance.  Some objects, places or systems are designed to be inherently 
secure ± secure products ± such as the car with built-in immobiliser. Others are purpose-designed 
to protect other things, places or people against crime. Security products are purpose-built to 
protect, with no other function ± for example locks, body armour or attack alarms. Securing 
products can protect other things or people in the course of supporting some other designed 
function ± IRUH[DPSOHWKH6WRS7KLHIFKDLULQDFDIpZKLFKKLWFKHVDFXVWRPHU¶VKDQGEDJEHQHDWK
her knees to protect it from theft ± whilst serving as a perfectly comfortable and attractive seat. 
The bike stand in the present project is a securing product, deliberately designed to protect the 
bike from theft whilst also supporting it in a safe and convenient position.  The design of security 
and securing products relates to crime in two ways:    
 Design as object sets aside the security function and WDNHVWKHRIIHQGHU¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQKRZ
the product, place, system or communication itself can become target, resource or 
environment for crime. This covers what  criminals can do to or with the product, i.e. actions 
with criminal intent that were not intended by the designer, purchaser, installer or user ± for 
example, the bike stand could itself be damaged for amusement, stolen for scrap or climbed on 
to escape the police over a wall. 
 Design in-function covers the intended security function designed into the product, place, 
system or communication. The risk analysis is not primarily of threats to the designed object 
DOWKRXJK LW PD\ JHW GDPDJHG LQ WKH FRXUVH RI WKH RIIHQGHU¶V DFWLRQ EXW WR WKH SHUVRQ RU
property (such as the bike) whose security the object is intended to protect.  Considering the 
bike stand in this light, it makes sense to risk-assess the functional whole of bike + lock + 
stand. It identifies the risks to the designed object, and those things that it protects, in serving 
its intended security purpose (eg the stand protecting the bike from theft; or the enclosure of a 
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parking facility protecting the bikes from theft, and protecting the stands themselves from 
damage or theft).  In other words, these risks are risks of failure of the security function. Of 
LQWHUHVW KHUH RI FRXUVH DUH FULPLQDOV¶ countermoves to the security function (eg preventer 
incorporates locking function; offender attempts to overcome/ bypass locking function).  Note 
however that the elementary security function of self-protection comes under design-as-
object above. 
A snappy way of expressing the difference between design-as-object and design-in-IXQFWLRQLVµto 
versus do¶ZKDWKDSSHQVto the designed furniture or facility in the way of crime (and with it, as 
a tool, weapon or environment for crime); and what does the furniture or facility purposefully do 
to affect the risk of crime, whatever other functions and requirements it serves?  
 
The procedure for risk analysis and security guidance ± an overview 
The final version of the procedure that applied CCO to generate design guidance is as follows:  
a) Select a µGHVLJQIRFXV¶ (furniture, eg a cycle stand or cluster of stands; or the wider facility 
comprising stands, enclosure etc).  Where relevant, break this designed entity into 
components (eg enclosure considered as a working whole comprising periphery, barrier, 
entry point, interior). 
b) Consider the design as an object, at least from a crime perspective ± then consider the 
crime risks associated with that furniture or facility, following the sequence possibility > 
probability > harm, using a systematic analytic structure based on CCO-dynamic, 
supplemented by wider sources of information described in the section immediately 
below. 
c) Having identified the crime risks, recast them in terms of design considerations 
(guidelines) whose purpose is to alert, inform and empower the designer to reduce the 
crime risk (whether by reducing possibility/probability, harm or both). These are 
essentially in high-level functional discourse and can be mapped across from the causal to 
the intervention side of CCO.  For example, bike stand as target is vulnerable to wrecking 
(causal) becomes ensure bike stand resists wrecking (intervention). Where standards are to 
be developed, more specific and measurable construction or performance requirements 
can be produced, but as explained above, not in this study. 
d) and e)  Repeat a) and b) for the design in-function, from a security perspective, and 
clearly express the security considerations. For example, consider the [stand + bike + lock 
complex] as a functional secure configuration and list desired properties such as may 
shelter environments and pedestrian/cycle users in vicinity of stand against nuisance and 
conflict by keeping bikes out of way of pedestrian paths. Include risks of failure of the 
VHFXULW\IXQFWLRQDQGFULPLQDOV¶FRXQWHUPRYHVDVGLVFXVVHGDERYH 
It is impossible to specify absolutely everything in risk analysis or design guidance. There are 
hundreds of variants, contingencies and contexts of design.  Moreover, the entities and agents 
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interact in complex ways ± for example, the resources for surveillance possessed by the guards of 
the site will interact with the potential for surveillance offered/constrained by the instrumental 
environment (eg guard has torch or CCTV, site has blind recesses or bushes that obscure the 
view),  but we can present some common issues in an organised way, and give systematic leads to 
help the designer (whether the designer of the guidance, or the designer using the guidance to 
create the product itself). The hope is that the more advanced designers (or at least the ones 
allowed a wider/freer remit by their clients) use the framework to envisage wider possibilities, 
constrained only by their ability to imagine crime and put themselves in the minds of criminals 
whilst taking in research evidence and contextual considerations. The less advanced designers or 
those heavily constrained in time and scope can fall back on the minimum.                            
To help readers keep track of where they are in the risk analysis and later the design guidance, a 
colour coding schema was adopted (Table 2). This is consistent throughout the documentation. 
 
Table 2    Colour code ± risk analysis for designed objects 
Design focus  :KDW¶VGHVLJQHG ± product, place, communication  
Possibility of crime Causal role designed object plays in crime ± CCO entity 
 General kind of crime risk involved ± Misdeed 
 The detailed possibilities of criminal events ± specific crime type 
and/or perpetrator technique 
Probability and Harm For each possibility of crime, how its risk ± probability and harm ± is 
influenced by design of product and/or the physical/social context in which 
the product or place is located, using the agents and other entities within CCO 
and if necessary higher, emergent levels such as markets and networks 
 
4. The risk analysis 
As with skinning cats, there are many ways in which bike parking furniture and facilities can play 
a part in crime. Each of these ways will in some way involve the design of the product or place of 
interest (in the present case, the design can variously comprise the stand and other furniture, the 
stand-bike-lock complex, cluster of bikes or full parking facility); and the context. The context in 
turn will comprise other CCO entities such as environmental features like walls or barriers; and 
human agents including other users, passers-by, guards and managers. Note that the complicity of 
the design in crime will often be implicit, and will have to be drawn out by application of a 
focused mindset. Note too that in some cases the context of one designed product (such as the 
stand) can itself be subject to design (eg the wider environment can be security-adapted, whether 
this is done by minor modifications or the creation of a specific, designed enclosure). 
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This report takes four µRUELWV¶URXQGWKHULVNDQDO\VLVWRGHVFULEHLWLQVXFFHVVLYHO\JUHater detail. 
First (Orbit A), it briefly rehearses the basic concepts of risk analysis described under Section 2 
above (The CCO approach to design).  This is linked to the colour code just described. Then 
(Orbit B), an annotated blank template for undertaking the risk analysis is shown in Table 3 
below, together with a commentary on the procedure for filling it in. After that (Orbit C), all the 
crime possibilities considered in the full analysis are set out. Finally (Orbit D), there is a worked 
example of the full risk analysis for the first of the crime possibilities just set out. (A full risk 
analysis for all the crime possibilities, for bike parking furniture, is in Appendix 1.) 
 
Orbit A: Basic concepts of the risk analysis ± a reminder 
Risk of crime comprises three aspects: possibility (what kinds of criminal events might happen), 
probability (how likely is each kind of event to happen) and harm (what are the immediate and 
wider undesirable consequences if the event happens).  Possibility could be left entirely to the 
GHVLJQHU¶VLPDJLQDWLRQEXWVLQFHXQWXWRUHGGHVLJQHUVDUHXQOLNHO\WREHYHU\HIIHFWLYHDWWKLQNLQJ
thief, it is better if their ideas are systematically structured as follows, using the colour code set 
out above. 
We start the risk analysis with the design focus ± that which is designed. In the present project 
this could be the furniture or the facility. Each design focus receives its own risk analysis. An 
important distinction within the design focus is between the design as object, and the design in-
function.   
We consider design as object first. 
Within design as object, we move on to possibilities of crime. 
Using, first, the language of CCO the product (and its design) can first be characterised in 
terms of the very general causal roles it may play in crime.  It can act as target itself or as 
a contributor to other products or persons becoming targets, by acting as a resource for 
crime like a tool or weapon or an environment for crime.   
M&S is then used to identify rather more specifically what kinds of crime risk the product 
is implicated in (Mistreatment, Misappropriation, Mishandling, Misuse, Misbehaviour; 
also Mistake).   
Then finally we get very specific, considering (for example under Mistreatment) very 
particular crime possibilities defined by a combination of legal category (eg criminal 
damage) and perpetrator technique (eg by wrecking).  
Having teased out major possibilities of criminal events into some detail, we then consider 
for each of these possibilities, their probability and harm (white in the colour code). (If 
the possibilities are the trunk, branches and twigs of the tree, then probability and harm are 
the leaves and rotten fruit at the end of the twigs.) For each detailed possibility, we ask 
how the design of the product, and how the physical and social context in which it is to be 
sited, each serve to influence the probability and the harm of the criminal event. 
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Design in-function 
The procedure here is similar, except that the target of crime is no longer the designed 
object itself (eg the stand), but that which it is designed to protect ± the bike, which is at 
risk for example of misappropriation, say by cutting the stand. A successfully-completed 
crime targeting the bike, represents a failure of the security function of the stand; in the 
course of this security failure, the stand itself may get damaged. (Note that things are more 
complicated because even unsuccessful attempts at theft may still damage both bike and 
stand itself; this still confers some limited benefit to other users because it may discourage 
future attempts.) 
 
Orbit B:  The risk analysis template 
The sequence just described is illustrated in more detail in the headings of the µEODQN¶ULVNDQDO\VLV 
template, presented in Table 3 below.  With reference to that table, for example, we can:  
 Take furniture/bike stand as the product which is the design focus (level 1, grey); and 
consider it as object, and then in-function. 
 The stand can be considered in terms of whether it could play any or all of the CCO roles 
(level 1.1-1.5, light blue) of target of crime,  resource for crime etc.  
o Under target, switching to the M&S framework -  (level 1.1.1. ± 1.1.6. yellow) it 
can then be considered as an object which can be mistreated (damaged), 
misappropriated (stolen), or mishandled (eg counterfeited).  
o The level-numbering scheme repeats hierarchically, so under 1.2 resource for 
crime  it can be misused (1.2.4 in M&S framework, not shown in Table 3) (eg as a 
climbing aid for burglary, or a place to hang a bomb) or misbehaved with (1.2.5, eg 
sat on, climbed on etc).  
 Each of these specific possibilities of types of criminal event illustrated in brackets will 
need to be considered in turn, appearing in purple,  eg level 1.1.1.1 Wrecking.   
 Then we go into the detail of this specific crime possibility (1.1.1.1.1. white« DQG
progressively down the hierarchy of numbering as appropriate). This includes a 
description of the defining perpetrator technique, legal offence category etc of this 
particular crime possibility; also some consideration of whether this is an instrumental 
FULPH D PHDQV WR DQ HQG VXFK DV µDFTXLULQJ PRQH\¶ RU DQ expressive one (such as 
µKDYLQJDODXJK¶RUµUHWDOLDWLRQLQUHVSRQVHWRSURYRFDWLRQ¶ such as when a coin machine 
swallows WKHXVHU¶Vmoney and then jams, turning user into abuser). The crime preventive 
options, and the design ones in particular, may differ depending on which is in play.    
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Each specific crime possibility is then considered in terms of its probability of occurrence and the 
harm occasioned if it happens. Both of these have design implications; and both occurrence, harm 
and the design response may depend on context. 
Under probability (1.1.1.1.2.), we first consider its overall magnitude (1.1.1.1.2.1.) with a crude 
scoring system 0-Low-Medium-High. Later, the same is done for harm. This leads to several 
DOWHUQDWLYHµDFWLRQFRQWLQJHQFLHV¶IRUWKHGHVLJQHUDQGFOLHnt: 
 If probability is judged high and harm high, then intervention (by design or other means 
such as guardianship) is vital.  
 If probability is high and harm medium to low, then µYROXPHFULPH¶FRQVLGHUDWLRQVRIFRVW
and inconvenience may mean it is still worth investing in prevention.  
 If the probability is very low but the consequences very serious (such as a terrorist bomb in 
a crowded place) then other priorities may dictate action.  
 Obviously if the probability turns out to be very low and harm equally low (and likely to 
remain so over the intended lifetime of the product) the designer may choose to ignore this 
possibility altogether beyond noting it for the record.  
Otherwise we continue, by identifying factors which influence the magnitude of the probability 
(1.1.1.1.2.1.). In other words, what factors affect how likely this possibility is to happen? Two 
broad influences are of interest ± the design of the product/place (1.1.1.1.2.2.1.), and the context 
(1.1.1.1.2.2.2.). (From now on the hierarchical heading numbers in the table will be omitted.) 
With design, it is necessary to express the design factors in a way that reflects how the properties 
of the designed product could influence crime ± eg strength could influence susceptibility to 
damage by bending; value could influence probability of theft.  We also consider how the design 
features (distinguishable structural elements of construction, components etc) and materials 
convey these properties. This is a major shift in mindset whether the risk analysis is being 
conducted by a designer or a criminologist/crime scientist. 
Under context, possibilities are endless. But to maintain focus, and limit what has to be 
considered, we return to the CCO to supply headings. While the product/place we are considering 
has already been identified as a CCO category (in the current example, target or resource for 
crime), the elements of the context can also be systematically listed in terms of the other causes 
within CCO.  
These contextual causes can be broadly classed as  
 agents (humans acting as offender, crime preventer or crime promoter) or  
 entities (environment, enclosure, resources for offender or preventer; even target of crime 
if the product we are considering is acting as a resource such as a tool or climbing aid ± 
here the target would be the goods to be stolen in the house whose back wall is climbed 
over).  
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Within the environment we can include some standard headings to describe generic properties 
relevant to crime, eg surveillability, accessibility ± drawn from CPTED (Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental Design).22 These also apply to the enclosure, whose interior is itself a 
mini-environment). The scale of the environment may need explicit consideration ± micro, meso 
or macro. Product designers will usually start from the product and work outwards into its 
environment of use; designers of facilities/places will work from the facility as a whole to its 
detailed content. The present risk analysis (and the accompanying design guidance) is intended to 
link these perspectives together. 
Of course, there may be interactions between the properties of the product and those of its context, 
eg camouflage of product only works if the background of the environment is of similar 
appearance. In particular, what the various agents are capable of doing with the environment, the 
target etc, are important.  For example, for surveillance to work the environment has to be 
surveillable (sight lines, lighting levels etc) and the agent has to be capable of undertaking the 
surveillance (good eyesight, knows what to look for etc) and motivated to respond. 
Crime preventer is a role which can be undertaken by many people ± here we have focused on 
user (cyclist), passer-by (normally anyone but could be subdivided to include eg police patrols or 
site employees with no specialist role in crime prevention but maybe a general responsibility) and 
manager or guard with clear responsibility, and perhaps training and equipment, for maintaining 
good behaviour and security at the site. Note that these people could equally well serve as 
promoters, making crime more likely to happen (eg by locking their bike insecurely, or by 
thoughtlessly locking through another bike leading to conflict). The idea of much prevention is to 
transform careless or inadvertent promoters into positive preventers. And a passer-by could 
suddenly turn into an opportunist thief if an expensive bike was left insecure; or a bike facility 
XVHUFRXOGGHOLEHUDWHO\GDPDJHDQRWKHU¶VELNHDIWHUDQDUJXPHQW 
Preventers, promoters and offenders all have factors of interest such as presence, perception, 
motivation, mental resources such as skills and knowledge for secure locking or stealth, and 
material resources such as locks, or tools for breaking them. Offenders may either bring tools with 
thHPULVNLQJEHLQJFDXJKW IRU µJRLQJHTXLSSHG¶RU find them near the crime site (eg bricks or 
sticks).  It is here that the designer has to think thief, think preventer or think promoter in relation 
to each of the various non-crime roles that are likely to be present in the environment (in or 
around the parking facility and/or the bike stands) ± users, managers, passers-by etc ± their goals 
and scripts, and any script clashes between conflicting agents. 
7KH HQWU\ µZLGHU RSSRUWXQLW\ VWUXFWXUH¶ &ODUNH 1997) goes beyond the contextual risk factors 
described by CCO and considers possibilities such as the existence of criminal networks or a 
nearby market for stolen bikes (in the case of Brick Lane, East London, the market is not just an 
HFRQRPLVW¶VDEVWUDFWLRQbut literally a street market). 
The final section on harm considers, first, immediate harms mediated by the design of the product 
itself ± harm to the product during the criminal event (eg stand scratched during bike theft), and 
                                                          
22
 There may be scope to revise the terms and concepts of CPTED along the lines of the frameworks set out here ± see 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/80.  
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after the event ± harm from the design of the product if the criminal attack leaves jagged edges 
which can scratch people. Then wider harms are considered ± these are knock-on consequences of 
the crime ± for example, those whose bikes are stolen may decide not to replace them, and hence 
the benefits of cycling to individuals and community are lost.  Again, there may be contextual 
influences on harm ± for example, if there are blind people regularly walking in the vicinity of 
some bike stands, the probability of an injurious incident from a damaged stand is higher. 
Finally, some global judgement is made about the severity of these harms, to feed into priority 
decisions in design, as discussed under magnitude of probability above.  
This completes coverage of the risk analysis as illustrated for the design as object; a similar one 
would now be done for the design in-function. 
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Table 3   Bikeoff - CCO-M&S worksheet ± risk analysis ±  template of standard headings plus interpretation  
Standard headings Interpretation 
1. Design focus ± ZKDW¶V designed  * Furniture/bike stand (or Facility ± repeat for each that applies) 
* As object; or serving a security function 
  
The causal role the designed object plays in crime  As a CCO entity ± repeat for each that applies 
1.1. Target of crime  
 
1.2. Resource for committing crime  
 
1.3. Enclosure  
 
1.4. Environment 
 
1.5. Resource for preventing crime   Later recast as separate statement of security functions of the 
designed object ± µLQ-IXQFWLRQ¶ 
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M&S framework - General kind of crime risk involved  Misdeeds &Security framework ± repeat for each that 
applies 
1.1.1. Mistreated (Damaged) by  
 
1.1.2. Misappropriated (Stolen) 
 
1.1.3. Mishandling 
 
1.1.4. Misused for  
 
1.1.5. Misbehaviour  
 
1.1.6. Mistake 
 
  
Within each crime risk (each Misdeed), specific crimes:  Risk = Possibility, Probability of event, Harm from event (or from 
its anticipation) 
1.1.1.1. Detailed possibility of crime: specific crime type and/or perpetrator 
technique 
Eg damage by Wrecking 
Repeat for each detailed possibility that applies 
1.1.1.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s and/or how crime unfolds As far as possible based on research into Perpetrator techniques. 
Can extend into scripts and script clashes (concealment v 
surveillance etc) 
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1.1.1.1.2. Probability of crime 
 
1.1.1.1.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [0/L/M/H] [Zero/Low/Med/Hi] 
1.1.1.1.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
 
1.1.1.1.2.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime As target, environment, enclosure. This may be a single product or a 
complex (as with bike+lock+stand) or a regularly-occurring 
configuration (eg stand in some regular geometrical relationship with 
a wall). 
1.1.1.1.2.2.1.1.  Design influences ± functional and/or technical expression. The 
design can have complicity which is criminogenic or criminally 
harmful; criminocclusive or mitigating criminal harm. Note that what is 
identified here are the obvious influences of susceptible or 
provocative properties, maybe explicit features or components.  Less 
obvious design complicity will surface under context ± for example, if 
the design makes it hard for the user to operate the lock securely. So 
this field is not the limit of what design can do to prevent crime, but 
the starting point.  Consider scripts and script clashes as these relate 
to design ± eg how far design of bike parking configuration favours 
RIIHQGHU¶VDPEXVKVXUSULVHRYHUXVHU¶VEHLQJRQ-guard ± eg by 
distraction and facing-away when inserting money. 
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1.1.1.1.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime Contextual influences on probability of crime based on CCO entities 
and agents other than the designed product. Even if that product 
is itself an environment, it will be located in a wider environment in its 
turn. These contextual influences may simply add to, or interact with 
properties of the product, e.g. visibility of product may add to lighting 
level in environment, to make product easier or harder to spot; or 
pattern on product will interact with pattern of background in 
environment to generate camouflage or contrast. Influences on 
agents (offenders, preventers, promoters) can be considered from 2 
parallel perspectives ± causal (eg engendering particular 
motivational or emotional states) and instrumental (relating to 
pursuit of goals to satisfy motives/consummate emotions, 
anticipation, decision etc). Note that even where contextual 
influences on crime have been identified, it may be possible to design 
around them ± for example the possibility of negligent users acting as 
crime promoters by failure to properly operate the lock can be 
compensated for by designing an easier-to-use lock. 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.1. Target  This covers the eventuality where the target of crime acts as context 
for e.g. a designed environment. For example the environment 
could be misused to damage the target if it contained bricks that 
could be misused to smash the target. Where the target is the 
designed object, the environment is its context.  
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.2. Enclosure ± motivating Eg provocative to offender; arousing/supporting territoriality in 
offender or preventer 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.3. Environment ± instrumental  ± wider accessibility eg via alleys, paths; surveillability from 
sightlines, lighting; favouring offender side of script clashes  eg 
pursuit v escape 
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1.1.1.1.2.2.2.4. Enclosure ± instrumental  limiting sightlines, accessibility  
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.4.1. Accessibility  These 4 headings apply to enclosure and to wider environment 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.4.2. Space ± to undertake action 
 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.4.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  from sightlines/ lighting/ sound eg background noise level 
Surveillability could be with naked eye or aids such as mirrors or 
CCTV 
NB surveillance and general perception can be done by offender too 
± eg in having enough light to see lock 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.4.4. Defensibility People instrumentally helped to act as preventers in their own space 
or territory ± eg advantage in surveillance, and script clashes such as 
pursuit/escape, surprise/alertness etc 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.5. Environment ± motivating  3UHVVXUHSURYRFDWLRQSURPSWLQJSHUPLVVLRQ:RUWOH\¶VµFULPH
SUHFLSLWDWRUV¶0RWLYDWLQJDQGGLVLQhibiting side of environment, 
acting on offender readiness to commit crime; also acting on 
preventers eg via territoriality, distraction. Note that the environment 
can be designed to boost territoriality (a CPTED concept) 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.6. Enclosure ± motivating 
 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.7. Offender presence Predisposed, ready, able offenders present/nearby/passing; planned 
v opportunist presence (connects with crime attractors and 
generators respectively); also with states (readiness) and 
predispositions (attitude to property; aggression) 
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1.1.1.1.2.2.2.8. Offender perception  And anticipation of risk, effort, reward, guilt, and associated decision-
making. Affordance of utility of design in meeting offender 
needs/serving goals. More generally, what does offender need to see 
or hear in order to achieve positive goals (crime) and avoid negative 
ones (beaten up, arrested etc)? 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.9. Offender resources ± brought  Resources best described in functional terms ± eg a hammer means 
anything you can bash with, including a rock 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.10. Offender resources ± locally found  
 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.11. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction their mere presence, motivation and resources (careless cyclists, 
negligent guards, fences) 
Note that careless/ignorant preventers are equivalent to promoters 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.12. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user  Preventers can be for example guards, managers, users, passers-by. 
Their mere presence may influence crime; also their motivation and 
resources to perceive and respond. More generally, preventers can 
be alerted, informed, motivated, empowered and directed to do the 
necessary tasks; their failure to be so can contribute to crime as 
above. How many potential preventers likely to be around during 
(various) hours of use? How alert, motivated, empowered, directed to 
notice crime or suspicious behaviour and take action? 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.13. Preventer resources ± user  Eg knowledge of perp techs, security products inc locks; what to do 
on site to prevent; what to do if see a suspicious person/activity, a 
crime in progress, a crime happened ± communications design? 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.14. Preventer presence/perception/action ± 
passerby  
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1.1.1.1.2.2.2.15. Preventer resources ± passer-by Knowledge of what to do/how to report crime in progress ± 
communications design?  
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.16. Preventer presence/perception/action ± 
guard/manager   
Effectiveness/efficiency of guard/manager depends on interactions 
with array of properties of product and its context ± eg capacity of 
guard to do surveillance/surveillability of environment; 
capacity/motivation of manager to do maintenance/maintainability of 
facilities 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2.17. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   Eg knowledge of perpetrator techs, security products including locks; 
what to do on site to prevent; what to do if see a suspicious 
person/activity, a crime in progress, a crime happened ± 
communications design, training, kit eg digital camera? 
1.1.1.1.2.2.3. Wider opportunity structure Markets, networks etc for crime 
1.1.1.1.3. Harm from crime Note there will be some harms from failed attempts at crimes ± eg 
damage to products, anxiety for near-victim 
1.1.1.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design of product Immediate harms are those which happen to the designed object 
itself or perhaps to victims in the course of the criminal event 
1.1.1.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product 
susceptible to:  
Product is susceptible to being harmed in the listed ways ± eg 
fracture 
1.1.1.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product Eg fracture leaves jagged edge 
1.1.1.1.3.2. Wider harms Wider harms are knock-on consequences of the crime beyond the 
immediate designed object. 
44 
 
1.1.1.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
 
1.1.1.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [0/L/M/H/X] ?relative to all possible 
bike-related crimes, or to all crimes in general? 
[Zero/Low/Med/Hi] 
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How the risk analysis procedure operates ± in practice  
The risk analysis procedure goes like this.   
Every time a new design focus is considered, a new set of blank cells as shown above is 
dropped into the growing risk analysis table. Likewise, for that product, place or 
communication that is the current focus, every time a new crime possibility is identified the 
relevant cells of the table repeat. All this leads WRDQXPEHURIµQHVWHG¶UHSHDWV indicated by 
the hierarchical numbering. Alternatively these repeats could be considered as the branches 
of a tree, with the specific risks of specific kinds of criminal event as the final twigs, and the 
entries describing risk factors etc as leaves at the very tip. 
In practice, it turned out to be easier to split the analysis task into two parts. The first was to 
tease out the specific crime possibilities relating to the current design focus, working from 
generic roles (CCO, light blue) to particular kinds of crime risk (M&S, yellow), to detailed 
kinds of criminal event (purple). Since there were many permutations of possibility, and 
many alternative variations on design focus, this involved some iteration in trading off the 
presentation of useful, distinguishing detail versus keeping the number of repeats of the 
template as small as possible. Only when the crime possibilities were satisfactorily organised 
was it sensible to proceed to the second part of the task, actually filling in the details (white, 
with design and context considerations in red text) under each specific criminal event 
category. 
Both tasks fleshed out the CCO Dynamic framework by drawing on the following 
information: 
 General knowledge of nature and range of crime 
 Knowledge of bike crime perpetrator techniques 
 Construction of typical designs 
 Their likely environment of use (including range of roles present such as passers-by, 
guardians)  
and modes of thinking: 
 µ7KLQNLQJ WKLHI¶ thinking terrorist, thinking rowdy children or whoever, and imagining 
their motivations to steal, damage or protect, and the deployment of perpetrator 
techniques within the unfolding of scripts 
 Envisaging the script clashes between the conflicting roles of offender, preventers and 
promoters 
The crime possibilities considered in the full risk analysis are summarised in Tables 4-7 
below. They cover the designed products or places in turn, as objects and in-function from a 
crime prevention point of view.  Note that for space-saving purposes in these summary tables, 
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unlike in the full risk analysis template (Table 3), the colour codes go horizontally across 
columns.  Likewise, for clarity, the hierarchical numbers have been omitted. 
The in-function risk analyses are intended to identify how the security function can fail. 
This can invoOYHSRVVLELOLWLHV VXFKDVRIIHQGHUV¶ countermoves against secure designs and 
security procedures (such as limiting surveillance at night by wearing dark clothing). A 
positive statement of the intended security functions of each design focus is included in the 
next main section, where we move to the design guidance. Of course, anyone developing a 
risk analysis in this way will have to have these security functions in mind already. 
 
Table 4  Risk analysis of possibilities ± furniture as object 
Design focus Generic role in crime 
± CCO 
Crime type ± 
Misdeeds & Security 
Specific crime ± perpetrator 
technique 
Furniture ± 
stand, cluster 
of stands ± as 
object 
Increased crime risk to 
object ± target 
Mistreatment Wrecking 
   Defacement ± ink, paint, sticker 
   Defacement ± scratching, abrasion 
    
  Misappropriation Stolen for resale or scrap 
    
  Mishandling Counterfeit for sale 
    
  Mistake  False alarm if security sensors fitted 
   Accidental damage mistaken for 
criminal tampering 
    
 Increased crime risk 
from object ± 
contributor as resource 
for offender 
Misuse Climbing aid for burglary or for 
escaping from pursuing police 
   Deceptive placing of bomb 
    
  Misbehaviour Climbing onto, sitting on 
   Bashing to make noise 
    
  Mistake False alarm of terrorist threat ± 
suspicious object leaning/hanging 
on stand  
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Table 5  Risk analysis of possibilities ± furniture in-function for crime prevention 
Design focus Generic role in crime 
± CCO 
Crime type ± 
Misdeeds & Security 
Specific crime ± perpetrator 
technique 
Furniture ± 
bike stand ± 
in-function 
Increased crime risk to 
bike and its 
components  as  target 
of crime 
Mistreatment Deliberate damage 
    
  Misappropriation of 
entire bike for resale 
Stolen by detaching bike from 
anchorage 
   Stolen by cutting stand 
   Stolen by breaking lock 
   Stolen by picking lock (as affected 
by design of stand) 
   
Hijacking of bike at point of user 
locking or unlocking it 
    
  
 
 
  
Misappropriation of bike 
components and add-ons 
Eg wheels or lights removed from 
bike 
 Increased crime risk 
from bike ± contributor 
as resource for 
offender 
Misuse of bike in 
service of its own 
misappropriation 
Bike frame used as lever to break 
lock 
    
 Parking money as 
target of crime [if 
payment system built 
into stand] 
Mishandling Fraud with parking money 
  Misappropriation with 
mistreatment of 
installation or users 
Theft of money by breaking into 
coin-operated mechanism 
   Robbing cyclist at point of parking 
   Robbing cash collector 
    
 Bike-lock-stand 
complex as 
environment of crime 
Misbehaviour Conflict with other user over 
parking ± bike jam 
   Conflict with pedestrian ± blockage 
   Conflict with pedestrian ± collision/ 
cut-up 
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Table 6  Risk analysis of possibilities ± enclosure/facility as object 
Design focus Generic role in 
crime ± CCO 
Crime type ± Misdeeds & 
Security 
Specific crime ± perpetrator 
technique 
Enclosure/ 
facility ± as 
object 
   
1.  Periphery Environment of 
crime 
Not specified Entire range against barrier, entry 
point, interior or contents of interior 
(described below) 
    
2. Barrier Target of crime Mistreatment Expressive ± wrecking, 
defacement, cutting, abrasion 
    
  Misappropriation Theft of barrier material 
    
 Resource for crime Misuse Concealment/entrapment ± 
hiding behind/within barrier for 
escaping pursuit, avoiding 
surveillance, 
ambushing/trapping victim of 
robbery/assault, urination drug 
dealing/consumption etc 
   As climbing aid for 
burglary/escape 
  
 Deceptive placing of terrorist 
bombs 
    
 
 
Mistake Bomb false alarm 
    
3. Interior Target of crime Mistreatment Expressive ± wrecking, 
defacement, cutting, abrasion of 
interior fittings 
    
  Misappropriation Theft of interior equipment ± 
removal, cutting off etc 
    
 Environment of 
crime 
Misappropriation/mistreatment 
of victims 
Theft/ robbery of users in 
interior 
    
  Misbehaviour Collisions or jams lead to 
conflict and perhaps expressive 
violence and damage 
   Littering 
   Urination 
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Table 7  Risk analysis of possibilities ± enclosure/facility in-function 
Design focus Generic role in 
crime ± CCO 
Crime type ± Misdeeds & 
Security 
Specific crime ± perpetrator 
technique 
Enclosure/ facility  
in-function 
   
 Enclosure  -
protecting contents 
of interior by 
enabling/delivering 
access control 
Mishandling ± entry (and 
exit) without justification or 
permission, in service of 
other crimes 
People with no right to enter 
enclosure, climb over barrier or 
slip through entry point, perhaps 
defeating any ticket/payment 
mechanisms by fraudulent 
means.  Escaping offenders 
climb or slip through in reverse 
    
  Mistreatment  in service of 
other crimes 
Entry to enclosure gained by 
damaging barrier/entry 
control equipment 
    
 Surveillance of 
interior 
Mistreatment/mishandling in 
service of other crimes 
Perpetrators damage or block 
surveillance function by 
obstructing sightlines, 
breaking lights or cameras 
 
 
Orbit D:  Full example risk analysis: furniture ± bike stand ± target of crime ± mistreated ± 
wrecking  
+DYLQJILOOHGLQWKHµFRORXUHG¶possibility sections of the risk analysis template in the above 
summary tables, we can now expand those tables vertically and GRWKHVDPHIRUWKHµZKLWH¶
sections covering the probability and harm associated with each of those possibilities, as 
per the worksheet in Table 3 above. This is illustrated horizontally taking the first row of 
furniture as object (Table 8, extracted from top line of Table 4) and then done in full 
vertical expansion below, with the hierarchical numbering (Table 9). 
 
Table 8  Example row of one crime possibility extracted from summary Table 4 
Design focus Generic role in crime 
± CCO 
Crime type ± 
Misdeeds & Security 
Specific crime ± perpetrator 
technique 
Furniture ± 
stand, cluster 
of stands ± as 
object 
Increased crime risk to 
object - target 
Mistreatment Wrecking 
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Table 9   Example of full risk analysis of the crime possibility in Table 8 
1. Furniture ± individual stand or cluster ± as object 
 
1.1. Target of crime  
1.1.1. Damaged (Mistreated) by  
1.1.1.1. Wrecking  
1.1.1.1.1. Probability  of crime 
1.1.1.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability  [L] 
1.1.1.1.1.2. Magnitude depends on  
1.1.1.1.1.2.1. Design RISURGXFW¶VLQIOXHQFHVRQSUREDELOLW\RIFULPH 
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.1. Inherent visibility of product prompts attack  
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.1.1. Cluster may be a more obvious target set to offender 
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.2. Value of product to offender ± rewarding to damage product ± eg makes satisfying noise/shape 
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.3. Prompting and provocation by distinctive shape; by being an authority symbol (signs, notices, gates, barriers) 
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.4. Susceptibility to deformation, fracture, uprooting, jamming  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.1. Target 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.1.1. In a cluster, one stand may act as a point eg of leverage or brace in attacking another ± strictly part of instrumental 
environment 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.1. Accessibility ± inc space for leverage surrounding individual stand or cluster  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.2. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
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                   «Cluster may affect sightlines eg if offender may  be hidden if crouched down between stands 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.3. Defensibility ± see also separate handling of enclosure under Facility below 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.3. Environment ± motivating 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.3.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.3.2. Territory of preventer 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.4. Offender presence   
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.4.1. Dislike of cyclists 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.4.2. Drunk/rowdy state 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.5. Offender perception 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.6. Offender resources ± brought tools 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.6.1. Cutters, levers, spanners 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.7. Offender resources ± locally found 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.7.1. Stones, levers eg scaffold poles 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.8. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.1. Friends urging/supporting misbehaviour ± pressure 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.2. Slow repair prompts fresh attack by sight of existing damage  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.3. Poor installation facilitates damage  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.9. Preventer presence/action ± user  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.9.1. Affected by short/med/long stay 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.10.   Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.11.   Preventer resources ± passer-by 
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.12.   Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
1.1.1.1.1.2.2.13.   Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
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1.1.1.1.1.2.2.13.1. Visual/audio surveillance aids 
1.1.1.1.2. Harm from crime 
1.1.1.1.2.1. Immediate harms mediated by  
1.1.1.1.2.1.1. Design 
1.1.1.1.2.1.2. Harm to product itself during criminal event ± susceptibility to:  
1.1.1.1.2.1.2.1. Deformation of body or anchorage 
1.1.1.1.2.1.2.2. Fracture of body or anchorage 
1.1.1.1.2.1.2.3. Uprooting of anchorage 
1.1.1.1.2.1.3. Post-event: harm from design of product 
1.1.1.1.2.1.3.1. Sharp points or edges left 
1.1.1.1.2.1.3.2. Trip hazard left 
1.1.1.1.2.1.3.3. Uplifted/broken paving 
1.1.1.1.2.2. Wider harms 
1.1.1.1.2.2.1. 'HQLDORIXVHLPSDFWRQFRQYHQLHQFHKDELWXDOGHFLVLRQWRF\FOH« 
1.1.1.1.2.2.2. Cost and effort of repair/replacement 
1.1.1.1.2.2.3. Injury from cutting or tripping 
1.1.1.1.2.2.4. Incivility ± generates general fear of crime 
1.1.1.1.2.2.5. Incivility ± generates specific perceived risk of damage/loss of bike, hence deters parking and use 
1.1.1.1.2.2.6. Aesthetic degradation of site ± environmental quality of life 
1.1.1.1.2.2.7. Contextual influences on wider harm 
1.1.1.1.2.2.7.1. Delay/difficulty in repair/replacement 
1.1.1.1.2.2.7.2. Susceptible users of site (eg blind, elderly)  
1.1.1.1.2.3. Overall severity of harms [M] 
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The complete risk analysis, crime possibility by crime possibility, is shown in Appendix 1. 
This covers furniture only, because the facilities equivalent was not recorded in risk format 
but entered directly into the design guidance format, as described next. 
From risk analysis to design guidance 
It was considered by those consulted in the Bikeoff team that the output of the risk analysis 
was valid;  but that it was too detailed, repetitive and perhaps esoteric to show designers ± 
the great majority ± who might be using this material themselves without a thorough 
appreciation of the underlying principles. It was also felt that to present such users with 
duaO GLVFRXUVHV µWKLV LV ULVN X; design needs to reduce risk X¶ was largely redundant.  
)LQDOO\ LQ RUGHU WR EH FRPSDUDEOH ZLWK WKH RXWSXW RI :3$ RQ µ%HVW RI %UHHG¶ GHVLJQ
experience, the CCO version had in any case to move on from analysis of risk to 
recommendation for design. So the decision was taken to make the main output a 
simplified set of design guidance statements based on the risk analysis. 
This was done in two ways. First, where the risk analysis had already been written out, the 
design prescriptLRQVZHUHµUHDGRII¶WKHWDEOHDQGFRQYHUWHGLQWRGHVLJQJXLGDQFHODQJXDJH
The correspondence was like this:  
1.1.1.1.1.2.1.2. Value of product to offender ± rewarding to damage product ± eg makes satisfying 
noise/shape  
That entry in the risk analysis became part of this more inclusive statement in the design 
guidance:  
1.1.2.3.1. Furniture should not stimulate deliberate damage (eg by appearing weak, provocative (as in 
authority symbol or pretentious µDUW\¶VKDSHRUEHLQJrewarding to damage eg in terms of enjoyment of 
exercise of force, sight, shape or sound). 
Second, where the analysis had not yet been completed, the author, with a little practice, 
was able to use the risk analysis template to focus on each risk element in turn in his head, 
and type it down directly in design language, in the design guidance template.  
The development of the design guidance itself is described in the next section. 
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5. The design guidance ± development  
At the design guidance stage, it is again necessary to give separate treatment to the twin 
perspectives of design as object and design in-function.  
Three qualifications follow. First, as said already, the function of self-protection makes 
more sense to locate XQGHUµDVREMHFW¶DERYHSecond, Misuse of designed product/place is 
QRUPDOO\FRYHUHGXQGHUWKHµDVREMHFW¶VHFWLRQDOWKRXJKdenial of misuse could be seen as 
a security function. Third, any harm from the preventive function itself is taken to be an 
unintended consequence of the design (unless the design deliberately seeks to subject the 
RIIHQGHUWRYROWVVRLWLVEHVWFRYHUHGXQGHUGHVLJQµDVREMHFW¶ 
Design as object  
The format for design as object is presented in Box 3 below. The format follows that for 
the risk analysis (Section 4 above) at least as far as the listing of detailed criminal events, 
and the same colour code is used. However, the numbering differs in the design guidance 
because the individual entries teased out in the risk analysis are, for the sake of simplicity 
and economy of space, more closely grouped together.  (If each risk analysis were to be 
done in full and then followed by its corresponding design guidance, the same numbering 
could be used.) 
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Several other considerations were taken into account when developing this format. 
 7KHPRVWHOHPHQWDU\IRUPRIJXLGDQFHZRXOGVLPSO\WHOOGHVLJQHUVµGRWKLVGRQ¶WGR
WKDW¶ ZLWKRXW DQ\ FULPH SUHYHQWLRQ UDWLRQDOH 7KLV ZRXOG allow simple, brief 
communications with minimal duplication and may be suited to circumstances where 
designers are only in a position to take heed of a simple checklist. But it does have its 
limitations, centring on the fact that the designers would be slavishly following a recipe 
rather than empowered to use their focused imagination.  (Writers of guidance need to 
focus on posing the correct questions, and not get too closely involved in supplying 
answers. 7KHGHVLJQHUVPD\WKLQNRIVRPHWKLQJWKHJXLGDQFHGLGQ¶W$OVRWKHQHHGIRU
simultaneous design response to different crime types may lead to design conflicts; this 
is user and abusers-centred design.)  6RWRVXSSRUWWKHµWKLQNWKLHI¶DSSURDFK but at the 
expense of some repetition, the version here maintains the separate listing of design 
recommendations for each individual set of crime possibilities.  
 Another matter leading away from bald checklists is the context-dependency of crime 
prevention (not to mention the context-dependency of most other designed-in 
functions) emphasised in Section 2 above. So rather than simply set out design 
requirements as absolutes, it is necessary to bear in mind the context. This is handled 
by identifying contextual risk factors which influence the probability of, or harm 
from, the relevant crime possibility. Obviously the more the risk factors or the greater 
their intensity, the more the requirement on design to mitigate them (and if not by 
design alone, then by human management/guardianship facilitated and assisted by 
Box 3  Format of design guidelines 
1. Design focus ± eg furniture as object 
1.1. CCO entity ± object as target of crime/ resource for crime/ environment of 
crime/ enclosure for crime  
1.1.1. Generic design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events  
1.1.1.1. )XUQLWXUHVKRXOGEHUHVLVWDQWWRSK\VLFDODWWDFNE\« 
1.1.2. Misdeed  
1.1.2.1. Details of criminal events 
1.1.2.1.1. Offenders, motivation, perpetrator techniques, victims etc [plus 
link to harms] 
1.1.2.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired 
events  
1.1.2.2.1. Proximity of bars and clubs 
1.1.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.1.2.3.1. )XUQLWXUHVKRXOGPLQLPLVHVXVFHSWLELOLW\WR« 
1.1.2.4. Design requirements to reduce harm from preventive measures 
themselves [Eg an annoying security barrier is inconvenient and may 
provoke retaliatory damage] 
1.1.2.4.1. )XUQLWXUHVKRXOG« 
1.1.2.5. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
1.1.2.5.1. )XUQLWXUHVKRXOG« 
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design). Some of these risk factors are generic, others relate to specific design 
requirements and to avoid repetition are inserted at appropriately generic or specific 
levels in the guidance.  The risk factors are described using CCO again, at appropriate 
places of greater and lesser generality.   
 The environmental context that appears under risk factors relating to furniture, may 
simply be part of the natural milieu into which the furniture is installed ± nearby walls, 
bus shelters etc. Alternatively, part of the environment can be deliberately hived off as 
a designed enclosure intended as a security adaptation which purposively manipulates 
many of those contextual risk factors to increase the security of the space within which 
the stands are sited. So what was context for the furniture becomes the designed entity 
when we move on to consider the enclosed facility. Note, however, that product and 
place designers may view their tasks from opposite starting points working from 
product to environment and vice-versa. 
 
Design in-function 
The in-function part of the design guidance begins with a statement of the various 
intended security functions of the designed object or place, together with a description of 
how they work. ,Q WKHIXQFWLRQDOVWDWHPHQW LWGUDZVRQ WKHµVHFXULW\¶FRXQWHUSDUWVRI WKH
misdeeds in the Misdeeds and Security framework: 
 Secured against misappropriation  
 Safeguarded against mistreatment  
 Shielded against misuse  
 Supporting  enforcement, justice,/crime reduction, community safety 
 Scam-proofed against mishandling ± fraud, counterfeiting, smuggling; 
 µ6¶LYLOLVHG ± environment resistant or repellent to misbehaviour and conducive to 
good behaviour  
 Slip-proofed against mistakes 
 
How the function is intended to work is described in terms of the causal mechanisms of 
intervention, a discourse introduced in Section 2 above. 
Thus for example the bike stand, in-function, 
Secures whole bike and its major components (eg wheels) against theft by anchoring 
them to environment, and either supporting a discriminator function on the anchorage (eg 
fixing point for a lock brought by user); providing one (captive locking function); or 
providing part of one (eg locking feature on stand designed to mate with counterpart 
locking feature on bike). 
The full security function statement of the furniture is in Box 4. 
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The equivalent for the parking facility is in Box 5. In this case, it is more efficient to list 
the mechanisms by which the security function is delivered together, rather than function 
by function as in the furniture box above. 
Box 4  Full security function statement of furniture 
 
Furniture ± outdoor/industrial bike stand ± in function 
Intended security functions± reducing probability of criminal event/s; reducing and/or 
mitigating harm from immediate criminal event or wider consequences ± and their preventive 
mechanisms ± how they work  
a) Secures whole bike and major components (eg wheels) against theft by anchoring it to 
environment, and either supporting a discriminator function (eg lock brought by user); 
providing one (captive locking function); or providing part of one (eg feature on bike 
designed to mate with locking feature on stand). 
b) May secure components of bike against theft by enclosing in lockable container or by 
wrapping main stand around them, denying access until whole bike legitimately removed 
via operation of discriminator. 
c) May shelter environments and pedestrian/cycle users in vicinity of stand against 
nuisance and conflict by keeping bikes out of way of pedestrian paths 
d) May shelter environments and cycle users in vicinity of stand against nuisance and 
conflict by orderly rationing of parking places and by regulating movement of multiple 
bikes in same space. 
e) May enable the secure obtaining of revenue from parking facilities by transacting and 
storing cash or transacting card payment linked to locking and release of bike. 
f) May enable the secure operation of bike rental schemes as in e above. 
g) May safeguard environment and all users against terrorist bombs by directing bike parking 
to less harmful locations (Eg out of the immediate way of crowds).  
h) Self-protection against attack, criminal countermoves aimed at disabling security function 
and misuse in furtherance of other crimes ± all included under 1 above (furniture as object) 
± by target-hardening/softening, or by avoiding provocation or prompting of attack. 
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Box 5  Full security function statement of parking facility 
Intended security functions ± reducing probability of criminal event/s; reducing and/or 
mitigating harm from immediate criminal event or wider consequences ± and how they work 
a) Secures bike and components against deliberate damage, theft 
b) Secures users and managers/guards against robbery (users/cash collectors), and shelters 
them against conflict. 
c) Safeguards all users, managers/guards, passers by, residents, businesses etc against 
terrorist attack by deposition of bomb etc. 
d) Protects stands against deliberate damage, theft, misuse and misbehaviour (see 
Furniture as objec above). 
e) Secures any payment-collecting system against theft. 
f) Self-protection against attack, criminal countermoves aimed at disabling security function 
and misuse in furtherance of other crimes ± all included under Facility as object above. 
Note that the enclosure can be intended as a security adaptation which purposively shapes 
the environment within which the stands are sited; which therefore deliberately controls the 
spatial and perhaps social context of the stands and hence manipulates many of the risk 
factors surrounding the stands, identified in Furniture as object and in-function above. 
All of these functions are achieved through acting as a designed, enclosed micro-environment 
for bike stands and users approaching/employing them. They work in more detail by enabling/ 
facilitating some or all of the following preventive mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms 
tip the instrumental balance in favour of preventers over offenders in the exercise of their 
scripts (eg surveillance v stealth), or by motivating or otherwise causally influencing one or 
other party: [should these be converted into safeguarding etc, where possible? But enclosed 
environment is too generic to cast into similar statement to furniture-in-function] 
 Controlling access by offenders to interior space ± technologically or by human staff  
 Mobilising (Alerting, Informing, Motivating, Empowering) 
guards/managers/users/others to control behaviour/ check people entering or leaving 
interior  
 Limiting escape of criminal on completion of crime, or of attempt 
 Limiting space and barriers for hiding 
 Limiting space for undertaking criminal actions (leverage etc). 
 Defining limited interior space requiring surveillance 
 Defining expected actions/users at access point and within interior, hence clarifying 
suspicious behaviour and people to improve detection and challenge performance for 
surveillers 
 Defining interior space setting subject to rules for good behaviour 
 Providing well-defined sightlines for surveillance (natural or technological) within 
interior and at entry point/s 
 Providing location/mounting for security communications to users, offenders; for 
technological surveillance aids eg CCTV 
 Channelling different street users along different paths/into different spaces to avoid 
conflict 
 Avoiding provocation or prompting of attack on enclosure itself 
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Designing against the risks of failure of the security functions to prevent crime 
The final part of the guidance returns to the security of the designed product but this time 
covers how its design should protect its function. The format (Box 6) is largely the same as 
that for the self-protection of the product under design as object, above. The difference is 
that the criminal possibility protected against actually amounts to a potential failure of the 
intended security function. In practice, the function of the designed product is 
represented (in blue) as protecting some target, resource environment etc other than itself; 
the failure is represented as one of the Misdeeds (in yellow), and in more detail as specific 
types of event (in purple). Once again, contextual risk factors are noted and design 
recommendations (occasionally with their own contextual considerations) set out which 
support the security function by reducing probability and/or harm from the criminal events. 
Repetition is kept to a minimum by using hyperlinks within the guidance. 
 
Box 6  Format of design guidance for security function of furniture 
 
0.1. Protecting bike and its components as target of crime 
0.1.1. Deliberate damage to bike/components as end in itself 
0.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
0.1.1.1.1. Bike vandalised probably for expressive reasons 
(entertainment, retaliation, dislike of cyclists) ± by hand, or 
with brought or adventitious tools.  
0.1.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired 
events  
0.1.1.2.1. Design or Contextual factors increasing probability of 
damage, theft, misuse of or misbehaviour with furniture as 
under Furniture as object 
0.1.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
0.1.1.3.1. Stand should be designed to protect bike and its components 
from any deliberate damage, eg by limiting: access, working 
space for abrasion, leverage etc, supply of leverage/bracing 
points or components such as locking arms which can be 
misused as tools. Bike itself should not be misusable as lever 
in its own destruction. 
0.1.1.3.2. Stand should be designed likewise to prevent damage 
incidental to targeting/misusing furniture as under 1. 
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6. The full design guidance 
The complete design guidance based on CCO and M&S frameworks now follows, 
covering Furniture and Facilities, each treated first as object, and second in-function. Some 
specific points to note: 
 To attempt to keep a lid on the number of design and crime contingencies in the list, 
some grouping together and hyperlinked cross referencing has been done. Therefore, as 
said, WKHKLHUDUFKLFDOQXPEHULQJ LQ WKHGHVLJQJXLGDQFHGRHVQ¶WFRUUHVSRQG WR WKDW Ln 
the risk analysis. 
 The very beginning of the guidance lists some general contextual risk factors for 
increasing probability or harm, which apply across all four of these perspectives. The 
more intense these are in a given locality, the more the designer should consider 
protecting the furniture (and the bikes that the stands receive) within a secure 
enclosure, and to allow for human guardianship on-site. 
 There was some debate among the Bikeoff project team about the extent to which 
harm information should directly be incorporated within the guidance, or made 
available separately in linked documentation. As previously argued, information on 
harm can have two functions ± influencing design priorities;23 and specifically 
guiding design to reduce that criminal harm.  In the current version, the emphasis is on 
the latter, and most of the harm information remains in the corresponding entries in the 
risk analysis where that was separately done. Within the guidance, further information 
on harm for both purposes could be incorporated in the (purple) entries supplying 
details of specific crime risks.   
 The language of the guidance is kept as functional as possible, to maximise design 
freedom. More technical, and thus more constraining, versions could be produced for 
designers with a narrower scope and/or less innovative capacity.  
 The technical terminology of CCO and M&S frameworks is less emphasised in the 
design guidance, to improve accessibility for designers for capacity building purposes. 
However, these frameworks still underlie the guidance and continue to be indicated by 
the colour code. For anyone using the frameworks for capacity development (in other 
words, for developing fresh sets of guidelines for products other than bike furniture or 
facilities), the more explicit use of the frameworks would be helpful. 
 Finally, although the above points on language may suggest otherwise, note that the 
current guidance material has not yet been formatted or fully drafted in a way that is 
                                                          
23
  Obviously, if more harmful consequences follow from a given type of crime, reducing 
the risk of that crime gets greater priority relative to other design requirements. The total 
harm could be reduced either by reducing probability of events, or directly reducing harm 
if the crime still does occur. More generally this links to the discussion of primary, 
secondary and tertiary security in Section 2.) 
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µUHDG\ WRXVH¶ IRUGHVLJQHUV or for developers of design guidance outside the current 
project team. Rather, it is primarily intended to generate the CCO-based guidance 
considerations that can be compared with those of WP A1, Best of Breed. Because 
different sets of designers may have different perspectives (eg product designers 
focusing on furniture/stands, architectural/building designers on facilities/enclosures), 
in a user-friendly guidance format the same crime possibility could be covered under 
both headings, with different emphases. For e[DPSOHµUREEHU\RIFDVKFROOHFWRUV¶FRXOG
come under both furniture (if the money was taken, stored and collected stand by 
stand) and facility (if a common cash machine serving whole facility; but also if any 
boundary, access control and interior environment of an enclosed facility had 
contextual design implications for risks of individual cash machines). 
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Full design guidance  
 
0. General contextual risk factors  
 
0.1. Factors increasing the probability of undesired events for all design foci  
0.1.1. Furniture/facility in environments which are easily accessible;  where surveillance possibilities (in terms 
of lighting, sightlines) favour offenders (spotting targets, assessing risks and keeping a look out) over 
guards and other potential preventers. 
0.1.2. Lighting conditions which facilitate offender actions (eg can see to select target, operate tools etc 
without exposure to risk by requirement to use a torch). 
0.1.3. Presence (resident, working, routinely passing through) of potential offenders. 
0.1.4. Absence of motivation and environmental conditions for exercise of informal prevention, including 
territoriality; and of social cohesion more generally. 
0.1.5. Specifically, tendency among local users to adopt insecure locking practices.  
0.1.6. Mutual anonymity of people present/passing through. 
0.1.7. Plausibility of presence/actions of offenders as legitimate ± eg disguise/props as council workers is 
credible in this location. 
0.1.8. Absence of formal guardianship; guardians inadequately trained/equipped to surveill, challenge, 
respond, summon assistance. 
0.1.9. Presence of general indicators of neglect/indifference to crime and misbehaviour (eg litter, poor 
maintenance). 
0.1.10. Infrequent use and/or long parking times. 
0.1.11. Presence of high-value bikes. 
0.1.12. Presence of cash-operated facilities or furniture. 
0.1.13. Construction of furniture/facilities of high-value materials. 
 
0.2. Generic design implications of these risk factors 
0.2.1. The more, and the more intense, these risk factors, the more it may be appropriate to raise the 
specification of detailed security properties, as listed in the remainder of this guidance. 
0.2.2. In addition, it may become cost-effective to protect the parking facility within an enclosure (either 
indoor or outdoor), to have on-site or telepresent guards, and to design the furniture and facility to 
support the carrying out of their duties (for example with reference to access control and surveillance). 
0.2.3. It is better to avoid designing cash into the system at all; but if this nonetheless proves necessary, 
various guidelines are suggested at appropriate points below. 
 
0.3. Factors increasing the harm from undesired events for all design foci  
0.3.1. Vulnerable street users present eg blind, elderly. 
0.3.1.1. Design implication ± increase attention to the various harms listed below. 
0.3.2. Inspection and maintenance is infrequent and/or limited. 
0.3.2.1. Design implication ± reduce costs and/or difficulty of inspecting and maintaining furniture 
and facilities (eg increase tamper-evident properties). 
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1. Furniture ± outdoor/industrial bike stand ± as object  
 
1.1. As target of crime 
1.1.1. Generic design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events   
1.1.1.1. Configuration/orientation of cluster of furniture should be designed to minimise concealment 
of offender from surveillance, especially if crouching; and maximise view from any intended 
surveillance outlooks (by eye or camera as appropriate). 
 
1.1.2. Deliberate damage as end in itself 
1.1.2.1. Details of criminal events 
1.1.2.1.1. Wrecking leading to deformation, fracture, uprooting; defacement by ink, spray paint, 
sticker; cutting, abrasion using range of brought and adventitious tools. Burning. 
Mechanisms with hinges, slots, interior works etc may be blocked, jammed or even 
glued or filled with noxious substances [I once encountered this service record in Tyne 
	 :HDU 0HWUR µ'RJ GXQJ LQ SXEOLF HQTXLU\ WHOHSKRQH PRXWKSLHFH¶@ 8VXDOO\ E\
children/young people for play or occasionally retaliation against officials/users. 
Damage may also occur out of frustration with failing or awkward mechanism. [Note 
that the intentional act of doing damage is the criminal event; the immediate harmful 
consequence to the furniture is the damage achieved] 
1.1.2.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
1.1.2.2.1. People ready to offend due to lack of legitimate local entertainment. 
1.1.2.2.2. Offending or oppositional subculture. 
1.1.2.2.3. People likely at times to be in drunken/rowdy state; availability of alcohol. 
1.1.2.2.4. People hanging around in groups likely to pressure/permit offending. 
1.1.2.2.5. Dislike of cyclists/envy at expensive bikes. 
1.1.2.2.6. Officious notices, over-zealous guards, may provoke attack. 
1.1.2.2.7. Slow/imperfect repair/replacement may prompt further attack. 
1.1.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.1.2.3.1. Furniture should not stimulate deliberate damage (eg by appearing weak, provocative 
DV LQDXWKRULW\ V\PERORU µDUW\¶ VKDSHRUEHLQJ UHZDUGLQJ WRGDPDJHHJ LQ WHUPVRI
enjoyment of exercise of force, sight, shape or sound). 
1.1.2.3.2. Any mechanism (eg locking, money operations) should cause minimum frustration to 
OHJLWLPDWHXVHUVKHQFHPLQLPLVHµPDFKLQHUDJH¶± both in operation and in failure mode 
(eg should clearly indicate 'out of order').  
1.1.2.3.3. Furniture and its components eg locking arms should resist deliberate damage, including 
by use of readily available hand tools or adventitious implements (eg stones, poles, 
sticks) including insertion of tools or substances into working parts. Risk factors for 
wrecking: proximity to supplies of adventitious implements or bracing/leverage points. 
1.1.2.3.4. Furniture in clusters should not provide leverage/bracing sites to apply force to their 
neighbours. 
1.1.2.3.5. Consider all users of the space to minimise likelihood that non-cyclists will become 
hostile to furniture. 
1.1.2.3.6. Furniture should activate surveillance by calling attention to damage in progress (eg by 
requirement for conspicuous movement to achieve damage, inherent noise, or electronic 
alarm if appropriate). 
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1.1.2.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
1.1.2.4.1. ,WVKRXOGµIDLOVDIH¶HJQRWOHDYHKDUPIXOVKDUSHGJHVWULSKD]DUGVRUHOHFWULFDOKD]DUGV
Risk factor: particularly if vulnerable or unwary street users present eg blind, elderly, 
children. 
1.1.2.4.2. It should not destroy ground anchorage.  
1.1.2.4.3. Damage should not propagate ± eg scratches leading to rusting. Risk factor: Damp or 
exposed locations. 
1.1.2.4.4. Damage to any parked bikes should be minimised. 
1.1.2.4.5. Functional damage should be tamper-HYLGHQW VR XVHU GRHVQ¶W WU\ WR SDUN DW D QRZ
ineffective stand eg which no longer locks properly, or where retaining rail becomes 
detached at one end).  
1.1.2.4.6. Visual impact on environmental quality should be minimised. Risk factor: particularly if 
in environmentally important/salient site; or where local people likely to be especially 
fearful of crime. 
1.1.2.4.7. Visual prompting of commission of further damage should be minimised (eg contrasting 
undercoat exposed by scratching). 
1.1.2.4.8. Effort and cost to clean/repair/replace damage should be minimised. 
1.1.2.4.9. Down-time when unavailable for use should be minimised. 
1.1.2.4.10. Cleaning (eg paint removal) should not degrade the furniture (eg affect visual 
appearance, water resistance) Risk factor: furniture sited in exposed/wet location. 
 
1.1.3. Theft of furniture 
1.1.3.1. Details of criminal events 
1.1.3.1.1. Usually adult offenders (maybe professional/organised) stealing furniture or its 
components for resale or scrap value. Furniture cut, detached, unfastened and 
removed, maybe requiring vehicle. 
1.1.3.2. Contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
1.1.3.2.1. Space for cutting, levering, striking 
1.1.3.2.2. Inadequate installation facilitating removal 
1.1.3.2.3. Vehicular access close by 
1.1.3.2.4. Possibly more organised offending ± co-offenders and good tools needed 
1.1.3.2.5. Market value of furniture or scrap ± will this rise over product lifetime? 
1.1.3.2.6. Presence in district of fences and other crime promoters 
1.1.3.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.1.3.3.1. Furniture or easily-removed components should not be made of high-value and/or 
easily reprocessed materials 
1.1.3.3.2. Furniture should not visually prompt theft (eg by obvious construction from high-
value materials)  
1.1.3.3.3. If resale a risk, furniture could have ineradicable identification (and registration). This 
should be made obvious to potential thief by a discouraging communication on or 
near the item. 
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1.1.3.3.4. Cutting or disconnecting furniture or components by readily available hand tools 
should be difficult, time-consuming, noisy and visually obvious, whether through 
choice of materials or configuration of stand. 
1.1.3.3.5. Anchorage should be resistant to illegitimate release but easy for legitimate release 
(eg for replacement) ± eg via requirement for specialist tools. 
1.1.3.3.6. Secure installation of anchorage in ground, and ongoing inspection/maintenance of 
anchorage, should be easy. 
1.1.3.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens  
1.1.3.4.1. Same requirements apply as for Damage (1.1.2.4.). 
1.1.3.4.2. Furniture or expensive components should be identifiable in resale or scrap. 
1.1.3.4.3. Removed furniture should not be suitable for misuse as weapon eg in riot or tool eg 
to smash shop windows. Risk factor: sited close to shops. 
 
1.2. As resource for crime 
 
1.2.1. Misuse of furniture as climbing aid ± whether as individual stand or a cluster 
1.2.1.1. Details of criminal events 
1.2.1.1.1. To gain access eg for burglary, or to escape pursuing police, offender climbs onto 
furniture and over wall, into window etc; or climbs down onto furniture to reach 
ground. 
1.2.1.2. Contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
1.2.1.2.1. Placement where climbing could facilitate illegal access or escape ± eg near wall 
giving access to back garden 
1.2.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.2.1.3.1. Strength for stepping on, grippability, nonslippability, and configuration for 
climbing up and down should be minimised whilst not jeopardising normal function 
and appearance. 
1.2.1.3.2. Perceived climbability (affordance) should be minimised. 
1.2.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens  
1.2.1.4.1. It should resist damage from force or abrasion (although harm reduction may trade-
off against probability of misuse); target-softening techniques such as spring-back 
may enable resistance to damage and to misuse to be co-maximised. 
1.2.1.4.2. It should not be deliberately designed to punish or expose offenders to physical 
hazard. 
1.2.1.4.3. Damage to any parked bikes should be minimised. 
 
1.2.2. Misuse of furniture for deceptive placing of bombs 
1.2.2.1. Details of criminal events 
1.2.2.1.1. Offender hangs/leans bomb in bag or container against or on furniture. 
1.2.2.2. Contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
1.2.2.2.1. Local tensions which may motivate local terrorism 
1.2.2.2.2. Crowded place, many human/material targets, places of particular value to terrorists. 
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1.2.2.2.3. Place where hostile reconnaissance is easy ± see generic risk factors under 0. 
1.2.2.2.4. Litter, waste acting as camouflage. 
1.2.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.2.2.3.1. Possibility to hang, lean or conceal explosives container/bag on stand (or in any 
closable/lockable container for cycling kit) should be minimised. 
1.2.2.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens (bomb detonates) 
1.2.2.4.1. Possible weaponisation of stand ± eg creating shrapnel ± should be minimised 
1.2.2.4.2. Proximity of people/places which can be harmed/damaged (as in 1.2.2.2) [note that 
these harm factors also appear under under probability factors, because the ability 
to achieve the harm is what motivates the offenders] Risk factor: accessibility for 
emergency services. 
 
1.2.3. Mistake ± false alarm if furniture used to place items resembling bombs 
1.2.3.1. Details of criminal events 
1.2.3.1.1. Not a crime but some person mistakenly perceives innocent bag or container 
hanging/leant against furniture as possible bomb. 
1.2.3.2. Contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
1.2.3.2.1. Same as for genuine event under 1.1.2.2. 
1.2.3.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.2.3.3.1. Possibility to hang or lean bag on stand, which might contain explosives, should be 
minimised. 
 
1.2.4. Misbehaviour ± sitting/climbing on stands ± individual or clusters. 
1.2.4.1. Details of criminal events 
1.2.4.1.1. Children and young people (possibly intoxicated) sit/climb on stands and more 
generally gather round them, causing nuisance/fear and possibly wrecking/abrasion 
damage.  
1.2.4.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
1.2.4.2.1. As under Damage 1.1.2.2. 
1.2.4.3. General contextual risk factors increasing harm from undesired events 
1.2.4.3.1. Presence of people (eg elderly, minorities) who might feel particularly threatened by 
presence of groups of misbehaving youths 
1.2.4.3.2. Crime propagation ± if hanging around generates opportunity eg for casing shops, 
houses etc for burglary/theft; or becomes a place of conflict between rival groups 
(even a contested territory). 
1.2.4.4. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.2.4.4.1. Climb-on/sit-on-ability of furniture should be minimised, eg in terms of strength, 
slipperiness, secure and comfortable configuration 
1.2.4.4.2. Affordance and invitation to climb/sit on should be minimised, eg in terms of 
appearance resembling familiar playground climbing frames or parallel bars in gym. 
1.2.4.5. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
1.2.4.5.1. See Damage 1.1.2.4 
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1.2.4.5.2. &OLPEHUVVKRXOGQRWEHH[SRVHGWRµXQDFFHSWDEOH¶RUGHOLEHUDWHO\SXQLWLYHDGGLWLRQDO
risk eg furniture unexpectedly tips them off. Risk factor: nature of ground to fall on. 
 
1.2.5. Misbehaviour ± bashing furniture to make noise 
1.2.5.1. Details of criminal events 
1.2.5.1.1. Young/child offenders/drunks use sticks/stones etc to create noise motivated by play, 
retaliation against elderly resident tellers-off etc  
1.2.5.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
1.2.5.2.1. Acoustics of environment or enclosure. 
1.2.5.2.2. Background noise levels. 
1.2.5.2.3. Presence of people the offenders want to annoy. 
1.2.5.2.4. Availability of items to bash with. 
1.2.5.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
1.2.5.3.1. Furniture/anchorage should not generate especially rewarding sounds when struck by 
hand/foot or with adventitious tools (sticks, stones etc). 
1.2.5.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
1.2.5.4.1. See damage 1.1.2.2. eg resistance to wrecking, abrasion [note that here, damage is a 
harmful consequence of the theft event, so what made events probable under 
deliberate damage now becomes what generates harm under damage in course of 
theft] and 1.1.2.4. 
1.2.5.4.2. Risk factor: presence of people (residents, shopkeepers, workers) susceptible to 
being annoyed. 
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2. Furniture ± outdoor/industrial bike stand ± in function 
Intended security functions± reducing probability of criminal event/s; reducing and/or mitigating harm from 
immediate criminal event or wider consequences ± and their preventive mechanisms ± how they work  
a) Secures whole bike and major components (eg wheels) against theft by anchoring it to environment, and either 
supporting a discriminator function (eg lock brought by user); providing one (captive locking function); or 
providing part of one (eg feature on bike designed to mate with locking feature on stand). 
b) May secure components of bike against theft by enclosing in lockable container or by wrapping main stand 
around them, denying access until whole bike legitimately removed via operation of discriminator. 
c) May shelter environments and pedestrian/cycle users in vicinity of stand against nuisance and conflict by 
keeping bikes out of way of pedestrian paths 
d) May shelter environments and cycle users in vicinity of stand against nuisance and conflict by orderly 
rationing of parking places and by regulating movement of multiple bikes in same space. 
e) May enable the secure acquisition of revenue from parking facilities by transacting and storing cash or 
transacting card payment linked to locking and release of bike. 
f) May enable the secure operation of bike rental schemes as in e above. 
g) May safeguard environment and all users against terrorist bombs by directing bike parking to less harmful 
locations (eg out of the immediate way of crowds), or by mitigating harm directly through design (eg by 
deflecting blast).  
h) Self-protection against attack, criminal countermoves aimed at disabling security function and misuse in 
furtherance of other crimes ± all included under 1 above (furniture as object) ± by target-hardening/softening, or 
by avoiding provocation or prompting of attack. 
Notes 
 The bike + lock + stand are treated here as a single complex. 
 The lock and/or fastenings can be brought by the user, or present as components of the stand.  
 The user should be considered part of the system operating the complex, although mostly treated below as context. 
 
2.1. Protecting bike and its components as target of crime 
 
2.1.1. Deliberate damage to bike/components as end in itself 
2.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
2.1.1.1.1. Bike vandalised probably for expressive reasons (entertainment, retaliation for 
obstruction, dislike of cyclists) ± by hand, or with brought or adventitious tools. 
[Note ± incidental damage to bikes in course of misuse or theft of bike stand is 
covered in 1.1 stand as target of crime]  
2.1.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.1.1.2.1. Design or Contextual factors increasing probability of damage, theft, misuse of or 
misbehaviour with furniture as under 1. 
2.1.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.1.3.1. Stand should be designed to protect bike and its components from any deliberate 
damage, eg by limiting: access, working space for abrasion, leverage etc, supply of 
leverage/bracing points or components such as locking arms which can be misused as 
tools. Bike itself should not be misusable as lever in its own destruction. 
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2.1.1.3.2. Stand should be designed likewise to prevent damage incidental to targeting/misusing 
furniture as under 1. 
 
2.1.2. Theft of bike or components from stand ± all techniques of theft 
2.1.2.1. Details of criminal events  
2.1.2.1.1. Bike removed from stand eg by detaching anchorage of stand, cutting stand, breaking or 
picking lock, coercing user. Detachable components removed, forced or cut from bike.24 
2.1.2.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
2.1.2.2.1. Significant presence of potential thieves routinely passing, or specifically attracted 
to, site. 
2.1.2.2.2. Site within catchment area of market for stolen bikes. 
2.1.2.2.3. Site likely to contain high-value bikes worth stealing for permanent 
possession/resale; or presence of significant number of offenders who would value 
µJHW-me-KRPH¶ELNHVRIDQ\TXDOLW\9DOXHRIELNHVLVUHDGLO\YLVLEOH 
2.1.2.2.4. Limited use of marking/registration or tracking schemes in area  
2.1.2.2.5. Managers/maintenance staff unaware of this perpetrator technique hence unlikely to 
repair/tighten fittings. 
2.1.2.3. Generic design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.2.3.1. Degree to which value of bikes can easily be seen without close inspection should be 
minimised. 
 
2.1.3. Theft of bike from stand ± Detaching stand from anchorage; cutting stand 
2.1.3.1. Details of criminal events  
2.1.3.1.1. Offender unbolts stand; cuts retaining fixings; digs out foundation; and either 
removes bike there & then or pre-loosens stand, to return when desirable bike 
present and unguarded. Alternatively, offender part cuts through stand and removes 
or bends section aside again for present or future removal of bike. Tools may include 
saws, cutting disks, spanners, socket wrenches, levers (which could be adventitious). 
2.1.3.2. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.3.2.1. Fixings, foundation and anchorage should be resistant to detachment or working 
loose. 
2.1.3.2.2. Stand should be resistant to cutting and then bending, especially in sections which 
would enable bike to be removed. 
2.1.3.2.3. Stand and anchorage should appear robust against these actions, discouraging 
offenders from even trying and thereby causing damage even in failed attempts. 
2.1.3.2.4. Any detachment/cutting should be tamper-evident to users and/or any 
guards/managers. If necessary consider communications to alert, inform and empower 
users to take note. 
                                                          
24
 7KHVHDFWLRQVDUHDOLWWOHGLIIHUHQWO\H[SUHVVHGIURPWKHVWDQGDUG%LNHRII3HUSHWUDWRU7HFKQLTXHVOLVWRIµVWULNLQJSLFNLQJ 
OHYHULQJFXWWLQJOLIWLQJDQGXQEROWLQJ¶,WZDVIHOWWKDWWKHVHµSXUHDFWLRQV¶ZHUHDGHTXDWHIRUVXPPDU\ODEHOVEXWIRUGHVLJQ
guidance purposes contained insufficient detail of what received the action (the stand, the lock, the bike etc). Also, one or two 
action possibilities listed here (such as coercive hijacking) were new. 
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2.1.3.2.5. Maintenance and repair of anchorage (eg tightening if loose) should be easy to spot 
the need and to undertake. 
2.1.3.2.6. Actions to detach or cut stand (unbolting, working loose or cutting) should be obvious 
in sound, sight of movement and intent 
2.1.3.2.7. Unbolting etc should require specialist tools and should be difficult with likely hand 
tools brought by offenders or acquired adventitiously nearby.  
2.1.3.2.8. Subject to requirement for legitimate use, and maintenance/ replacement, access and 
space to undertake the detachment or cutting actions should be constrained. 
2.1.3.2.9. If stand + bike + lock detached from anchorage, bike + lock should not be easily 
removable (eg by sliding off free end) from loose remains of stand, but should remain 
attached as an encumbrance (discouragement through increased effort required for 
IXUWKHUVHSDUDWLRQDQGDGHWHUUHQWRIIHQGHU¶VSHUFHLYHGULVNRIGHWHFWLRQ 
2.1.3.3. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.1.3.3.1. &RQVLGHUµIXVH¶DUUDQJHPHQWVRUHPRYDOOHDYHVDQFKRUDJHLQWDFW± but avoid thereby 
making crime easier. 
2.1.3.3.2. Minimise risk of injury from loosened stand falling on someone, or cut edges cutting, 
spiking or tripping them. 
2.1.3.3.3. Minimise possible damage to neighbouring parked bikes. 
 
 
2.1.4. Theft of bike from stand ± breaking, picking or electronically defeating lock  
Lock/s may be captive or supplied by user. 
2.1.4.1. Details of criminal events 
2.1.4.1.1. Offender uses force (perhaps with brought or adventitious tools eg chisel, drill, 
hammer, stick, bike frame) to break/release lock mechanism or cut retaining cable/bar; 
fine tool (pick lock, paperclip or whatever) or electronics as appropriate to circumvent 
the discriminatory property of the lock; or both in combination. More than one lock, 
of different kinds, may need to be defeated. 
2.1.4.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
2.1.4.2.1. Space within cluster of stands, wider environment or enclosure to undertake action ± 
apply tools. 
2.1.4.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.4.3.1. Reduce susceptibility of any captive lock to levering, hammering, drilling, prising or 
cutting ± by hardening material or construction; or softening (eg making bars swivel 
VRVDZLQJIRUFHFDQ¶WEHDSSOLHG 
2.1.4.3.2. Reduce susceptibility of lock to picking, requiring time, specialist tools, good light, 
skills and concentration. 
2.1.4.3.3. Lock and bars etc should appear robust against these actions, discouraging offenders 
from even trying and thereby causing damage even in failed attempts. 
2.1.4.3.4. Any breaking/picking should be tamper-evident to users and/or any 
guards/managers/maintenance staff. If necessary consider communications to alert, 
inform and empower users to take note; and data link to staff. 
2.1.4.3.5. Maintenance and repair of captive lock/bars/cables etc should be easy to spot the need 
and to undertake. 
2.1.4.3.6. Actions to break/pick lock should be obvious in sound, sight of movement and intent 
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2.1.4.3.7. (QVXUHDQ\µHQJLQHHU¶VEDFNGRRU¶RQFDSWLYHORFN± to facilitate unlocking of broken 
lock or in case of lost key/code ± is not susceptible to exploitation. Risk factor: low 
level of security among maintenance employees. 
2.1.4.3.8. Ensure configuration of components does not facilitate one part being used to supply 
leverage, or brace, against another. This includes bike frame used as lever to snap lock 
or lock cable/chain/bar.  Likewise ensure lock cable/chain/bar (captive or otherwise) 
is not able to be brought too near any nearby ground, wall etc so it can be braced 
against force.  
2.1.4.3.9. Ensure user applying own lock fits it in secure position. 
2.1.4.3.10. Locking mechanism easily/cheaply replaceable/upgradeable if offenders discover how 
to overcome it, obtain master keys etc. 
2.1.4.4. Design requirements to reduce harm if event happens 
2.1.4.4.1. As under Damage to furniture 1.1.2.4. (not all apply). 
 
2.1.5. Theft of bike from stand ± bike removed from improperly activated captive lock 
2.1.5.1. Details of criminal events  
2.1.5.1.1. User thinks that lock has activated; offender discovers, or has pre-arranged (eg with 
an object placed within locking mechanism), that it has not.  
2.1.5.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
2.1.5.2.1. User in a hurry (eg commuter station) 
2.1.5.2.2. Poor lighting or other distractions (noise, crowding) inhibit checking of lock 
2.1.5.2.3. User unaware of risk 
2.1.5.2.4. Infrequent maintenance/inspection 
2.1.5.2.5. Maintenance staff unaware of perpetrator technique 
2.1.5.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.5.3.1. Lock easily and reliably activated. 
2.1.5.3.2. Lock gives clear visual/audio feedback when activated. 
2.1.5.3.3. Lock resistant DQGRUWDPSHUHYLGHQWWRµVSLNLQJ¶RUZKDWHYHULW¶VFDOOHG 
2.1.5.3.4. Communication about risk to user perhaps incorporated ruggedly in lock, stand or 
separate signage. 
2.1.5.4. Design requirements to reduce harm if event happens 
2.1.5.4.1. Damage to or from any loosely-flapping lock arm/bar should be minimised. 
2.1.5.4.2. In high-risk contexts where data link already available, remote sensing of failed lock 
actuation may be appropriate, eg notifying guard/manager/maintenance staff. 
 
2.1.6. Theft of components from bike in stand  
2.1.6.1. Details of criminal events  
2.1.6.1.1. Wheels, saddle, mudguards etc removed, leaving bike frame in place; frame removed 
leaving wheel in place; unsecured items eg pumps, lights removed. 
2.1.6.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events 
2.1.6.2.1. User leaves kit behind carelessly or ignorantly. 
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2.1.6.2.2. Valuable items available/ in fashion hence desirable and constituting a marketable 
commodity. 
2.1.6.2.3. Nowhere to take/store items off-site 
2.1.6.2.4. Bikes with easily removable components 
2.1.6.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.1.6.3.1. Consider scope for stand to protect removables (by static shape or barrier or 
anchorage afforded by any captive locking components) 
2.1.6.3.2. Consider scope for stand design to lead the user to lock-on major components 
especially wheels. 
2.1.6.3.3. Consider scope for inbuilt secure container for small items eg lamps; but equally 
consider risk of this becoming in its turn a target for breaking in, or a resource for 
terrorist bomber, drug dealer etc. 
2.1.6.3.4. Communication about risk to user perhaps incorporated ruggedly in lock, stand or 
separate signage. 
2.1.6.4. Design requirements to reduce harm if event happens 
2.1.6.4.1. Ensure wheel-less frames/vice-versa do not pose an injury risk to users/ passers-by or 
damage other bikes parked alongside. 
2.1.6.4.2. Ensure carcasses are easily removable by maintenance staff to PLQLPLVHµEURNHQELNH¶
V\QGURPH DQG LPSDFW RQ DHVWKHWLFVIHDU EXW EHZDUH H[SORLWDWLRQ RI µEDFN GRRU¶
susceptibility by thieves). 
 
2.2. Protecting parking money as target of crime  
 
2.2.1. Generic design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events  
2.2.1.1. Consider cash-free systems eg based on cards or tokens 
 
2.2.2. Theft of cash from machine 
2.2.2.1. Details of criminal events 
2.2.2.1.1. Breaking into cash box by prising, cutting, striking, drilling etc 
2.2.2.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.2.2.2.1. Infrequent collection allows cash to build up. 
2.2.2.2.2. Susceptibilities of cash box and infrequent collection become known among circle of 
offenders (a particular problem if design is standardised and widespread). 
2.2.2.2.3. Local thieves motivated to take petty cash ± eg if feeding drugs habit is widespread. 
2.2.2.2.4. Bike stands not surveilled, or in enclosure. 
2.2.2.2.5. Guards unalerted and uninformed about risk. 
2.2.2.2.6. Space to apply tools to cash box. 
2.2.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.2.2.3.1. Cash box should be robust (target hardening/softening) against known perpetrator 
techniques and available hand tools. Risk factor: If close to vehicle access, heavier 
tools may be brought. 
2.2.2.3.2. Cash box should look robust, to deter and discourage thieves. 
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2.2.2.3.3. Cash box component of bike stand should not be concealed from view of managers/ 
guards/ legitimate users/ passers-by, by body of thief, bike or other components of 
stand. 
2.2.2.3.4. Action to break cash box should be obvious visually, aurally and in terms of intention.  
2.2.2.3.5. Consider alarm system in high-risk circumstances. 
2.2.2.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.2.2.4.1. See 2.1.5 ± broken cash box could increase risk of theft of bike if lock mechanism 
affected ± so tamper evident design required. 
2.2.2.4.2. Fail-safe against injury risk ± see  1.1.2.4. 
 
 
2.3. Protecting parking money as target of crime, parking area as environment of crime  
 
2.3.1. Robbery of cash collectors  
2.3.1.1. Details of criminal events 
2.3.1.1.1. Thief/thieves ambush cash collector in vicinity of bike stand/s and force them to hand 
over money 
2.3.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.3.1.2.1. Absence of safe cash handling practices. 
2.3.1.2.2. Environment and any enclosure (including bike parking enclosure) provide for 
waiting ofIHQGHU¶VFRQFHDOPHQW± in terms of sight lines, lighting; or give excuse for 
offender to loiter for apparently innocent reason. 
2.3.1.2.3. Environment/ enclosure allow sudden approach of offender, and easy 
escape/disappearance. 
2.3.1.2.4. Robbery of all kinds is frequent in vicinity. 
2.3.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.3.1.3.1. Cash box emptying action should not require employee to turn back on possible 
danger.  
2.3.1.3.2. Cash box emptying action should be swift and fumble-free. 
2.3.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.3.1.4.1. Cash box design should allow cash-collecting employee to surrender box if 
threatened. 
2.3.1.4.2. If employee is pushed or falls, minimise protruding elements or sharp edges on which 
they could be injured. 
 
2.4. 3URWHFWLQJXVHU¶VSHUVRQPRQH\SURSHUW\DVWDUJHWRf crime ± cluster of stands as environment 
 
2.4.1. Robbery of user at point of parking/unparking 
2.4.1.1. Details of criminal events 
2.4.1.1.1. Whilst user distracted by task of seeking a stand or parking/unparking, and perhaps 
getting out wallet or opening bag to extract cash or card for payment, thief 
ambushes/snatches, and/or threatens user to hand over money, wallet, bag, phone etc  
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2.4.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.4.1.2.1. As per robbery of cash collectors 2.3.1.2. 
2.4.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.4.1.3.1. Cash payment action (whether pay on arrive or pay on leave) should not require user 
to turn back on possible danger.  
2.4.1.3.2. Cash payment action should be swift and fumble-free. 
2.4.1.3.3. Any payment card should not be transferable. 
2.4.1.3.4. Payment instructions should be easy for user to take in and should not distract them 
over-long. 
2.4.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.4.1.4.1. Configuration of cluster of stands should not trap victim and offender together in 
confined space. 
2.4.1.4.2. If user is pushed or falls, minimise protruding elements or sharp edges on which they 
could be injured. Consider the stand in configuration with kerbstones, walls, windows 
etc if possible. 
2.4.1.4.3. Risk factors: elderly users more vulnerable to injury and less resilient to trauma. 
 
2.5. Protecting cluster of stands as environment of crime  
 
2.5.1. Misbehaviour ± conflict between cyclist and pedestrian  
2.5.1.1. Details of criminal events 
2.5.1.1.1. Cyclist approaching/leaving cycle stand or cluster of stands, collides (whilst pushing 
RUSHGDOLQJZLWKSHGHVWULDQRURQHEORFN¶VRWKHU¶VSDWKPD\OHDGGLUHFWO\WRLQMXU\RU
to verbal or physical aggression. 
2.5.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.5.1.2.1. Environment ± channels different street users into same space/paths. 
2.5.1.2.2. Crowded environment ± perhaps at particular times. 
2.5.1.2.3. Close to drinking/entertainment areas. 
2.5.1.2.4. Area associated with aggressive subculture; presence of long-standing conflicts ± eg 
between different groups of young people (including schools), old v young. 
2.5.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.5.1.3.1. Clear pavement markings/ signage to indicate hazards 
2.5.1.3.2. Communications to cyclists alerting/informing/motivating thoughtful behaviour; 
perhaps explicit rule-setting (eg µQRULGLQJRQSDYHPHQW¶ 
2.5.1.3.3. Design of movement channels to separate different users; perhaps through 
incorporation of barriers. (Design conflict with preventing ambush for robbery.) 
2.5.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.5.1.4.1. Design cluster configuration (and any enclosures/barriers) to allow one or other party 
to leave an escalating confrontation, or to escape if a fight starts. (Design conflict: but 
WKLVPD\IDFLOLWDWHDUREEHU¶VHVFDSH 
2.5.1.4.2. If antagonist is pushed or falls, minimise protruding elements or sharp edges on which 
they could be injured. 
2.5.1.4.3. Risk factors for harm: elderly pedestrians/ cyclists; population carrying knives. 
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2.6. Protecting cluster of stands or enclosure as environment of crime  
 
2.6.1. Misbehaviour ± conflicts between bike users ± cross-locking   
2.6.1.1. Details of criminal events 
2.6.1.1.1. Cyclist 1 cross-ORFNV FDEOH HWF WKURXJK F\FOLVW ¶V ELNH WUDSSLQJ VHFRQG ELNH
Argument ensues, leading to verbal/physical aggression/ deliberate damage of bike. 
2.6.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
2.6.1.2.1. Insufficient parking spaces relative to demand, perhaps at peak times. 
2.6.1.2.2. Young users? 
2.6.1.2.3. Poor illumination ± deep shadows? 
2.6.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
2.6.1.3.1. Consider designing single-user stands; moreover that are difficult to add a second bike 
to. 
2.6.1.3.2. Alternatively, with two-user stands, make cross-locking pointless or difficult. 
2.6.1.3.3. Consider increasing numbers of stands to meet demand (but tradeoff with crowding). 
2.6.1.3.4. Communications to cyclists alerting/informing/motivating thoughtful behaviour; 
perhaps explicit rule-VHWWLQJHJµQRFURVV-ORFNLQJ¶ 
2.6.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
2.6.1.4.1. As under 2.5.1.4. 
 
2.7. 3URWHFWLQJXVHU¶V,'DVWDUJHWRIFULPH ± Theft ± ID theft from malfunctioning, insecure or tampered-
with cash card machine. Not done 
 
2.8. Protecting parking opportunity as target of crime ± Fraud ± Improperly obtained use of stand  not 
done 
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3. Enclosure/ facility ± outdoor/industrial ± as object 
Enclosures comprise several defining structural features: Periphery; Barrier; Entry point/s; Interior. (Note ± here the 
µEDUULHU¶ DVSHFW RI HQWU\ SRLQWV VXFK DV D ERRP RU JDWH LV FRQVLGHUHG DV SDUW RI WKH PDLQ %DUULHU DOEHLW ZLWK
specialised features/properties. Otherwise HQWU\SRLQWVDUHFRQVLGHUHGXQGHUWKHµLQIXQFWLRQ¶VHFWLRQ4) that follows) 
Additional features may include common payment-handling fittings (eg a single one at or near the entry, for example, 
not one per stand) and common security fittings (eg one or two CCTV cameras).  
3.1. Periphery 
3.1.1. As environment of crime 
3.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
3.1.1.1.1. Crimes in question are entire range (see below) against barrier, entry point, interior or 
contents of interior 
3.1.1.2. Generic design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events  
3.1.1.2.1. If possible (to the extent it is under the control of the designer and/or manager) the 
periphery should be kept clear of climbing aids and enjoy good sight lines and 
illumination on micro-meso scales. 
3.1.1.2.2. The enclosure should not cast a deep shadow on the wider periphery, increasing crime 
risk there. This may involve attention to lighting in the meso environment in which 
enclosure is sited. 
3.1.1.2.3. The enclosure should not, in conjunction with the configuration of the surrounding 
meso environment, create recesses or traps usable for lurking for robbery, hanging 
round for drug dealing, hanging round and creating noise and disorder. 
3.1.1.3. Generic design requirements to reduce harm from undesired events 
3.1.1.3.1. If possible (to the extent it is under the control of the designer and/or manager) the 
Periphery should be kept clear of climbing aids, points of leverage or bracing etc on 
micro scale, which could be used against Barrier; and enjoy good sight lines and 
illumination on micro-meso scales.and enjoy good sight lines and illumination on 
micro-meso scales. 
3.1.1.3.2. Consider possibility of bent/broken parts of barrier falling on people in periphery ± 
where might they fall? 
 
3.2. Barrier  
Including barrier elements of entry point 
3.2.1. As target of crime 
3.2.1.1. Deliberate damage  - expressive mistreatment as end in itself 
3.2.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
3.2.1.1.2. Wrecking leading to deformation, fracture, uprooting; defacement by ink, spray 
paint, sticker; cutting, abrasion using range of brought and adventitious tools.  Could 
also include incidental damage eg from bike users or pedestrians climbing over 
barrier as shortcut or to evade payment, or criminals escaping. 
3.2.1.1.3. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
3.2.1.1.3.1. See risk factors for bike stands 1.1.2.2.  
3.2.1.1.3.2. Climbing aids (fixed eg low walls, or mobile eg wheelie bins) in vicinity enabling 
offenders to climb onto or over barrier. 
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3.2.1.1.4. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.2.1.1.4.1. See equivalents for bike stands 1.1.2.3. 
3.2.1.1.4.2. Construction and materials should be resistant (hardened or softened) to 
wrecking, defacement, cutting and abrasion.  
3.2.1.1.4.3. ,Q SDUWLFXODU WR PLQLPLVH JUDIILWL DQGRU IO\ SRVWLQJ ODUJH µFDQYDV¶-type 
surfaces/ colours/ textures should be avoided 
3.2.1.1.4.4. Operation (including forced movement) of moving parts eg boom/ gate should 
be particularly resistant to damage (hardening or softening) (may be conflicts 
with safe escape and security functionality ± eg offender can escape or enter by 
forcing boom). 
3.2.1.1.4.5. Barrier should not be sited/ constructed so as to cause a significant 
inconvenience to other users eg pedestrians, which could provoke damage.  
3.2.1.1.4.6. It should not be easy to climb over barrier as a shortcut. If this is likely, 
consider making it robust (harder or softer); deterrent (increased risk to abuser, 
but within acceptable safety limits ± no broken glass on top); or discouraging 
(requiring more effort/time).   
3.2.1.1.5. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
3.2.1.1.5.1. See equivalent for bike stands 1.1.2.4. 
3.2.1.1.5.2. In particular, damaged elements should not cause a hazard if they lean, project 
or fall off into periphery and beyond; or interior; and as far as possible should 
not interfere with normal use of interior whilst awaiting repair. 
3.2.1.1.5.3. To minimise reward to offenders and prompting of further attack, graffiti-
covered surfaces should be easily/cheaply cleanable. 
 
3.2.1.2. Theft of barrier material 
3.2.1.2.1. As per theft of furniture 1.1.3. 
 
3.2.2. As resource for crime 
3.2.2.1. Misuse of barrier for concealment and entrapment 
3.2.2.2. Details of criminal events 
3.2.2.2.1. Offender hides behind or within barrier in order to escape pursuit or avoid surveillance, 
perhaps to spring ambush on user of enclosure or passer by, perhaps to trap victim, or 
transact a drug deal; perhaps to commit various kinds of nuisance eg urination or 
GDPDJH HJ JUDIILWL WR LQWHULRU RI EDUULHU SHUKDSV DV µRXW RI VLJKW¶ JDWKHULQJ SODFH IRU
young people, interfering with designed function and/or causing more general nuisance 
eg through noise, litter. 
3.2.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.2.2.3.1. Barrier should be see through and perhaps low to aid visibility (though if too low 
could enable bypassing of entry point to gain entry). 
3.2.2.3.2. Consider multiple exit points. 
3.2.2.3.3. Barrier + interior layout should not create cul-de-sacs in which victims could be 
trapped. 
3.2.2.4. Misuse of barrier as climbing aid ± whether as individual stand or a cluster 
3.2.2.4.1. As per misuse of furniture for same 1.2.1.  
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3.2.2.5.  Misuse of barrier for deceptive placing of bombs ± whether as individual stand or a cluster 
«DQGMistake ± false alarm if barrier used to place items resembling bomb 
3.2.2.5.1. As per misuse of furniture for same, respectively 1.2.2. and 1.2.3.   
3.2.2.6. Misbehaviour ± sitting/climbing on stands ± LQGLYLGXDORUFOXVWHUV«DQG bashing barrier to 
make noise 
3.2.2.6.1. As per misuse of furniture for same, respectively 1.2.4. and 1.2.5.  
 
3.3. Interior 
Interior per se is distinct from what it contains ± eg bike stands. Some aspects of interior layout already covered 
under configuration of bike stands under 1. Interior surface of barrier can be treated same as exterior, under 
Barrier, 3.2.1. above. Interior may be equipped with security fittings eg lights, CCTV cameras, which themselves 
may be targets of crime  
3.3.1. As target of crime 
3.3.1.1. Deliberate damage as end in itself 
3.3.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.1.1.1.1. Fittings, eg lights, cameras, payment machines wrecked. 
See  Deliberate damage to furniture 1.1.2. 
3.3.1.2. Theft of interior equipment 
3.3.1.2.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.1.2.1.1. Fittings, eg lights, cameras, payment machines or their components are 
removed either by unscrewing as per design, or they or their anchorage are 
snapped or cut off.  
See  Theft of furniture 1.1.3.  
3.3.1.3.  Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.3.1.3.1.1. Requirement for ease of replacement in servicing should not mean that 
equipment such as light bulbs etc can be casually removed without tools. 
3.3.1.3.1.2. If possible equipment should not be compatible with domestic use (eg different 
voltage light fittings); and discouraging communications to this effect should be 
visible on or near the equipment. 
 
3.3.2. As environment of crime 
Obviously, configuration of interior, barrier and contents eg bike stands should be considered as a 
whole. 
3.3.2.1. Theft/Robbery of users in interior 
3.3.2.1.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.2.1.1.1. Criminal uses interior, and perhaps items such as bike stands within it, to 
ambush and trap or to stealthily approach user in order to rob or steal money, 
bag etc. 
3.3.2.1.2. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.3.2.1.2.1. Internal configuration of interior of enclosure should not provide recesses for 
hiding/ambushing, or trapping user/victim. 
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3.3.2.1.2.2. Interior should be well-lit by natural and/or artificial light. 
3.3.2.1.2.3. Interior configuration should be conducive to surveillance in terms of 
sightlines. 
3.3.2.1.2.4. Interior configuration should not be modifiable by offender to neutralise the 
above properties. 
3.3.2.1.2.5. Interior should offer no excuses/rationales for non-users to enter/loiter within. 
3.3.2.1.2.6. Where robbery is a significant risk, on-site human guardianship should be 
considered; or at least via CCTV. 
3.3.2.1.3. Design requirements to reduce harm from undesired events 
3.3.2.1.3.1. Sharp edges or corners should be avoided in case victim is pushed/falls against 
them. 
3.3.2.2. Misbehaviour - Conflict between users in interior 
3.3.2.2.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.2.2.1.1. Collisions or jams lead to conflict and perhaps expressive violence and 
damage.. 
3.3.2.2.2. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.3.2.2.2.1. Internal layout should minimise choke or collision points whether between 
cyclists wheeling bikes or cyclists purely on foot. 
3.3.2.2.2.2. Conflicting parties should be able to leave scene of confrontation without 
difficulty, and not be trapped together. 
3.3.2.2.3. Design requirements to reduce harm from undesired events 
3.3.2.2.3.1. Sharp edges or corners should be avoided in case victim is pushed/falls against 
them. 
 
3.3.3. Misbehaviour ± litter 
3.3.3.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.3.1.1. Users or other parties drop (or throw in) litter; litter is unsightly and could be fire 
ULVN«HYHQGHOLEHUDWHO\OLW 
3.3.3.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
3.3.3.2.1. Proximity to fast food shops. 
3.3.3.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.3.3.3.1. Consider including litter bins or at least designing-in possibility for mounting them 
should this problem emerge; but depending on context may be design conflict with 
prevention of places to conceal bomb. Note that litter bins may themselves be 
arsonised. 
3.3.3.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
3.3.3.4.1. Make for easy-sweeping of interior. 
 
3.3.4. Misbehaviour ± urination 
3.3.4.1. Details of criminal events 
3.3.4.1.1. Users or more usually other parties use interior of enclosure as toilet. Note ± 
depending on configuration of enclosure in wider environment, risk could apply to 
periphery too.  
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3.3.4.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
3.3.4.2.1. Proximity to pubs, entertainment district. 
3.3.4.2.2. Absence of available WCs especially late at night. 
3.3.4.2.3. Absence of wider CCTV monitoring of meso environment. 
3.3.4.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
3.3.4.3.1. See-through barriers and internal configuration. 
3.3.4.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
3.3.4.4.1. Make for easy-washing of interior. 
3.3.4.4.2. Ensure materials at waist height and below are resistant to corrosion from urine 
(design synergy ± applies to dog wee too). 
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4. Enclosure ± outdoor/industrial ± in function 
 
Intended security functions ± reducing probability of criminal event/s; reducing and/or mitigating harm from 
immediate criminal event or wider consequences ± and how they work 
a) Secures bike and components against deliberate damage, theft 
b) Secures users and managers/guards against robbery (users/cash collectors), and shelters them against conflict. 
c) Safeguards all users, managers/guards, passers by, residents, businesses etc against terrorist attack by 
deposition of bomb etc. 
d) Protects stands against deliberate damage, theft, misuse and misbehaviour (see 1 above). 
e) Secures any payment-collecting system against theft. 
f) Self-protection against attack, criminal countermoves aimed at disabling security function and misuse in 
furtherance of other crimes ± all included under 3 above. 
Note that the enclosure can be intended as a security adaptation ZKLFKSXUSRVLYHO\VKDSHVWKHµULVNHQYLURQPHQW¶
(Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007a) within which the stands are sited; which therefore deliberately controls the 
spatial and perhaps social context of the stands and hence manipulates many of the risk factors surrounding the 
stands, identified in 1 and 2 above. The design recommendations that apply to the environment created by clusters 
of stands, or individual stands plus any incidental walls or barriers that happen to be nearby, equally apply to 
facilities with deliberately designed enclosures. In a fully-developed guidance document, these recommendations 
would be repeated, with different emphasis, under both furniture and facility to cater for the different kinds of 
designer who maybe referring to them. 
All the above functions are achieved through acting as a designed, enclosed micro-environment for bike stands 
and users approaching/employing them. They work in more detail by enabling/ facilitating some or all of the 
following preventive mechanisms. Some of these mechanisms tip the instrumental balance in favour of 
preventers over offenders in the exercise of their scripts (eg surveillance v stealth), or by motivating or otherwise 
causally influencing one or other party: [should these be converted into safeguarding etc, where possible? But 
enclosed environment is too generic to cast into similar statement to furniture-in-function] 
 Controlling access by offenders to interior space ± technologically or by human staff  
 Mobilising (Alerting, Informing, Motivating, Empowering) guards/managers/users/others to control 
behaviour/ check people entering or leaving interior  
 Limiting escape of criminal on completion of crime, or of attempt 
 Limiting space and barriers for hiding 
 Limiting space for undertaking criminal actions (leverage etc). 
 Defining limited interior space requiring surveillance 
 Defining expected actions/users at access point and within interior, hence clarifying suspicious behaviour 
and people to improve detection and challenge performance for surveillers 
 Defining interior space setting subject to rules for good behaviour 
 Providing well-defined sightlines for surveillance (natural or technological) within interior and at entry 
point/s 
 Providing location/mounting for security communications to users, offenders; for technological 
surveillance aids eg CCTV 
 Channelling different street users along different paths/into different spaces to avoid conflict 
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 Avoiding provocation or prompting of attack on enclosure itself 
Notes 
a) The enclosure may have many variants, including those where bike is mechanically taken from user at entry point 
and stored in compartment to which users have no access at all. 
b) Enclosure may or may not have a gate/boom; may or may not have a common payment-gathering point. Payment 
function can be treated as per guidance on stand-based payment ± see 2.2.  2.3. 
c) Enclosure may or may not be guarded. 
d) Enclosure may or may not be in public, semi-public or private space; and its interior may be similarly defined by 
one of these alternatives. 
 
4.1. Enclosure protecting contents of interior by enabling/delivering access control  
 
4.1.1. Mishandling ± entry (and exit) without justification or permission 
4.1.1.1. Details of criminal events 
4.1.1.1.1. People with no right to enter enclosure, climb over barrier or slip through entry 
point, perhaps defeating any ticket/payment mechanisms by fraudulent means.  
Escaping offenders climb or slip through in reverse. 
4.1.1.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
4.1.1.2.1. High-value bikes frequently parked here. 
4.1.1.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events  
4.1.1.3.1. Ensure barrier (including any gate) is difficult to climb over in either direction. If this is 
likely, consider making it robust (harder or softer); deterrent (increased risk to abuser, 
but within acceptable safety limits ± no broken glass on top); or discouraging (requiring 
more effort/time).   
4.1.1.3.2. Ensure passing into enclosure does not offer concealment hence attract offenders. 
4.1.1.3.3. If improper entry is a frequent/significant problem, consider additional 
surveillance/guarding. 
4.1.1.3.4. If enclosure is guarded, ensure climbing over barrier is visible. 
4.1.1.3.5. Ensure any technological entry control is reliably discriminating; minimally provocative 
(eg unreliable or difficult to operate) and robust against attack (see 2.1.4 on breaking 
/picking/ electronically defeating lock) 
4.1.1.3.6. If entry control is remotely monitored by guards, ensure sightlines, illumination and if 
necessary CCTV cameras are adequate for surveillance; and that some response 
capabilities exist. 
4.1.1.3.7. If (although unlikely) there is a guard in place at the entry point, ensure they can see 
people approaching intent on entry; there is space and illumination for them to check 
permission; the entrance is blockable either by a gate/boom or the person of the guard 
(but beware risk of confrontation); and in high-risk environments with frequent 
aggressive or drunken behaviour that the guard has means of protection eg a booth and 
of summoning help. 
4.1.1.3.8. Ensure entry line to the enclosure is clearly marked, which may deter improper entry 
and empower guard. 
4.1.1.4. Design requirements to reduce harm from preventive measures themselves 
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4.1.1.4.1. Minimise chances of collision (and also perhaps consequent conflict) between users at 
entry/exit, perhaps by channelling flow using interior layout, markings etc. 
4.1.1.5. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
4.1.1.5.1. Ensure second line of defence ± that interior environment, bike stands themselves and 
other contents of enclosure are crime resistant should improper entry be gained. Decide 
on balance between entry-point and interior security. 
4.1.1.5.2. Ensure passing into enclosure does not offer concealment allowing offenders to perform 
further misdeeds. 
 
4.1.2. Mistreatment  ± entry to enclosure gained by damaging barrier/entry control equipment 
4.1.2.1. Details of criminal events 
4.1.2.1.1. Offenders damage gate mechanism or main part of barrier in order to get in/out ± 
with bodily force eg, kicking/barging, twisting or with brought/adventitious hand 
tools for levering, cutting, drilling etc (depending on context). 
4.1.2.2. General contextual risk factors increasing probability of undesired events  
4.1.2.2.1. Few people present/ in position to see actions/ motivated to respond. 
4.1.2.3. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
4.1.2.3.1. Gate mechanism should be robust against force and/or tools as described. 
4.1.2.4. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
4.1.2.4.1. See reducing harm from damage to furniture 1.1.2.4.  
4.1.2.4.2. Gate mechanism should fail safe ± people should not be trapped within enclosure 
(especially if barrier is difficult to climb). 
4.1.2.4.3. Depending on the level of risk to the now-less-protected contents of the interior, and 
issues of revenue collection, interior should either remain fully usable if gate 
damaged, or sealable-off. 
 
4.2. Enclosure mobilising people to protect itself and its contents 
 
4.2.1. Supports crime preventer role 
4.2.1.1. Details of criminal events 
4.2.1.1.1. All kinds of criminal events covered, especially those that bike users, pedestrians and 
other users/occupants of space in the vicinity can influence when acting as informal 
crime preventers. 
4.2.1.2. Design requirements to reduce probability of undesired events 
4.2.1.2.1. Alert preventers by communications describing crime risks. 
4.2.1.2.2. Inform preventers of what constitutes inappropriate presence and criminal/suspicious 
actions (eg by communications) 
4.2.1.2.3. Motivate preventers by including them in design process and/or paying heed to their 
preferences/requirements, especially where enclosure might interfere with their 
interests eg as pedestrian passers-by, shopkeepers. Ensure décor fits well with 
environment or (in their eyes) improves it. 
4.2.1.2.4. Empower preventers a) by aiding informal surveillance ± clear sightlines, illumination 
etc; making inappropriate presence and/or actions within enclosure appear obvious 
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and unambiguous; b) by telling preventers what to do if this happens; if appropriate 
supplying alarm function etc. 
4.2.1.2.5. Ensure offenders get the same message as preventers ± which should deter and 
discourage them; but avoid giving away too much detail about how preventive 
measures work, which could help offenders circumvent them and would remove the 
GHWHUUHQWµXQFHUWDLQW\IDFWRU¶ 
4.2.1.3. Design requirements to reduce harm If event happens 
4.2.1.3.1. Given that many of the probability-reducing interventions act when offender is on 
point of committing the crime, or actually undertaking it, harm reduction comes from 
cutting the event short and/or immediate reporting of any damage. 
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7. Conclusions 
The entire Work Package (WPA2) has been an evolutionary, iterative exercise extended 
over some two years, so it is appropriate to make some reflections.  
The main aim of the work package was to see whether a theory-based framework could 
produce usable guidance for Design Against Crime, and in particular for secure bike 
parking, which could then be compared with guidance based on distillation from 
experience.  Ultimately (beyond the current work package) this would lead to an improved, 
combined set of guidance and/or standards, and further possible applications discussed 
below.  
Delivering the work package involved action at a number of levels: collaboration, and 
evolution of mutual understanding, among a small cross-disciplinary group of crime 
scientists and designers; development, through that collaboration, of a framework for 
undertaking crime risk analysis and for generating design guidance based on the outcome 
of that analysis; and using the developed framework to populate the risk analysis and then 
convert it into design guidance. In practice these activities were not distinct and did not 
follow a linear sequence: as might be expected there was much iteration, during the early 
stages of which the use of conceptual sketches and diagrams (involving a graphic designer) 
was important. Even quite fundamental changes were occasionally being made relatively 
late on in the work package. 
 
Collaboration 
The evolutionary process in its widest form showed that it was not only possible, but 
stimulating and challenging, for designers and crime scientists to collaborate on an 
extended project that has both practical and theoretical dimensions within both disciplines. 
But this did require goodwill, effort and persistence, and a willingness both take 
constructive and critical steps into the others¶ domains and just as important, to allow the 
others into their own.  
In the end, the collaboration helped to create concepts and language that verged on being 
entirely new interdisciplinary territory. It also turned a critical searchlight onto existing 
domains. The development of the CCO Dynamic framework in particular, not only 
represented a substantial development and extension of the original CCO Classic 
framework (the starting point), but also raised some challenging questions for crime 
science (for example about the nature of risk)  and the tenets and practice of Situational 
Crime Prevention more generally.   
 
Creating the framework 
The creation of the new framework was perhaps yet another recursive layer of the 
capacity-evolving process described in the Introduction. It developed our own capacity to 
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develop both innovative capacity for designers, and operational capacity for crime 
prevention practitioners when using the fruits of that design.  
The detailed activity of creating the framework and procedure for undertaking full risk 
analysis and producing corresponding design guidance proved to be rather demanding. 
This was because (between team discussions) the author was simultaneously developing 
the framework categories and headings, and populating the entries under the headings by 
undertaking the pilot analysis process with those categories. This involved much iteration 
as new exemplars often required backtracking to update the categories for previous entries, 
and occasionally to reconfigure the framework and the process more widely.   
Getting the categories right, and handling the entry information in an efficient way, was a 
matter of balancing detailed distinction against generality.  This not only applied to the 
analysis of possibility, probability and harm, but also to the characterisation of each design 
focus to be considered. For example, there are many variations on bike stands, some with 
captive locks, some with inbuilt individual payment systems and others part of a complete 
facility with common payment equipment at the entrance. Bike stands could be considered 
as individual instances or as clusters (where each formed part of the micro-environment of 
its neighbours and perhaps affected risk of crime by blocking the view or supplying points 
of leverage).  *XLGDQFHWKDWZDVWRRJHQHUDOLVHGZRXOGFRQVWLWXWHDVRUWRIµDYHUDJH¶DFURVV
designs that would merely be trite and unstimulating. Guidance that was too detailed would 
be massively repetitive and could overload the designer with material to wade through (or 
more likely, to avoid).  In the end, enough design variants were pursued to cover the most 
common range and supply a comprehensive-enough coverage for the immediate purpose of 
this work package (comparison with, and extension of, the experience-based guidance 
material).  These also served to give sufficient numbers of detailed exemplars to illustrate 
the framework and how it could be used. 
 
Applying the framework to generate risk analysis and design recommendations 
Applying the framework and procedure in practice involved a substantial sequence of 
µWKLQNLQJE\QXPEHUV¶± of deliberate switches of attention and perspective, and focused 
visualisation of combinations of circumstances whilst thinking thief, and imagining the 
perspectives of other agents too ± crime preventers and promoters.  When the procedure 
evolved from that of separate risk analysis followed by design guidance to doing the two 
tasks simultaneously, even more had to be held in the head at once. However, 
paradoxically the channelling of thinking from design complicity in causing crime to 
design responses, was not in fact such a great mental leap. 
Nonetheless, any practical system for generating design-against-crime risk analyses and 
guidance would have to provide considerable support for the user undertaking the 
procedures and drawing on the frameworks. This support would best be provided through 
,7 ,QWHUDFWLYH IRUPV FRXOG SURPSW DQG IRFXV WKH XVHU¶V DWtention, topic by topic, and 
context-sensitive drop-down menus could show only those choices of category the user 
needed to think about there and then. The system could also learn by including the scope 
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for adding on or revising categories and content. It could manage the production of a final 
standard-format report, with a background audit trail of the logic from risk analysis to 
design recommendation. It could perhaps be linked to a knowledge pool which stored and 
retrieved guidance and risk analyses selectively.  
 
Presenting and disseminating the framework and its results 
The final design guidance presented the results in a way which understated the framework 
rather than signalling its presence and terminology in every heading. To the extent that 
underlying theories and principles are hidden, designers are confined to the specifics of the 
guidance given. To the extent that the theories, principles and language are explicit, 
designers are empowered to generate their own guidance for contingencies and contexts 
not covered ± true innovative capacity. (They also acquire the ability to apply the 
framework in other commissions.) Such capacity is vital given the many contextual factors, 
the delicacy of some preventive mechanisms, the need to innovate and out-anticipate 
adaptive criminals and wider, non-FULPHGHVLJQUHTXLUHPHQWVZKLFKVKDSH WKHGHVLJQHU¶V
task. In many cases, cookbook copying of ready-PDGH VROXWLRQV GRHVQ¶W ZRUN (kblom 
2002; Tilley 1993).  
But the start-up cost of having to become familiar with a new framework with its own 
language and concepts could be burdensome and discouraging. And in any case, designers 
may have been given only limited scope from their clients to attend to the crime side of 
their brief. There is obviously no single correct solution to this dilemma. Rather, it implies 
the need to develop of a range of alternative formats of the guidance suited at one end of 
the scale to crime prevention practitioners and bike facility commissioners and builders 
(who might work off a checklist), to designers with limited scope and skill, to those who 
KDYH WKH FDSDFLW\ DQG WKH RSSRUWXQLW\ WR µJR LQ GHHS¶ 7KLV RI FRXUVH UHVHPEOHV WKH
situation in medicine, where a single, highly-sophisticated framework of medical science 
underlies everything from elementary family first-aid and health books and websites to 
general practitioner education and reference materials to leading-edge guidance for 
advanced brain surgery. 
 
Who would undertake risk analysis and preparation of design guidance of this kind? 
The current exercise was led, and mainly conducted, by a crime scientist reasonably 
familiar with design, aided by a mixed group of designers and other crime scientists. It is 
likely that this mix would have to be replicated in developing similar analyses and 
guidance for other areas of Design Against Crime. Now the framework and procedure have 
been developed (at least to Version 1.0), future applications should be rather less 
demanding. However, the judgement, interpretation and intelligent compromise of 
complexity and detail that would irreducibly remain means that this can never be a 
mechanical procedure. 
 
88 
 
Taking the design guidance further 
The sequence for design guidance set out in this report so far has been to proceed from 
specifying the design focus, to analysis of the risks attending that product or place, to 
functional design specifications of the kind attempted here. Where might it go next? The 
µLQWHUYHQWLRQ¶ VLGH RI &&2 FDQ JLYH D YHU\ EURDG VWHHU HJ LI WKH WDUJHW LV YXOQHUDEOH
increase its resistance to crime by hardening or softening it; if valuable, reduce that value; 
if provocative, make it less so). But as currently developed these do not go much further 
than restating risks in an alternative discourse. However, experimental attempts to develop 
progressively branching typologies of the criminogenic and criminocclusive (crime-
reducing) properties of the designed entities (eg space: visibility: sightlines and 
illumination etc)25 could constitute a further step and an accumulation of knowledge which 
would also help frame the risk analysis in greater depth.   
An alternative source of generic crime prevention interventions is of course the 25 
techniques of SCP.26 While CCO considers causes and interventions in terms of analytic 
principles, amounting to abVWUDFWLRQV RI PHFKDQLVPV WKH  WHFKQLTXHV DUH D µQDWXUDO
KLVWRU\¶RISUDFWLFDOLQWHUYHQWLRQPHWKRGVRUJDQLVHGDround the world as the offender sees 
and experiences it ± in terms of perceived risk, effort, reward, provocation and guilt. The 
resulting list has immediate face-validity, and design-related interventions can be readily 
identified to populate each cell. But depending on how individual designers thinks and are 
inspired to innovate (and on the time and scope they have for the task), tangible exemplars 
PD\QRWEHQRW VR µJHQHUDWLYH¶ DVSULQFLSOHV7KHYLHZ IURP WKHRIIHQGHU LV RQO\RQHRI
several perspectives that could be taken ± with design, of course, we are already interested 
in the view from the legitimate user or manager who could act as preventers or promoters. 
CCO Dynamic itself envisages adaptive offenders, scripts and script clashes which make 
VWDWHPHQWVVXFKDVµWKLVLQWHUYHQWLRQLQFUHDVHVWKHHIIRUWRIRIIHQGLQJ¶UDWKHUWRRFOXPV\to 
use.  
Perhaps the best approach would be a combined one, with a widened range of exemplars 
like the 25 techniques but not necessarily organised exclusively around the view from the 
offender, complementing generic intervention principles worked up into greater detail. 
Designers could then follow the approach that best suited their capacities and 
circumstances. 
 
The evidentiary basis of the guidance 
It is worth commenting on the evidentiary status of the guidance and any subsequent 
standards produced by CCO.   
                                                          
25
 As illustrated in the CCO Dynamic slide presentation 
www.designagainstcrime.com/files/CCO_Dynamic_Design_framework.ppt.  
26
 See www.popcenter.org/25techniques/  
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The current exercise has shown that CCO, even as modified, could not produce useful 
output unaided ± it had to be supplemented by some very generic knowledge of bike theft 
perpetrator techniques, bike stand designs etc. This is to be expected ± WRROVHYHQµWRROV
IRUWKRXJKW¶KDYHWRZRUNRQVRPHVXEVWUDWH they cannot deliver if merely waved around 
in the air, however energetically.  
Knowledge ± in the form of research evidence ± is therefore also needed of crime risk in its 
three aspects of possibility, probability and harm. Bare statistics of bike theft are fairly 
readily available in the UK at least, though these are far from perfect and insufficiently rich 
in detail for guiding crime prevention. Information such as place/type of place of theft, 
perpetrator technique, make and model of bike, locking arrangements that failed, etc, are 
rarely available in quantifiable form, or even in detailed qualitative form, save from special 
research exercises. Such information would not only be useful as an input to design, but 
could also support commercial and governmental decisionmaking and action against cycle 
crime, for example by prioritising µKRW¶ targets for action, and by naming and shaming 
companies which acted as crime promoters through inadequate attention to the security of 
the products they manufactured. This happened with the security of cars, although unique 
circumstances enabled the collection and integration of such information into a UK Car 
Theft Index.27 
It has also been argued that CCO, informed by knowledge of risks, can only lead as far as 
guidance. Standards require further information based on more formal testing and 
comparative evaluation of alternatives, to be able to state which are best; and even which 
are best for which context. The formal evidence base for Design Against Crime is so far 
relatively limited (Ekblom 2005a) but that for the wider field of Situational Crime 
Prevention has a fairly long history (Clarke 1997; Ekblom 1998;  Welsh and Farrington 
1999). The Center for Problem-Oriented Policing is now compiling an evidence base of 
evaluations of Situational Crime Prevention28.  
CCO (and its predecessor, Proximal Circumstances (Ekblom 1994)) was originally created 
as a means of  integrating principles of prevention of crime, based on theories of causation; 
it was deliberately agnostic about the validity of the principles, merely claiming to map 
µLQWHUYHQWLRQVSDFH¶DVDVHWRIpreventive possibilities which it was the task of subsequent 
evaluations to confirm or refute. But given that CCO is essentially regurgitating highly 
generic principles distilled from a great deal of past research and evaluations, mostly 
assembled through individual theories such as Routine Activity Theory, it is fair to claim 
that those principles are in one sense already evidence-based. As Eck puts it,  
³WKHDQVZHU WR Whe question, "what works?" to prevent crime at places is "routine 
activity theory and situational crime prevention." The answer is not, CCTV, 
lighting, locks, management screening of prospective tenants, nuisance abatement, 
street redesign or any other particular measure. These are tools that might work in 
                                                          
27
 www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/car-theft-index/  
28
 www.popcenter.org/library/scp  
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some circumstances but probably do not work in every circumstance (Clarke, 
´ 
The implication is that the strong evidence is generic, but that individual preventive 
methods, and more particularly specific methods realised in specific detail in specific 
FRQWH[WV FDQ RQO\ HYHU EH ODEHOOHG PRUH RU OHVV µSODXVLEOH¶  However, the evidentiary 
basis of the experience-derived guidelines and standards against which CCO is to be 
compared in the current project, is even less robust. In most cases the claims of experience 
are confined to explicit or implicit assertions of effectiveness against crime without benefit 
of even the support of functional testing, let alone impact evaluation.  
 
Wider applications of the procedure and framework 
The procedure and framework developed here can be used to develop risk analysis and 
guidance for design against other crime problems ± it was intentionally designed to be 
generic and versatile.  There is also scope for linking the risk analysis to the approach 
known as crime proofing (Armitage and Pease 2007; Ekblom and Sidebottom 2007a)29, in 
which products at the design stage are reviewed for the risks of crime to which they might 
be exposed in their working life, and then assessed for whether they have commensurate 
levels of security.  
In outcome terms, and referring back to the terminology introduced on p5 of the 
Introduction, this report has described the initial version of a conceptual tool to increase 
the innovative capacity of designers and developers of design guidance, in the form of a 
prototype framework for undertaking systematic and rigorous crime risk analysis and 
generating corresponding design considerations;  and an initial version of the means of 
communicating the framework to both professional end users and students. The tool, and 
the documentation, are applicable to most Design Against Crime initiatives.  If the tool 
becomes widely used, the benefit will be a step increase in the ability of developers of 
design against crime guides to undertake their work (innovative capacity building of 
developers of design guides); this will in turn increase the ability of designers using those 
guides to quickly and effectively tackle crime problems (innovative capacity building of 
designers); this should ultimately build operational capacity for crime prevention 
interventions on the ground (ie new secure, securing and security products to deploy); 
ultimately this should reduce crime and associated problems, as well as creating wealth by 
making marketable capabilities and marketable products.  The risk analysis/design 
guidance tool will be tested against output of Best of Breed (WPA 1) contributing to 
further output WPA 4. The utility of the tool, and the effectiveness of the materials to 
communicate it, will ultimately be tested in the field ± not part of this portfolio. But it has 
been used within the DAC Research Centre in support of other recent projects. 
                                                          
29
 See also www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/82 and 
www.designagainstcrime.com/index.php?q=node/87 for material on risk and security, and crime proofing.  
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It is also possible that the CCO-Dynamic framework could be used to organise the 
knowledge, from whatever source, about bike crime, its causes, consequences and 
preventive interventions. Only by arranging knowledge in this way can gaps be discerned - 
and hopefully then closed by research, practice and evaluation. 
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Appendix 1   Full CCO-M&S crime risk analysis for bike parking furniture 
 
Colour code 
Design focus ± SURGXFWSODFHWKDW¶VGHVLJQHG 
Causal roles it plays in crime ± CCO entities 
Generic kinds of crime risk involved ± M&S 
6SHFLILF FULPH DQG SHUSHWUDWRU WHFKQLTXH >µFULPH PRGH¶"@ ± 
the possibilities of criminal events 
For each possibility of crime, how its risk ± probability and 
harm ± are influenced by design of product and/or the 
physical/social context in which the product or place is located, 
using the agents and other entities within CCO and if necessary 
higher, emergent levels such as markets and networks 
Notes  
1. Some rows have been left unfilled ± this is a consequence of the repeated insertion of the generic risk analysis template. But when reading off the risk considerations into design 
implications even the bare headings proved a useful reminder (for example, of the different roles that could act as crime preventers).  
2. The risk analysis as a separate exercise was only completed for the bike parking Furniture as object and in-function. For the bike parking Facility, the risk analysis was done using the 
same headings, but the results were written directly into the design guidance template. 
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Crime Risk analysis: Criminal events,  
their probability and harm,  
and the design and contextual factors influencing these  
for a given designed object or place 
 
2. Furniture ± individual stand or cluster ± as object 
 
2.1. Target of crime  
2.1.1. Damaged (Mistreated) by  
2.1.1.1. Wrecking  
2.1.1.1.1. Probability  of crime 
2.1.1.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability  [L] 
2.1.1.1.1.2. Magnitude depends on  
2.1.1.1.1.2.1. Design RISURGXFW¶VLQIOXHQFHVRQSUREDELOLW\RIFULPH 
2.1.1.1.1.2.1.1. Inherent visibility of product prompts attack  
2.1.1.1.1.2.1.1.1. Cluster may be a more obvious target set to offender 
2.1.1.1.1.2.1.2. Value of product to offender ± rewarding to damage product ± eg makes satisfying noise/shape 
2.1.1.1.1.2.1.3. Prompting and provocation by distinctive shape; by being an authority symbol (signs, notices, gates, barriers) 
2.1.1.1.1.2.1.4. Susceptibility to deformation, fracture, uprooting, jamming ± see 1.1.1.1.4.3.1.1. below 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime  
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.1. Target 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.1.1. In a cluster, one stand may act as a point eg of leverage or brace in attacking another ± strictly part of instrumental environment 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.1. Accessibility ± inc space for leverage surrounding individual stand or cluster  
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2.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.2. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
                   «Cluster may affect sightlines eg if offender may  be hidden if crouched down between stands 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.2.3. Defensibility ± see also separate handling of enclosure below 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.3. Environment ± motivating 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.3.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.3.2. Territory of preventer 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.4. Offender presence   
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.4.1. Dislike of cyclists 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.4.2. Drunk/rowdy state 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.5. Offender perception 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.6. Offender resources ± brought tools 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.6.1. Cutters, levers, spanners 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.7. Offender resources ± locally found 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.7.1. Stones, levers eg scaffold poles 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.8. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.1. Friends urging/supporting misbehaviour ± pressure 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.2. Slow repair prompts fresh attack by sight of existing damage  
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.8.3. Poor installation facilitates damage  
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.9. Preventer presence/action ± user  
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.9.1. Affected by short/med/long stay 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.10. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.11. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.12. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.13. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.1.1.2.2.13.1. Visual/audio surveillance aids 
2.1.1.1.2. Harm from crime 
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2.1.1.1.2.1. Immediate harms mediated by  
2.1.1.1.2.1.1. Design 
2.1.1.1.2.1.2. Harm to product itself during criminal event ± susceptibility to:  
2.1.1.1.2.1.2.1. Deformation of body or anchorage 
2.1.1.1.2.1.2.2. Fracture of body or anchorage 
2.1.1.1.2.1.2.3. Uprooting of anchorage 
2.1.1.1.2.1.3. Post-event: harm from design of product 
2.1.1.1.2.1.3.1. Sharp points or edges left 
2.1.1.1.2.1.3.2. Trip hazard left 
2.1.1.1.2.1.3.3. Uplifted/broken paving 
2.1.1.1.2.2. Wider harms 
2.1.1.1.2.2.1. 'HQLDORIXVHLPSDFWRQFRQYHQLHQFHKDELWXDOGHFLVLRQWRF\FOH« 
2.1.1.1.2.2.2. Cost and effort of repair/replacement 
2.1.1.1.2.2.3. Injury from cutting or tripping 
2.1.1.1.2.2.4. Incivility ± generates general fear of crime 
2.1.1.1.2.2.5. Incivility ± generates specific perceived risk of damage/loss of bike, hence deters parking and use 
2.1.1.1.2.2.6. Aesthetic degradation of site ± environmental quality of life 
2.1.1.1.2.2.7. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.1.1.1.2.2.7.1. Delay/difficulty in repair/replacement 
2.1.1.1.2.2.7.2. Susceptible users of site (eg blind, elderly)  
2.1.1.1.2.3. Overall severity of harms [M] 
2.1.1.2. Defacement by ink, paint or sticker 
2.1.1.2.1. Probability  of crime 
2.1.1.2.2. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
2.1.1.2.3. Magnitude depends on  
2.1.1.2.3.1. Design RISURGXFW¶VLQIOXHQFHVRQSUREDELOLW\RIFULPH 
2.1.1.2.3.1.1. Inherent visibility of product  
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2.1.1.2.3.1.2. Value (rewarding to offender to damage ± eg tag is well visible and potentially durable/hard to remove) 
2.1.1.2.3.1.3. Provocation by distinctive shape 
2.1.1.2.3.1.4. Susceptibility to adhesion by paint/ink 
2.1.1.2.3.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.1.1.2.3.2.1. Environment ± instrumental 
2.1.1.2.3.2.1.1. Accessibility  
2.1.1.2.3.2.1.2. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
2.1.1.2.3.2.2. Environment ± motivating 
2.1.1.2.3.2.2.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
2.1.1.2.3.2.2.2. Territory of preventer 
2.1.1.2.3.2.3. Offender presence 
2.1.1.2.3.2.4. Offender perception 
2.1.1.2.3.2.5. Offender resources ± brought tools 
2.1.1.2.3.2.5.1. spravcans, marker pens, sticky labels 
2.1.1.2.3.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found tools 
2.1.1.2.3.2.7. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.1.1.2.3.2.7.1. eg friends urging/supporting misbehaviour ± pressure 
2.1.1.2.3.2.8. Presence of preventers ± users  
2.1.1.2.3.2.8.1. Affected by short/med/long stay 
2.1.1.2.3.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.1.1.2.3.2.10. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.1.1.2.3.2.11. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.2.3.2.12. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.2.3.2.12.1. Mitigation/further prevention ± eg rapid application of cleaning materials; calling in cleaning team 
2.1.1.2.3.2.13. Provocation of offenders by officious notices, over-zealous guards 
2.1.1.2.3.2.14. Prompting fresh attack by sight of existing marks ± depends on speed of cleaning 
2.1.1.2.4. Harm from crime 
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2.1.1.2.4.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
2.1.1.2.4.1.1. Harm to product itself during criminal event ± susceptibility to:  
2.1.1.2.4.1.1.1. Temporary spoiling of appearance 
2.1.1.2.4.1.1.2. Permanent wearing or destruction of surface 
2.1.1.2.4.1.2. Post-event: harm from paint/ink/stickers 
2.1.1.2.4.1.2.1. Degradation of product surface due to reaction with paint etc 
2.1.1.2.4.1.2.2. Removal of paint etc in cleanup causes degradation of surface 
2.1.1.2.4.2. Wider harms 
2.1.1.2.4.2.1. 'HQLDORIXVHGXULQJUHSDLULPSDFWRQFRQYHQLHQFHKDELWXDOGHFLVLRQWRF\FOH« 
2.1.1.2.4.2.2. Cost of repair/replacement 
2.1.1.2.4.2.3. Incivility ± generates general fear of crime  
2.1.1.2.4.2.4. Incivility ± generates specific perceived risk of damage/loss of bike, hence deters parking and use 
2.1.1.2.4.2.5. Aesthetic degradation of site ± environmental quality of life 
2.1.1.2.4.2.6. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.1.1.2.4.2.6.1. Delay/difficulty in cleaning/ repair/ replacement 
2.1.1.2.4.2.6.2. Especially fearful users of site (eg elderly) 
2.1.1.2.4.3. Overall severity of harms [0/L/M/H] 
2.1.1.3. Defacement by scratching/abrasion 
2.1.1.3.1. Probability  of crime 
2.1.1.3.2. Overall magnitude of probability [H] 
2.1.1.3.3. Probability depends on  
2.1.1.3.3.1. Design RISURGXFW¶VLQIOXHQFHVRQSUREDELOLW\RIFULPH 
2.1.1.3.3.1.1. Inherent visibility of product  
2.1.1.3.3.1.2. Value (rewarding to offender to damage ± eg scratched tag is well visible and potentially durable/hard to remove; scratching action reveals bright 
surface) 
2.1.1.3.3.1.3. Provocation by distinctive shape 
2.1.1.3.3.1.4. Susceptibility to scratching 
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2.1.1.3.3.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.1.1.3.3.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.1.1.3.3.2.1.1. Accessibility 
2.1.1.3.3.2.1.2. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
2.1.1.3.3.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.1.1.3.3.2.2.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
2.1.1.3.3.2.2.2. Territory of preventer 
2.1.1.3.3.2.3. Offender presence 
2.1.1.3.3.2.4. Offender perception  
2.1.1.3.3.2.5. Offender resources ± brought tools  
2.1.1.3.3.2.5.1. Diamond rings, engraving tools? 
2.1.1.3.3.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found tools  
2.1.1.3.3.2.6.1. Sharp stones etc in vicinity 
2.1.1.3.3.2.7. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.1.1.3.3.2.7.1. Friends urging/supporting misbehaviour ± pressure 
2.1.1.3.3.2.7.2. Slow repair prompts fresh attack by sight of existing damage 
2.1.1.3.3.2.8. Preventer presence/action 
2.1.1.3.3.2.8.1. eg friends urging misbehaviour 
2.1.1.3.3.2.9. Presence of preventers ± users 
2.1.1.3.3.2.9.1. Affected by short/med/long stay 
2.1.1.3.3.2.10. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.1.1.3.3.2.11. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.1.1.3.3.2.12. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.3.3.2.13. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.1.1.3.3.2.13.1.  
2.1.1.3.4. Harm from crime 
2.1.1.3.4.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
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2.1.1.3.4.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± susceptibility to:  
2.1.1.3.4.1.1.1. Temporary spoiling of appearance 
2.1.1.3.4.1.1.2. Permanent wearing or destruction of surface 
2.1.1.3.4.1.2. Post-event: harm from scratches 
2.1.1.3.4.1.2.1. Degradation of surface due to rust, flaking etc (outdoor issue) 
2.1.1.3.4.2. Wider harms 
2.1.1.3.4.2.1. 'HQLDORIXVHGXULQJUHSDLULPSDFWRQFRQYHQLHQFHKDELWXDOGHFLVLRQWRF\FOH« 
2.1.1.3.4.2.2. Cost of repair/replacement 
2.1.1.3.4.2.3. Incivility ± generates general fear of crime  
2.1.1.3.4.2.4. Incivility  - generates specific perceived risk of damage/loss of bike, hence deters parking and use 
2.1.1.3.4.2.5. Aesthetic degradation of site ± environmental quality of life 
2.1.1.3.4.2.6. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.1.1.3.4.2.6.1. Delay/difficulty in cleaning/ repair/ replacement 
2.1.1.3.4.2.6.2. Especially fearful users of site (eg elderly) 
2.1.1.3.4.3. Overall severity of harms [L] 
2.1.2. Misappropriated (Stolen)  
(note ± consider damage from failed theft attempt  as harms from wrecking 1.1.1.1.4. and/or scratching/abrasion 1.1.1.3.4 as appropriate) 
2.1.2.1. Stolen for resale or scrap combined 
2.1.2.1.1. Probability  of crime 
2.1.2.1.2. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
2.1.2.1.3. Magnitude depends on  
2.1.2.1.3.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
2.1.2.1.3.1.1. Inherent visibility of product  
2.1.2.1.3.1.2. Value (rewarding to offender to sell as scrap, or for resale) 
2.1.2.1.3.1.3. Susceptibility to removal ± in pieces or as undamaged whole 
2.1.2.1.3.1.3.1. Ease of cutting stand ± shape, thickness, material (time offender exposed to risk of detection, effort, tool requirement) 
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2.1.2.1.3.1.3.2. Visibility, audibility and obviousness of criminal intent of offender actions in removing stand (risk of detection, effort of any countermoves eg 
deadening cloth) 
2.1.2.1.3.1.3.3. Ease/difficulty with which the stand can be properly anchored to ground in installation 
2.1.2.1.3.1.3.4. Requirement for maintenance of anchoring mechanism eg tightening of bolts 
2.1.2.1.3.1.3.5. Ease of dismounting from anchorage eg requiring specialist tools 
2.1.2.1.3.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.1.2.1.3.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.1.2.1.3.2.1.1. Accessibility ± vehicular access needed close by 
2.1.2.1.3.2.1.2. Space ± for cutting, levering, striking 
2.1.2.1.3.2.1.3. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
2.1.2.1.3.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.1.2.1.3.2.2.1. Territory of preventer 
2.1.2.1.3.2.3. Offender presence 
2.1.2.1.3.2.3.1.1. More likely planned than opportunist 
2.1.2.1.3.2.3.1.2. Possible co-offenders required ± leverage, carrying, lookout etc 
2.1.2.1.3.2.4. Offender perception 
2.1.2.1.3.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
2.1.2.1.3.2.5.1. &XWWHUVVSDQQHUVOHYHUVPRWRUYHKLFOH« 
2.1.2.1.3.2.5.2. Props eg to look like council workers 
2.1.2.1.3.2.6. Preventer presence/action ± users  
2.1.2.1.3.2.6.1. Affected by short/med/long stay 
2.1.2.1.3.2.7. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.1.2.1.3.2.8. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.1.2.1.3.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.1.2.1.3.2.10. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.1.2.1.3.2.10.1.  Trained in challenge/check procedures with purported maintenance people 
2.1.2.1.3.2.11. Wider opportunity structure 
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2.1.2.1.3.2.11.1. Market value of scrap, resale 
2.1.2.1.3.2.11.2. Presence in neighbourhood (or maybe in wider region) of promoters (in wider market eg fences, unscrupulous scrapdealers, end-buyers)  
2.1.2.1.3.2.11.3. Poor installation facilitates theft 
2.1.2.1.4. Harm from crime 
2.1.2.1.4.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design ± see harms from wrecking 1.1.1.1.4 
2.1.2.1.4.2. Wider harms 
2.1.2.1.4.2.1. 'HQLDORIXVHGXULQJUHSODFHPHQWLPSDFWRQFRQYHQLHQFHKDELWXDOGHFLVLRQWRF\FOH« 
2.1.2.1.4.2.2. Cost of repair/replacement 
2.1.2.1.4.2.3. Injury from cutting or tripping 
2.1.2.1.4.2.4. Incivility ± generates general fear of crime  
2.1.2.1.4.2.5. Incivility ± generates specific perceived risk of damage/loss of bike, hence deters parking and use 
2.1.2.1.4.2.6. Aesthetic degradation of site by stump or hole ± environmental quality of life 
2.1.2.1.4.2.7. Resale of stolen stand ± PDQXIDFWXUHU¶VORVVRIOHJLWVDOH 
2.1.2.1.4.2.8. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.1.2.1.4.2.8.1. Delay/difficulty in cleaning/ repair/ replacement 
2.1.2.1.4.2.8.2. Especially susceptible/ fearful users of site (eg blind, elderly) 
2.1.2.1.4.3. Overall severity of harms [M] 
2.1.3. Mishandling 
2.1.3.1. Counterfeited for sale  
2.1.3.1.1. Probability  of crime 
2.1.3.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] Low ± ignore? 
2.2. Resource for crime  
2.2.1. Misused for  
2.2.1.1. A climbing aid for burglary or escaping pursuing police 
2.2.1.1.1. Probability  of crime 
2.2.1.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
2.2.1.1.2. Magnitude depends on  
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2.2.1.1.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
2.2.1.1.2.1.1. Affordance ± visible and looks like something to climb on safely perhaps including when carrying swag 
2.2.1.1.2.1.2. Strength 
2.2.1.1.2.1.3. Grip-nonslip  
2.2.1.1.2.1.4. Climb-up-ability 
2.2.1.1.2.1.5. Climb-down-ability 
2.2.1.1.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.2.1.1.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental 
2.2.1.1.2.2.1.1. Placement where climbing could facilitate crime by access to target enclosure ± eg wall giving access to back garden 
2.2.1.1.2.2.1.2. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
2.2.1.1.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.2.1.1.2.2.2.1. Territory of preventer ± user, passer-by (?if a local) guard/manager 
2.2.1.1.2.2.3. Offender presence 
2.2.1.1.2.2.4. Offender perception 
2.2.1.1.2.2.5. Offender resources - brought 
2.2.1.1.2.2.5.1. Agility, strength, footwear, hands-free swag bag, 
2.2.1.1.2.2.6. Preventer presence ± user  
2.2.1.1.2.2.6.1. Absence or indifference may increase risk of misuse 
2.2.1.1.2.2.7. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.2.1.1.2.2.8. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.2.1.1.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.2.1.1.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.2.1.1.2.2.11. Target 
2.2.1.1.2.2.11.1. Proximity of enclosures/targets for burglary or likely places for street crime (to escape from) 
2.2.1.1.3. Harm from crime 
2.2.1.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design of product 
2.2.1.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± susceptible to:  
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2.2.1.1.3.1.1.1.1. Abrasion from climbing and consequent rusting or flaking 
2.2.1.1.3.1.1.1.2. Bending from climbing 
2.2.1.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
2.2.1.1.3.1.1.2.1. Denial of use if bent out of shape 
2.2.1.1.3.2. Wider harms 
2.2.1.1.3.2.1. Wide range of harms from burglary or from successful evasion of offender from pursuers 
2.2.1.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.2.1.1.3.3.1.1. ? 
2.2.1.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [M] 
2.2.1.2. Deceptive placing of bombs 
2.2.1.2.1. Probability  of crime 
2.2.1.2.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
2.2.1.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
2.2.1.2.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
2.2.1.2.2.1.1. Possibility to hang or lean explosives container/bag on stand 
2.2.1.2.2.1.2. Possible weaponisation of stand ± creates shrapnel ± guides offender choice of site 
2.2.1.2.2.1.3. Visibility, audibility and obviousness of criminal intent of offender actions in placing bomb by/on stand 
2.2.1.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.2.1.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.2.1.2.2.2.1.1. Crowded place, many targets ± value to terrorist 
2.2.1.2.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.2.1.2.2.2.2.1. Provocative to offender ± eg mosque provokes racist  
2.2.1.2.2.2.2.2. Territory of preventer 
2.2.1.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
2.2.1.2.2.2.3.1. Terrorists will do hostile reconnaissance and seek out suitable places 
2.2.1.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
2.2.1.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
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2.2.1.2.2.2.5.1. Bomb, camouflage, possible fastening 
2.2.1.2.2.2.5.2. Props eg to look like council workers 
2.2.1.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
2.2.1.2.2.2.6.1. camouflage ± eg litter 
2.2.1.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.2.1.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/action ± user  
2.2.1.2.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.2.1.2.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.2.1.2.2.2.11. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.2.1.2.2.2.12. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.2.1.2.2.2.13. Wider opportunity structure 
2.2.1.2.2.2.13.1. Local terrorist support network 
2.2.1.2.3. Harm from crime 
2.2.1.2.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
2.2.1.2.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
2.2.1.2.3.1.1.1.1. %ODVWGHVWUXFWLRQOHDVWRIDQ\RQH¶VSUREOHPV 
2.2.1.2.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
2.2.1.2.3.1.1.2.1. Stand weaponised ± becomes shrapnel 
2.2.1.2.3.2. Wider harms 
2.2.1.2.3.2.1. Usual list of harms from terror attack 
2.2.1.2.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.2.1.2.3.3.1.1. Numbers of people present 
2.2.1.2.3.3.1.2. Accessibility for emergency services 
2.2.1.2.3.4. Overall severity of harms [X] 
 
2.2.2. Misbehaved with by 
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2.2.2.1. Climbing onto; sitting on 
2.2.2.1.1. Probability  of crime  
2.2.2.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
2.2.2.1.2. Magnitude depends on  
2.2.2.1.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
2.2.2.1.2.1.1. Strength, slipperiness, sit-onability, climb-up-ability, climb-down-ability 
2.2.2.1.2.1.2. Visibility/appearance in self ± affordance  
2.2.2.1.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.2.2.1.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.2.2.1.2.2.1.1. Configuration for climbing ± eg hand brace from wall 
2.2.2.1.2.2.1.2. Configuration for sitting on ± eg support from wall 
2.2.2.1.2.2.1.3. Accessibility 
2.2.2.1.2.2.1.4. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
2.2.2.1.2.2.1.5. Defensibility 
2.2.2.1.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
2.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.2. Image of area prompts misbehaviour 
2.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.3. Availability of alcohol disinhibits behaviour 
2.2.2.1.2.2.2.2. Territory of preventer 
2.2.2.1.2.2.3. Offender presence 
2.2.2.1.2.2.4. Offender perception  
2.2.2.1.2.2.5. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.2.2.1.2.2.5.1. Regular presence of rowdy youngsters prompts, pressures or provokes misbehaviour 
2.2.2.1.2.2.6. Preventer presence/action ± user 
2.2.2.1.2.2.7. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.2.2.1.2.2.8. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.2.2.1.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
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2.2.2.1.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.2.2.1.3. Harm from crime 
2.2.2.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
2.2.2.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
2.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.1. As per climbing aid 1211 
2.2.2.1.3.2. Wider harms 
2.2.2.1.3.2.1. Noise, nuisance and general misbehaviour 
2.2.2.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.2.2.1.3.3.1.1. Passers-by, residents, shops disturbed/disrupted 
2.2.2.1.3.3.1.2. Perceived threat from gathering/ playing youths 
2.2.2.1.3.3.1.3. Accidental damage from gathering/ playing youths 
2.2.2.1.3.3.1.4. Injury from/to gathering/playing youths 
2.2.2.1.3.3.1.5. Conflict from/among gathering/ playing youths ± eg if stand is located on border between 2 gangs 
2.2.2.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [M] 
2.2.2.2. Bashing to make noise  
2.2.2.2.1. Probability  of crime  
2.2.2.2.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
2.2.2.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
2.2.2.2.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Resonance of stand and quality of anchorage 
2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Visibility/appearance in self ± affordance  
2.2.2.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Acoustics ± good sound/echo 
2.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Accessibility  
2.2.2.2.2.2.1.3. Poor surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting  
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2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Lack of legitimate entertainment supplies time and causes readiness to offend 
2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Image of area prompts misbehaviour 
2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.3. Availability of alcohol disinhibits behaviour 
2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Territory of preventer 
2.2.2.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
2.2.2.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
2.2.2.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
2.2.2.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
2.2.2.2.2.2.6.1. 6WLFNVVWRQHVSLSLQJ« 
2.2.2.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/action or inaction 
2.2.2.2.2.2.7.1. Regular presence of rowdy youngsters prompts, pressures or provokes misbehaviour 
2.2.2.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/action ± users 
2.2.2.2.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
2.2.2.2.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
2.2.2.2.2.2.11. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
2.2.2.2.2.2.12. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
2.2.2.2.3. Harm from crime 
2.2.2.2.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
2.2.2.2.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
2.2.2.2.3.1.1.1.1. bending/denting/abrasion 
2.2.2.2.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
2.2.2.2.3.1.1.2.1. As per climbing aid 1211 
2.2.2.2.3.2. Wider harms 
2.2.2.2.3.2.1. Noise, nuisance and general misbehaviour 
2.2.2.2.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
2.2.2.2.3.3.1.1. Passers-by, residents, shops disturbed/disrupted 
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2.2.2.2.3.3.1.2. Perceived threat from gathering/ playing youths 
2.2.2.2.3.3.1.3. Accidental damage from gathering/ playing youths 
2.2.2.2.3.3.1.4. Injury from/to gathering/playing youths 
2.2.2.2.3.3.1.5. Conflict from/among gathering/ playing youths ± eg if stand is located on border between 2 gangs 
2.2.2.2.3.4. Overall severity of harms [M] 
 
2.3. Mistake (not covered by CCO ± M&S only) 
2.3.1. Mistake  
2.3.1.1. Source of false alarm of terrorism (as with suspicious object leaning against or hanging on stand)  
2.3.1.1.1. Probability  of event 
2.3.1.1.1.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
2.3.1.1.2. Magnitude depends on  
2.3.1.1.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of event 
2.3.1.1.2.1.1. Possibility to hang or lean container/bag on stand, which could contain explosives 
2.3.1.1.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of event 
2.3.1.1.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
2.3.1.1.2.2.1.1. Crowded place, many targets ± value to terrorist 
2.3.1.1.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
2.3.1.1.2.2.2.1. Provocative to offender ± eg mosque provokes racist  
2.3.1.1.3. Harm from crime 
2.3.1.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design 
2.3.1.1.3.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to preventive detonation by security services  
2.3.1.1.3.2. Wider harms 
2.3.1.1.3.2.1. Usual disruptions from a terror false alarm 
2.3.1.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
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2.3.1.1.3.3.1.1. What/who are nearby to be disrupted ± eg major transport interchange, home for elderly to be evacuated 
2.3.1.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [M] 
 
Defacement by shooting/stoning (sign panels) 
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Criminal events,  
their probability and harm,  
and the design and contextual factors influencing these  
for a given designed object or place 
 
3. Furniture in-function - Bike-lock-stand complex  
note that lock could be brought by user and/or a captive lock incorporated within the stand, perhaps also connected to a stand-based cash or card-based money collection 
system. More than one bike could be lockable to the stand.  
3.1. Bike and its components as target of crime  
3.1.1. Mistreatment of bike [could follow from misbehaviour] 
3.1.1.1. Deliberate damage to bike 
3.1.1.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.1.1.1.1. Bike damaged for expressive reasons [could be instrumental for a school protection racket I suppose!] 
 
3.1.2. Misappropriation of entire bike  
3.1.2.1. Theft of bike by detaching stand from anchorage  
3.1.2.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.1.1.1. Unbolt stand; dig out stand foundation; perhaps pre-loosen covertly before bike is parked. Lock may need to be slid off detached stand. 
3.1.2.1.2. Probability of crime  
3.1.2.1.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
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3.1.2.1.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.1.2.1.2.2.1. Design of BLS complex ± influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.1.2.2.1.1. Design of anchorage ± see 112131. Note that stand could be stolen for own value, leaving bike unprotected 
3.1.2.1.2.2.1.2. How far tampering is evident to preventer (user, guard, manager)  
3.1.2.1.2.2.1.3. Visibility, audibility and obviousness of criminal intent of offender actions in detaching stand 
3.1.2.1.2.2.1.4. Space within the complex eg between bike and stand, to deploy tools 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.1. Accessibility 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.2. Space ± to undertake action 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.3. Surveillability in immediate environment from sightlines/ lighting 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.1.4. Defensibility (in absence of designed enclosure) 
                     «%DUULHUVHWFFRQILJXUHGVRRIIHQGHUFDQQRWJHWQHDUHQRXJKIRUDERYHLQVWUXPHQWDO-environment purposes 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.2.1. Territoriality of preventers 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.5.1. Cutters, drills, spanners, levers 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.5.2. Props eg to look like council workers 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.6.1. Levers ± eg tree stakes 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.7.1. Failure of management  to properly install/check/maintain anchorage 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/perception/action - user 
3.1.2.1.2.2.2.9. How long user leaves bike 
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3.1.2.1.2.2.3. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.1.2.1.2.2.4. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.1.2.1.2.2.5. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.1.2.2.6. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.1. Preventer resources 
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.1.1. Knowledge of Perp Technique/s hence alertness to pre-loosening 
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.1.2. Security product ± lock 
                       «ORFNFDQEHVOLGRIIEURNHQGHWDFKHGIURPVWDQG 
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.2. Target ± Bike 
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.2.1. Valuable 
3.1.2.1.2.2.6.2.2. Susceptible to removal 
3.1.2.1.2.3. Wider opportunity structure 
3.1.2.1.2.3.1. Market for stolen bikes conveniently near 
3.1.2.1.2.3.2. Inadequate registration/identification system/ use of such system 
3.1.2.1.3. Harm from crime 
3.1.2.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± complex susceptible to:  
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.1.1. Damage to stand from detaching 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.1.2. Damage to ground from detaching 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.1.3. Damage to bike from sliding off 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of complex 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.2.1. As per wrecking, abrasion 
3.1.2.1.3.1.1.2.2. Damaged bike may be unsafe 
3.1.2.1.3.2. Wider harms 
3.1.2.1.3.2.1. Loss of bike 
3.1.2.1.3.2.1.1. Cost and effort to replace 
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3.1.2.1.3.2.1.2. Sentimental loss 
3.1.2.1.3.2.1.3. Public costs ± Police, CJS 
3.1.2.1.3.2.1.4. Public costs ± less cycling, more use of other less sustainable transport 
3.1.2.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.1.2.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H] 
3.1.2.2. Theft of bike by cutting stand 
3.1.2.2.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.2.1.1. Stand is cut and/or bent to release lock + bike 
3.1.2.2.2. Probability of crime 
3.1.2.2.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
3.1.2.2.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.1.2.2.2.2.1. Design of products/complex ± influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.2.2.2.1.1. Non-susceptibility to cutting (and perhaps to bending if only a single cut possible) ± including time taken to cut through. Target softening ± 
eg tube swivels with movement of saw. 
3.1.2.2.2.2.1.2. Visibility, audibility and obviousness of criminal intent of offender actions in cutting stand  
3.1.2.2.2.2.1.3. Space within the complex eg between bike and stand, to deploy tools 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Accessibility  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Space ± to undertake action 
                       «%HWZHHQVWDQGDQGZDOO 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.1.4. Defensibility 
                      «%DUULHUVHWFFRQILJXUHGVRRIIHQGHUFDQQRWJHWQHDUHQRXJKIRUDERYHLQVWUXPHQWDO-environment purposes 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
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3.1.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Territoriality of preventers 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.5.1. Cutting tools; light source 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.5.2. Sound deadening kit 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.5.3. Props eg to look like council workers 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.6.1. Lever to open up cut 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/perception/action - user 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.8.1. Locking behaviour ± lock deployed properly to deny offender operating space or make action and criminal intent obvious 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.8.2. Surveillance ± spotting/ recognition of criminal intent 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.9. Preventer resources ± user  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.10. Surveillance ± knowledge of how to challenge intent and action to take if criminal 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.11. Lock ± unaffected by cut stand 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.11.1. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.11.2. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.11.3. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.2.2.2.2.11.4. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.2.2.2.3. Target  - bike as lever to open up cut  
3.1.2.2.2.3. Wider opportunity structure 
3.1.2.2.2.3.1. Supply of high performance cutting tools 
3.1.2.2.3. Harm from crime 
3.1.2.2.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to complex itself ± products susceptible to:  
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3.1.2.2.3.1.1.1.1. Damage to stand from cutting 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.1.2. Damage to ground from bending stand 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.1.3. Damage to bike from sliding off 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of complex 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.2.1. As per wrecking, abrasion 
3.1.2.2.3.1.1.2.2. Damaged bike may be unsafe 
3.1.2.2.3.2. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.1.2.2.3.3. Overall severity of harms [M] 
3.1.2.3. Theft of bike by breaking lock  
3.1.2.3.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.3.1.1. Lock is broken/cut to release bike 
3.1.2.3.2. Probability of crime 
3.1.2.3.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [H] 
3.1.2.3.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.1.2.3.2.2.1. Design/configuration of complex ± influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.3.2.2.1.1. Space to insert tool, apply cutter or leverage or other force in right point/ direction/ strength 
3.1.2.3.2.2.1.2. Close-in sightlines to guide these offender actions 
3.1.2.3.2.2.1.3. Resistance of configuration, to aid application of this force to desired point 
3.1.2.3.2.2.1.4. Action has no obvious/unambiguous criminal intent 
3.1.2.3.2.2.1.5. Concealment of action by body of bike 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.1. Target  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.1.1. Bike misused as lever to break lock 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.2.1. Accessibility  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.2.2. Space ± to undertake action 
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3.1.2.3.2.2.2.2.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
                      «(QRXJKOLJKWIRURIIHQGHUWRVHHW\SHRIORFNDQGZKHUHWREULQJIRUFHWREHDU 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.2.4. Defensibility 
                      «%DUULHUVHWFFRQILJXUHGVRRIIHQGHUFDQQRWJHWQHDUHQRXJKIRUDERYHLQVWUXPHQWDO-environment purposes 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.5.1. Cutter, lever, drill, hammer, chisel; light source 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.6.1. Lever, hammer (rock, brick) 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction (here = careless, ignorant or impoverished user who could be turned into a preventer) 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.7.1. Inadequate choice of lock/s 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.7.2. Inadequate deployment/ positioning of locks 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.8. Preventer resources ± user 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.8.1. Inadequate lock ± weak  
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.8.2. Too few locks 
3.1.2.3.2.2.2.8.3. Inadequate knowledge of locks and ways to use them 
3.1.2.3.2.2.3. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.1.2.3.2.2.4. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.1.2.3.2.2.5. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.3.2.2.6. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.3.2.2.6.1. Wider opportunity structure 
3.1.2.3.2.2.6.1.1. Availability of suitable tools 
3.1.2.3.3. Harm from crime 
3.1.2.3.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product/complex 
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3.1.2.3.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product/complex itself ± product susceptible to:  
3.1.2.3.3.1.1.1.1. Abrasion or bending to bike and stand 
3.1.2.3.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product/complex 
3.1.2.3.3.1.1.2.1. Injury to users or passers-by from broken lock 
3.1.2.3.3.1.1.2.2. Litter from lock remains 
3.1.2.3.3.2. Wider harms 
3.1.2.3.3.2.1. Incivilities ± as under damage to furniture 
3.1.2.3.3.2.2. Cyclists specifically deterred from using cycle stands by perceived risk ± fly parking in apparently safer places? 
3.1.2.3.3.2.3. Cyclists deterred from cycling altogether 
3.1.2.3.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.1.2.3.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H] 
 
3.1.2.4. Theft of bike by picking lock [main interest here is in how the configuration facilitates this; less interest in design of lock per se, unless the lock is a captive component o
the stand] 
3.1.2.4.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.4.1.1. Lock is picked to release bike  
3.1.2.4.2. Probability of crime 
3.1.2.4.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [H] 
3.1.2.4.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.1.2.4.2.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.4.2.2.1.1. Mechanism of lock is pickable  
3.1.2.4.2.2.1.2. Configuration of lock+stand+bike allows access, space, sight and application of necessary force for use of lock-picking tools 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.1.1. Accessibility  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.1.2. Space ± to undertake action 
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3.1.2.4.2.2.2.1.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.1.4. Defensibility 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.2. Environment ± motivating  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.5.1. Knowledge of different kinds of locks, their susceptibilities, how to pick them 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.5.2. Lock-picking tools (the more obvious these are required to be, perhaps by virtue of the design of the lock, the more the risk to the 
offender of being arrested for going equipped); light source 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.5.3. Props to look like plausible user, maintenance personnel etc 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.6. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.6.1. Incomplete/improper/entirely omitted locking sequence 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.7. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.8. Preventer resources ± user  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.8.1. Knowledge of operating sequence 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.8.2. Knowledge of crime risks; perhaps of perpetrator techniques involving lock picking 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.8.3. Knowledge and possession of appropriate locks 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.11. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.4.2.2.2.12. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.4.2.2.3. Wider opportunity structure 
3.1.2.4.2.2.3.1. Availability of lock-picking tools, knowledge of susceptibilities etc 
3.1.2.4.3. Harm from crime 
3.1.2.4.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.1.2.4.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
3.1.2.4.3.1.1.1.1. Damage to lock 
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3.1.2.4.3.1.1.1.2. Damage to other elements in order to gain access to lock and apply tools 
3.1.2.4.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
3.1.2.4.3.1.1.2.1. With captive lock, stand may be unlockable until repaired 
3.1.2.4.3.1.1.2.2. With lock non-functional but showing no evidence of tampering, new users may falsely think their bike is secure 
3.1.2.4.3.2. Wider harms 
3.1.2.4.3.2.1. With captive lock, user ceases to trust the stand and may stop using it, or bring own lock which causes damage or is a nuisance eg if bike needs to 
be removed by personnel 
3.1.2.4.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.1.2.4.3.4. ? 
3.1.2.4.3.5. Overall severity of harms [H]  
 
3.1.2.5. Hijacking of bike at point of user locking or unlocking it 
3.1.2.5.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.5.1.1. Robber seizes bike while it is unlocked, but cyclist is dismounted and possibly distracted with parking procedures 
May fill this in but in many respects similar to Robbing cyclist at point of parking, below 
 
3.1.2.6. Theft of bike components and add-ons 
3.1.2.6.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.2.6.1.1. Wheels, saddle, mudguards etc removed leaving bike frame in place; or frame removed leaving wheel in place; unsecured items eg lights, pump, helmet 
removed leaving bike in place 
3.1.2.6.2. Probability of crime 
3.1.2.6.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [H] 
3.1.2.6.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.1.2.6.2.2.1. Design of complex ± influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.6.2.2.1.1. Bike ± ease of removability of components/add-ons [not taken further here] ± by undoing or breaking 
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3.1.2.6.2.2.1.2. Lock/locks  
3.1.2.6.2.2.1.2.1. Extent to which they protect the components/add-ons (eg with cable or protrusions of arms threaded through) 
3.1.2.6.2.2.1.2.2. Security of lock itself (see breaking, picking above) 
3.1.2.6.2.2.1.3. Stand and configuration as a whole  
3.1.2.6.2.2.1.3.1. Extent of access to components/add-ons to enable undoing/breaking, and their removal once freed from bike 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.1. Target 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.1.1. Components hard to conceal when escaping; add-ons may be easy to conceal 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.1.2. Items non-traceable (no property marking/registration) 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.2.1. Accessibility  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.2.2. Space ± to undertake action 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.2.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.2.4. Defensibility 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.3. Offender presence 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.5.1. Tools ± for undoing and/or cutting and breaking; light source 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.5.2. Knowledge of ways to undo or otherwise release components 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.7.1. 2ZQHU¶VFKRLFHRIELNHZLWKHDVLO\UHPRYHGFRPSRQHQWVRUDGG-ons  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.7.2. 2ZQHU¶VIDLOXUHWRUHPRYHFRPSRQHQWVDGG-ons on leaving bike 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.9. Preventer resources ± user 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.9.1. Knowledge of risks and preventive actions 
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3.1.2.6.2.2.2.9.2. Pockets to carry add-ons in, place to store removed wheels etc 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.10. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.11. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.12. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.6.2.2.2.13. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.1.2.6.2.2.3. Wider opportunity structure 
3.1.2.6.2.2.3.1. Market for components/ add-ons 
3.1.2.6.3. Harm from crime 
3.1.2.6.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.1.2.6.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
3.1.2.6.3.1.1.1.1. Damage during removal ± to remainder of bike, to stand 
3.1.2.6.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product/complex 
3.1.2.6.3.1.1.2.1. ? 
3.1.2.6.3.2. Wider harms 
3.1.2.6.3.2.1. Safety issues ± no lights, flat tyres, remaining components may be loose/distorted 
3.1.2.6.3.2.2. Bike unrideable  
3.1.2.6.3.2.3. Costs of theft 
3.1.2.6.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.1.2.6.3.3.1. Where/how user has to travel to; whether day or night 
3.1.2.6.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H]  
 
3.1.3. Misuse 
3.1.3.1. Theft of bike  
3.1.3.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.1.3.1.1.1. Using bike as lever to break lock [covered elsewhere] 
 125 
 
 
3.2. Parking money as target of crime [if payment system built into stand] 
3.2.1. Mishandling 
3.2.1.1. Fraud with parking money 
3.2.1.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.2.1.1.1.1. A wide range of methods of offending (with associated resources) depending on exact details of money-collection system ± mechanical, electronic,
procedural. Goal is either to obtain cash from machine/legitimate users, or to fraudulently obtain free bike parking.  
Use generic risk entries to work out the risk possibilities and influence of design and context ± eg environment-instrumental-surveillability 
 
 
3.2.2. Misappropriation with mistreatment of installation and/or users 
3.2.2.1. Theft of money by breaking into coin operated mechanism 
3.2.2.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.2.2.1.1.1. Breaking open the cash box in any coin-operated parking mechanism 
3.2.2.1.2. Probability of crime 
3.2.2.1.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [M] 
3.2.2.1.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.2.2.1.2.2.1. Design of product ± influences on probability of crime 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1. Cash box component 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1.1. Cash rather than card payment 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1.2. Susceptibility - can be prised open with reasonably available tools; points of application of force can be seen 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1.3. Looks insufficiently robust so offender not discouraged 
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3.2.2.1.2.2.1.1.4. Value - VWRUHVVXIILFLHQWPRQH\DQGDSSHDUVWRGRVRWRPDNHLWZRUWKRIIHQGHU¶VZKLOH 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2. Rest of complex 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.1. Accessibility to susceptible parts of cash box 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.2. Space to apply tools to cash box 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.3. Light and sightlines to see action point 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.4. Prospect ± Immediate sightlines to avoid being surprised at work by potential preventers 
3.2.2.1.2.2.1.2.5. Concealment ± of body or of actions of offender from potential surveillance by preventers (users, guards, managers, passers-by, 
police 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1. Environment ± instrumental  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.1. Accessibility  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.2. Space ± to undertake action 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.1.4. Defensibility 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.2. Offender perception  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3. Offender resources ± brought  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.1. Knowledge of cashboxes of particular types ± likely content, susceptibilities 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.2. Tools ± SULVLQJOHYHULQJGULOOLQJFXWWLQJ« 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.3.3. Props and explanations to alleviate suspicion and disarm challenge 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.4. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.4.1. Infrequent cash collection builds up money 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.5. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.5.1. Surveillance ± spotting of suspicious behaviour, and response 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.6. Preventer resources ± user 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.6.1. .QRZOHGJHRIRIIHQGHU¶VSHUSHWUDWRUWHFKQLTXHHPSRZHUVVXUYHLOODQFHDQGFKDOOHQJH 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.7. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.8. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
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3.2.2.1.2.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± guardmanager   
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.11. Wider opportunity structure 
3.2.2.1.2.2.2.11.1. Availability of tools, knowhow 
3.2.2.1.3. Harm from crime 
3.2.2.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.2.2.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product itself ± product susceptible to:  
3.2.2.1.3.1.1.1.1. Damage ± no longer functions 
3.2.2.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
3.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.1. Lock may cease to function 
3.2.2.1.3.1.1.2.2. Revenue loss 
3.2.2.1.3.2. Wider harms 
3.2.2.1.3.2.1. Reduced revenue jeopardises financial viability of service 
3.2.2.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.2.2.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H] ?relative to all possible bike-related crimes, or to all crimes in general? 
 
3.2.2.2. Robbing cyclist at point of parking 
3.2.2.2.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
3.2.2.2.1.1. Robber surprises parking cyclist when gets out money RUFDUG WRSD\«VWHDOVPRQH\FDUGZDOOHWRUKDQGEDJ Note ± robbery could also take place in
absence of payment requirement, just using distraction of cyclist with parking procedure 
3.2.2.2.2. Probability of crime 
3.2.2.2.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
3.2.2.2.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
3.2.2.2.2.2.1. Design of product/complex ± influences on probability of crime 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Possibilities for script clash ± ambush/surprise v on-guard ± eg parking cyclist required to turn back on pavement space when inserting 
money or card 
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3.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Extent to which complex impedes view of user 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.3. Slow/fast to make payment ± how long is cash exposed, user distracted by procedure? 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.4. Extent to which complex corners the user  
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.5. Extent to which complex corners the offender 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.6. Defensibility ± can user employ the complex as a barrier to separate self from robber? 
3.2.2.2.2.2.1.7. Defensibility ± FDQUREEHUHPSOR\WKHFRPSOH[DVDEDUULHUWRVHSDUDWHVHOIIURP¶GDQJHURXVSUH\¶RUIURPRWKHUSRWHQWLDOSUHYHQWHUV"  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Target  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.1. Cyclist ± unlikely to resist? Wealthy? 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.2. Sufficient potential targets using site to make it worth waiting 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.1.3. &\FOLVW¶VFDVK 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.1. Accessibility  
                     «6FULSWFODVK± cyclist cornered in wider environment v able to escape 
                     «2.1.2.   Script clash ± UREEHU¶VULVNRIEHLQJFRUQHUHGDQGHYDGLQJSXUVXLWYXVHUVRURWKHUVSXUVXLQJKROGLQJWKHP 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.2. Space ± to undertake action 
                     «5REEHUQHHGVWRNHHSVRPHVSDFHEHWZHHQKLPVHOIDQGYLFWLP± µGDQJHURXVSUH\¶ 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.3. Surveillability in immediate environment  
                        «&RXOGRWKHUVVHHUREEHU\WDNLQJSODFH" 
                        «&RXOGRIIHQGHUVHHRWKHUVDSSURDFKLQJ" 
                        «&&79FRYHU" 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.2.4. Defensibility 
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3.2.2.2.2.2.2.3. Offender presence  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.3.1. Is this an area where many potential offenders present/passing ± eg high incidence of drug misuse? 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.3.2. Does wider context give excuse for offender presence ± eg apparently waiting at nearby bus stop? 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.4. Offender perception  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5. Offender resources ± brought  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.1. Weapon, strength/dangerous appearance (but this needs to be turned off when lurking or perhaps escaping) 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.2. Props and behaviours to lull suspicion 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.3. Distraction/shock/intimidation/control tactics 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.4. Speed of action 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.5. Escape tactics 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.5.6. Familiarity with parking complex and wider environment 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± locally found  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.6.1. Ad-hoc weapons 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.7. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.7.1. User fails to pay attention to people and surroundings 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.7.2. User adopts insecure money-handling procedures eg waving fat wallet around 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.8. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.8.1. Absence of potential challengers or interveners  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.9. Preventer resources ± user/victim 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.9.1. Ability to fight, summon help eg with voice or alarm, pursue, identify offender 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.10. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.11. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.12. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.13. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
3.2.2.2.2.2.2.13.1. Alarm to distract robber, summon assistance 
3.2.2.2.2.2.3. Wider opportunity structure 
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3.2.2.2.2.2.3.1. Market for stolen cards etc 
3.2.2.2.3. Harm from crime 
3.2.2.2.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
3.2.2.2.3.1.1. Cash/card requirement contributes to loss of  these, with various knock-on consequences 
3.2.2.2.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to product/complex itself ± susceptible to:  
3.2.2.2.3.1.1.1.1. Damage during scuffle, escape 
3.2.2.2.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
3.2.2.2.3.1.1.2.1. As per deliberate damage  
3.2.2.2.3.2. Wider harms 
3.2.2.2.3.2.1. All usual harms caused by robbery to individuals including trauma and possible injury  
3.2.2.2.3.2.2. Collective harms to area reputation, fear of crime etc 
3.2.2.2.3.2.3. Unwillingness to use cycle facility 
3.2.2.2.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
3.2.2.2.3.3.1. People particularly susceptible/vulnerable ± HOGHUO\\RXQJ« 
3.2.2.2.3.3.2. Things to bump into, to fall onto when being pushed 
3.2.2.2.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H] ?relative to all possible bike-related crimes, or to all crimes in general? 
 
4.  
 
4.1.1.1. Robbing cash collector 
4.1.1.1.1. Details of Perp Technique/s 
4.1.1.1.1.1. Robber surprises cash collector when arrives to empty cash box 
Similar to robbing user but preventer will have more resources and maybe co-preventer. Will depend on design of cash box removal design and procedure 
4.1.2. Bike-lock-stand complex as Environment of crime 
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4.1.3. Misbehaviour  
4.1.3.1. Conflict over parking ± bike jam 
4.1.3.1.1. Details of how crime unfolds 
4.1.3.1.1.1. Bikes secured either side of 1 stand could damage or block removal of each other, leading to conflict between users, resulting in insult, injury, damage, 
UHWDOLDWRU\WKHIW« 
4.1.3.1.2. Probability of crime 
4.1.3.1.2.1. Overall magnitude of probability [L] 
4.1.3.1.2.2. Magnitude depends on  
4.1.3.1.2.2.1. Design of product/complex ± influences on probability of crime 
4.1.3.1.2.2.1.1. Basic design of stand  
4.1.3.1.2.2.1.1.1. When used as designer intended ± does it cater for more than one bike?  
                     «'RELNHVRIFRPPRQGHVLJQJHWLQWKHZD\RIHDFKRWKHUZKHQSDUNHGZKHQEHLQJSDUNHGXQSDUNHG"&DQWKLVOHDd to damage 
of other bike/s and/or significant blockage time? 
4.1.3.1.2.2.1.1.2. When used not as designer intended 
                     «,VLWSRVVLEOHIRUPRUHWKDQRQHELNHWREHSDUNHGRQVWDQG"$QGRULVLWSRVVLEOHIRUWKRXJKWOHVVXVHUWRORFNRWKHUXVHU¶VELNHLQ
eg by threading lock arm/cable round own and other bike? 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2. Contextual influences on probability of crime 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.1. Target ± in case of assault, target could be other user, or their bike ± with former, see crime promoter for active aspects of behaviour 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2. Environment ± instrumental  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2.1. Surveillability in immediate environment  
                     «$FWXDORUSRWHQWLDORYHUVLJKWE\RWKHUXVHUVSDVVHUV-by or guards as preventers may cause conflicting parties to moderate their 
aggressive behaviour 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.2.2. Defensibility 
                     «  Can complex + environment shield victim from assault? Or corner victim?  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3. Environment ± motivating  
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4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3.1. Could poor lighting cause people and or their bikes to collide in dark? 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.3.2. Does the environment (and/or the complex) force users into close physical proximity (eg when pushing past one another to leave the 
site), which could be provocative? 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.4. Offender presence 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.4.1. Is this an area where habitually aggressive people, or those who are drunk, may use bike stands? Beware of sweeping 
generalisations! 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.5. Offender perception  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.6. Offender resources ± brought  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.6.1. Is this an area where habitually knife-carrying people may use bike stands? 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.7. Offender resources ± locally found  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.7.1. Availability of bottles, bricks etc in vicinity for adventitious weapons 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.8. Promoter presence/perception/action or inaction 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.8.1. Pressure ± generating motivation for conflict by bad parking behaviour 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.8.2. Provocation ± aggressive behaviour as argument unfolds 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.8.3. Inadequate site maintenance, leaving bottles, bricks etc lying around 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.9. Preventer presence/perception/action ± user   
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.10. Preventer resources ± user  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.10.1. Attack alarm? Audibility may depend on background noise level and if anyone present to hear and act 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.10.2. µ&RROLW¶VNLOOV 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.11. Preventer presence/perception/action ± passer-by  
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.12. Preventer resources ± passer-by 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.13. Preventer presence/perception/action ± guard/manager   
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.14. Preventer resources ± guard/manager   
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.14.1. Alarm to distract conflicting parties, summon assistance 
4.1.3.1.2.2.2.14.2. µ&RROLW¶VNLOOV 
4.1.3.1.3. Harm from crime 
4.1.3.1.3.1. Immediate harms mediated by Design  of product 
 133 
4.1.3.1.3.1.1. Possible injury from being shoved against complex? 
4.1.3.1.3.1.1.1. Criminal event: harm to complex itself ± product susceptible to:  
4.1.3.1.3.1.1.1.1. Damage from being bumped into or being deliberately attacked as part of the conflict 
4.1.3.1.3.1.1.2. Post-event: harm from design of product 
4.1.3.1.3.1.1.2.1. As per damage to bike and/or stand 
4.1.3.1.3.2. Wider harms 
4.1.3.1.3.2.1. Unpleasantness, trauma, injury 
4.1.3.1.3.2.2. Unwillingness of user to return to use stand on this site 
4.1.3.1.3.2.3. User deterred from cycling 
4.1.3.1.3.3. Contextual influences on wider harm 
4.1.3.1.3.3.1. Things to bump into, to fall onto 
4.1.3.1.3.4. Overall severity of harms [H ?relative to all possible bike-related crimes, or to all crimes in general? 
 
4.1.3.2. Conflict with other user/s over parking ± competition for scarce spaces [incomplete] 
4.1.3.2.1. Details of how crime unfolds 
4.1.3.2.1.1. Conflict between users due to demand for spaces exceeding supply  
 
4.1.3.3. Conflict with guard/manager over parking ± infringement of regulations etc [incomplete] 
4.1.3.3.1. Details of how crime unfolds 
4.1.3.3.1.1. Conflict between users due to guard/manager seeking to enforce regulations ± perhaps leading to insult, threat, assault, damage  
 
4.1.3.4. Conflict with pedestrian ± blockage 
4.1.3.4.1. Details of how crime unfolds 
4.1.3.4.1.1. Parked bike left in way of pedestrians ± argument ensues 
 134 
 
4.1.3.5. Conflict with pedestrian ± Collision/cut-up 
4.1.3.5.1. Details of how crime unfolds 
4.1.3.5.1.1. Cyclist collides with/cuts up pedestrian whilst approaching stand ± argument ensues 
 
 
 
 
 
 
